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SUMMARY ABSTRACT 
Increasing anthropogenic influence has left no corner of the natural world 
untouched. As the negative impacts of people on the natural world have become 
more prominent, pro-conservation actions have been incentivised across scales, 
from individual to societal to intergovernmental. Clashes over conservation 
objectives, when there is a perception that one party is asserting its interests at the 
expense of the other, is termed Conservation Conflict, and causes negative 
outcomes for biodiversity and people. Conservation conflicts are complex 
problems, the successful management of which can rarely be undertaken 
unilaterally, for both practical and ethical reasons. Finding the best ways for 
encouraging social interactions and cooperative behaviours are therefore vital in 
managing conservation conflict. 
I take a conservation conflict surrounding the damaging of crops by hyper-
abundant flocks of wild geese across Scotland as a case study to explore the roles of 
social interactions in conservation conflict. In Chapter 2 I start at the network scale 
by modelling the interactions between individuals and organisations involved in 
the goose conflict at two locations. I test the networks for the prevalence of 
particular sets of network configurations which represent individuals forming 
interactions in response to either a coordination problem (where solutions are 
sought and implemented efficiently to tackle an agreed goal) or to a cooperation 
problem (where goals are not shared, and for which solutions must be sought 
through negotiation). I find that interaction networks in both locations were 
formed in response to, and have the function to tackle, coordination problems. 
This is useful for dealing with coordination problems such as the practical 
management of geese. Interaction networks formed in response to, and having the 
function to tackle, cooperation problems were less prevalent. This presents a 
problem when collective problem solving requires negotiation, such as for 
managing conservation conflict. Networks at both locations would benefit from 
forming certain types of interactions to strengthen the network for future 
cooperation problems. 
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To effectively manage conservation conflicts in-depth knowledge of the 
cooperative behaviours of the people involved is required. In Chapter 3 I use 
stakeholder interviews, to investigate how and why individual members of three 
important stakeholder groups (farmers & crofters, conservation managers, and 
shooters) cooperated with one another and what barriers to cooperation they 
faced. I identify three dimensions of cooperation in the goose conflict: i) that the 
lack of horizontal interactions (between actors who interact with others at a 
similar organisational scale, for example farmers communicating with other 
farmers or conservation project managers communicating with other conservation 
project managers) and vertical interactions (between actors across different 
organisational scales, for example farmers communicating with farming union 
representatives, or conservation project managers communicating with senior 
management) linking widely distributed actors meant both shared learning and 
the perception of fairness suffer. Building up horizontal and vertical interactions 
could bypass these scientific and political barriers; ii) a false belief in uniformity 
among stakeholder groups can be the source of poor system understanding, which 
can be prevented by developing wider or alternative stakeholder representation; 
and iii) for long-term, complex issues, identification and discussion of trade-offs is 
needed to avoid poor outcomes throughout the process, not just at the planning 
stages.  
Laboratory experiments with volunteers show cooperation is less likely in the 
presence of uncertainty. Much less is known about how stakeholders in real-life 
conservation conflicts respond to different types of uncertainty. In Chapter 4, I test 
the effect of different sources of uncertainty on cooperative behaviour using a 
framed field experiment and interviews with crofters in Scotland. The experiment 
compared a baseline scenario of perfect certainty with scenarios including either: i) 
scientific uncertainty about the effectiveness of a conflict-reduction intervention; 
ii) administrative uncertainty about intervention funding; or iii) political 
uncertainty about the extent of community support. I find that crofters’ intention 
to cooperate is high but lessened by uncertainty, especially over the commitment 
from other stakeholders to cooperate on goose management. I conclude that 
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existing cooperation on goose management may be at risk if uncertainty isn’t 
reduced outright or if commitments between parties are not strengthened. To 
avert this issue researchers and government advisers need to: i) determine how 
uncertainty will impact intention of stakeholders to cooperate; and ii) take steps 
(such as uncertainty reduction, communication, or acceptance) to reduce the 
negative impact of uncertainty on cooperation. 
In Chapter 5 I use the findings from Chapters 2 to 4 in conjunction with a 
conservation conflict management tool to evaluate goose conflict management in 
Scotland. I find many existing structures and processes of goose conflict 
management in Scotland were successful, but in order to build on these successes I 
propose several practical interventions. Increasing interactions between disparate 
groups; building data commons for shared learning; identification, 
acknowledgement, discussion and inclusion of trade-offs as they emerge; and 
making commitments to balance and fairness across the system. Enacting these 
recommendations would give goose conflict management in Scotland greater 
ability to deliver positive outcomes in what is a highly dynamic issue. 
This thesis uses mixed methods to investigate the role of social interaction in 
conservation conflict. The work succeeds in both identifying interventions specific 
for managing the goose conflict in Scotland and developing the theory of social 
interactions and cooperation in conservation conflict management more widely.  
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Chapter 1 
 
General introduction 
 
 
1.1 CONSERVATION CONFLICT 
1.1.1 What is conservation conflict? 
Conservation conflict is defined by Redpath et al. (2013) as ‘situations that occur 
when two or more parties with strongly held opinions clash over conservation 
objectives and when one party is perceived to assert its interests at the expense of 
another.’ The first part of the definition specifies conservation conflict occurs 
regarding wildlife, but between people. This differentiates conservation conflict 
from ‘human-wildlife conflict’ which occurs when the needs and actions of wildlife 
impact negatively on humans, or vice versa (Madden 2004; Woodroffe et al. 2005). 
Human-wildlife conflict is similar to the earlier concept of ‘animal damage’ 
(Conover 2001) where people suffer negative consequences from living with 
wildlife, but human-wildlife conflict repositions wildlife as an actor consciously in 
opposition to humans (Peterson et al. 2010). This can lead to people directing 
anger and frustration onto wildlife, allowing those who advocate on wildlife’s 
behalf to be portrayed as rational representatives rather than individuals driven by 
values and subjectivity themselves (Peterson et al. 2010). By re-establishing the 
framing to have people embedded within an ecological system, conservation 
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conflict concentrates on interactions between people, leaving ‘biodiversity impacts’ 
to describe the outcomes of human-biodiversity interactions (Young et al. 2010; 
White et al. 2009). The second part of the definition of conservation conflict, the 
requirement for a perception of one party asserting their interests at the other’s 
expense, builds on the concept that all people involved in a conflict are driven by 
attitudes and values. It is a threat or imposition to these values which turns a 
disagreement into a conflict (Redpath et al. 2013).  
1.1.2 The impacts of conservation conflict 
Human pressure on the environment is unsustainable at current or even much 
reduced levels (Arrow et al. 1995). The global conservation response has led to 
increased incentives for governments and society to undertake pro-conservation 
actions, for example under the umbrellas of the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals (United Nations 2018) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services (Díaz et al. 2015). This has resulted in a tension between 
building social foundations for living a good life (such as social equality, clean 
water, food security, peace, and livelihoods) and limiting processes which cross 
planetary boundaries (such as biodiversity loss, climate change, and land 
conversion) (Raworth 2017). Conservation conflicts are the symptoms of these 
social-environmental tensions: legally protected Indian elephants damage crops 
and cause loss of life (Gubbi 2012), local people in Tanzania lack formal rights to 
sustainably access resources in protected areas, worsening livelihood insecurity 
(Vedeld et al. 2012), and active forest restoration in Latin America can cause net 
losses in tourism and livestock production revenue (Birch et al. 2010). Conservation 
conflicts negatively pervade all these social and environmental dimensions as well 
as being taxonomically (e.g. Johnson et al. 2015; Woodroffe & Redpath 2015; 
Simmonds & Brown 2010) and geographically (e.g. Woodroffe et al. 2005; Nyhus 
2016; Lemly et al. 2000) widespread. Conflicts can have positive effects such as 
increased dialogue and creative problem solving (Young et al. 2010), but their 
severity and ubiquity present a major challenge in conservation science and 
practice (Redpath et al. 2015). 
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1.1.3 Types of conservation conflict 
Conservation conflict is a social-ecological example of a wicked problem (Redpath 
et al. 2015; Mason, Pollard et al. 2018); an intractable issue emergent from a 
complex system, which is hard to define, and lacks clear solutions (Rittel & Webber 
1973). The characteristics of a complex social-ecological system include non-linear 
dynamics with thresholds, multiple feedback loops, time lags, resilience, 
heterogeneity, and high levels and multiple sources of uncertainty (Liu et al. 2007). 
Conservation conflicts are thus hard to type based on their underlying cause, as 
they change and evolve over time. However, six broad categories of conflict have 
been outlined (Jones et al. 2005; Young et al. 2010) (Table 1). Conflicts will often 
overlap between several categories at any given time. 
 
Table 1 - Typology of conservation conflict, adapted from Jones et al. (2005) and Young et 
al. (2010). Actors can be people, groups or organisations. 
Category Source of conflict 
Conflict of interest Actors want different things from the same habitat or 
system 
 
Beliefs & values Actors hold different normative perceptions on the 
value or use of wildlife 
 
Process Actors approach a problem favouring different 
methods 
 
Information Knowledge is missing, uncertain or perceived 
differently by different actors 
 
Social structure Actors interact within social, legal, economic and 
political arrangements, which harbour latent problems 
of their own 
 
Interpersonal Individual actors or groups have personal differences 
with one another, such as issues with trust or 
communication 
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1.1.4 Tackling conflicts and impacts 
As conservation conflict is distinct from biodiversity impacts, so approaches to 
their respective management differ also. Management of biodiversity impacts 
focusses on technical fixes to reduce the incidence or intensity of impact, for 
instance scaring geese from crops (Simonsen et al. 2016), fencing elephants out of 
agriculture (King et al. 2017), culling badgers to prevent the spread of disease 
(Donnelly et al. 2006) and removal of an invasive seagrass (Lubell et al. 2017). 
Alternatively or additionally, compensatory instruments can be used to offset 
impacts on people (Nyhus et al. 2005, e.g. McKenzie 2014; Ogra & Badola 2008). 
The success of technical and compensatory methods may be limited for addressing 
conservation conflict as they do not confront the roots of underlying complexity 
(Table 1) (Young et al. 2010; Redpath et al. 2015). Overreliance on technical and 
compensatory approaches can lead to continuation or exacerbation of the conflict 
(Young et al. 2010; DeFries & Nagendra 2017). 
1.1.5 Mapping and managing conflict 
To tackle conservation conflict, rather than just biodiversity impacts, Redpath et 
al. (2013) proposed an iterative roadmap. Activities along the roadmap are split into 
mapping the conflict and managing the conflict, both of which rely on an 
interdisciplinary set of skills required to navigate the inherent complexity 
(Dickman 2010; Pooley et al. 2017). Mapping the conflict is about building an 
accurate picture of the situation, starting with the identity, circumstances, values, 
and goals, of stakeholders. Then, to provide the context in which stakeholders live 
and operate, ecological, political, economic and sociological data are gathered, 
including data gaps and uncertainties (Redpath et al. 2013).  
Managing the conflict is about developing and implementing a mechanism for 
stakeholders to identify and test potential solutions. If a party has the power to 
develop and implement actions without inclusion of all stakeholders, the result can 
be top-down solutions imposed upon others (Reed & Sidoli Del Ceno 2015; Redpath 
et al. 2015; Kahane 2017). However, the more complex a problem the less likely it is 
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that unilateral solutions exist, and the more likely that cooperation rather than 
imposition will result in more positive progress (Henmati 2002; Kahane 2017). A 
multi-stakeholder, participatory approach (MSPA) for managing complex 
conservation problems, which often involve conflict, uses cooperation rather than 
imposition to make progress (Henmati 2002; Kahane 2017). MSPAs enhance 
conservation conflict management by including diversity of viewpoints, increasing 
trust, generating shared learning, developing networks for future cooperation, and 
increasing perceived fairness (Henmati 2002; Reed 2008; Balint et al. 2011; Young, 
Jordan, R. Searle, et al. 2013; Bodin 2017). But no process is a panacea for complex 
social-ecological problems (Ostrom et al. 2007); MSPAs demand a high level of 
social resources (time, funding, and commitment) and as such can be easily 
derailed (Reed 2008; Balint et al. 2011; Young, Searle, et al. 2016). The conflict may 
be so severe that an MSPA is not possible (Henmati 2002). MSPAs having been 
shown to build cooperation during conservation conflict (Dickman 2010). For 
example, an MSPA including fishers, wildlife tourism operators, scientists and 
government cooperated to resolve a conflict surrounding the predation of 
commercially important salmon by seals in Scotland (Butler et al. 2015). Despite 
this, there remains a need to better recognise, understand and stimulate 
cooperative behaviours between stakeholders. 
1.2 COOPERATION IN CONSERVATION CONFLICT 
1.2.1 Cooperative behaviours 
Cooperative behaviours include sharing information, exploring others’ interests, 
needs and perspectives, working together on a problem, and actively seeking 
win/win solutions. Conversely, withholding information, arguing from fixed 
positions, attacking others’ positions, and actively seeking purely self-winning 
solutions are adversarial behaviours (Pound 2015). Cooperation to tackle a complex 
problem requires individuals adopting cooperative behaviours on a scale to match 
the issue. 
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At the actor scale, researchers can simplify these behaviours into strategic 
‘cooperate or defect’ behaviours.  Analysis of these data via game theory has been 
suggested as a means to understand social interactions in conservation conflict 
(Frank & Sarkar 2010; Colyvan et al. 2011) and as a way to potentially identify win-
win solutions (Redpath et al. 2013). Experimental economics can be used to test 
game theoretical predictions about cooperative behaviour in social-ecological 
systems. For example, Barrett & Dannenberg (2012) used volunteers in lab 
experiments to investigate decision making in the context of climate change 
negotiations, showing how uncertainty of the position of a carbon emission 
threshold resulted in less cooperation than uncertainty surrounding the impacts of 
exceeding that threshold. In the field Travers et al. (2011) played a game with 
stakeholders in Cambodia, showing how treatments that promoted cooperation 
between players through self-organisation had the greatest effect in reducing 
individual extraction of a valuable common-pool resource. These research methods 
are highly sensitive to experimental design and can be limited in their external 
validity (Redpath, et al. 2018), so richer data on the test system are required to 
draw system-wide conclusions. 
At the system scale, social interactions between multiple pairs of actors combine to 
form network level structures. Networks have been used to study cooperation of 
orangutan conservation organisations in Borneo (Morgans et al. 2017), cross-scale 
cooperation of actors in a large-scale conservation restoration project in Australia 
(Guerrero et al. 2015), and to unpick the links between actors who hold opposing 
views in a hunting conflict in Malta (Veríssimo & Campbell 2015). The structure of 
a social interaction network can impact how well its actors can tackle certain types 
of problems (Berardo & Scholz 2010; Lubell et al. 2012). For instance, ‘coordination 
problems’ which are characterised by multiple actors holding broadly shared or 
non-competing goals, require efficient organisation of activities and rapid sharing 
of trusted information can be best approached by sparse networks, with well-
connected central hubs (Figure 1 A). Whereas ‘cooperation problems’, 
characterised by actors with opposing or competing goals, require deliberation, 
negotiation, and the checking of unreliable information and actors, are better 
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approached by dense networks, with many shared interactions (Figure 1 B) 
(Berardo & Scholz 2010). Interactions which directly link two actors who are 
otherwise already linked via one or more other actors, are known as ‘redundant’ 
interactions. Managing biodiversity impacts is more akin to a coordination 
problem with shared actor goals, whereas conservation conflict management is a 
cooperation problem of competing actor goals. A major challenge in collaborative 
conservation management is how to form and maintain networks which can 
simultaneously tackle complex cooperation problems and complete efficient 
coordination of relatively simple tasks (Bodin 2017). Due to its complexity, 
conservation conflict is highly context specific (White et al. 2009). To gain new 
understanding of cooperative behaviours at network scale and between 
individuals, compiling a detailed case study of a conservation conflict is required.  
 
Figure 1 - Example network structures, show a sparse, open network with centralised hubs 
(A), and a dense closed network with many redundant links (B) 
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1.3 A CASE STUDY IN CONSERVATION CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: 
GOOSE CONFLICT IN SCOTLAND 
1.3.1 The impacts & management of hyper-abundant geese 
Wild goose populations are the source of a range of ecosystem services and 
disservices (Buij et al. 2017). Cultural services benefiting birdwatchers, 
conservationists, wildfowl hunters, and researchers are traded-off with 
provisioning disservices of crop damage for which they are regarded by farmers as 
a pest (Buij et al. 2017). Disagreements about how service and disservice trade-offs 
are managed can cause conservation conflict (Ceaușu et al. 2018). Goose 
population recoveries to hyper-abundance in Europe and North America are 
applauded as conservation success stories of habitat management and legislation, 
although much of the increase is attributable to abundant anthropogenic food 
sources and recent warming of breeding grounds due to climate change (Fox et al. 
2017; Mason, Keane et al. 2018).  
Some hyper-abundant populations are now viewed as too large (Lefebvre et al. 
2017; Fox & Madsen 2017; Anderson et al. 2018). In Canada and the U.S. the greater 
snow goose Anser caerulescens atlanticus population grew from 3000 individuals in 
the early twentieth century to over 700,000 in the 1990s, with the resulting 
overpopulation responsible for habitat degradation in autumn and spring staging 
posts and damage to crops in both countries (Lefebvre et al. 2017). In Scandinavia 
and the Low Countries, the Svalbard population of pink-footed goose Anser 
brachyrhynchus increased at a rate of 3.6% per annum between 1965 and 2013, to 
reach 76,000. The large and growing population was degrading vulnerable tundra 
vegetation in the breeding grounds of Svalbard and causing conflict via crop 
damage in Norway (Madsen, et al. 2017; Fox & Madsen 2017).  
There are four main tactics to manage geese and their impacts (reviewed by Fox et 
al. (2017)): population management, scaring, provision of alternative feeding areas, 
and payment of compensation to farmers. Population management requires 
coordinated shooting at an organisational level appropriate to the goose 
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population (local, regional, national, international) and takes the form of culls (e.g. 
greylag geese in Scotland (Bainbridge 2017)) or changes in seasonal hunting (bag) 
limits (e.g. snow geese in North America (Lefebvre et al. 2017)). Scaring of geese 
through visual and / or audible stimuli is conducted to move geese away from 
crops. Efforts to scare geese are usually carried out by impacted individuals at the 
farm level, rather than via larger scale coordination. At the landscape scale, 
benefits accrued from individuals scaring geese become non-excludable, and 
people are impacted beyond the individual farm level as goose populations change 
in size and location (Zhang et al. 2007). Alternative feeding areas involve planting 
or maintenance of food sources more preferable to the geese than the crops to be 
protected (e.g. maintenance of high quality grassland for Greenland barnacle geese 
in Islay (McKenzie & Shaw 2017)). This requires agreement by people on whose 
land the geese are feeding, and can include compensation (McKenzie & Shaw 
2017). Compensating farmers for lost crops (as opposed to provision of alternative 
feeding areas) has been effective in reducing economic impacts of goose damage 
(e.g. Svalbard pink-footed geese in Norway (Tombre et al. 2013a)). However, long-
term payments, especially if they rise as goose populations continue to grow, 
maybe politically unpopular or economically impossible to maintain (Fox et al. 
2017). None of these methods for decreasing the negative impacts of hyper-
abundant geese can be successfully applied unilaterally, as even a single farmer 
scaring geese from their crops is affecting and affected by their neighbours.  
1.3.2 Goose management in Scotland 
In Scotland the impacts on agriculture of rising numbers of two goose species, 
Greenland barnacle geese Branta leucopsis and British greylag geese Anser anser 
resulted in the formation of the National Goose Forum by Scottish Government in 
1997, subsequently replaced by the National Goose Management Review Group 
(NGMRG) in 2001. The NGMRG remains the national level body for goose issues in 
Scotland and includes representatives of Scottish Government, conservation 
organisations, shooting interests, and farming and crofting interests. Crofts are 
small-scale farms of typically 5 ha, culturally unique to the more remote and less 
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productive areas of the Highlands and Islands of Scotland and legally distinct from 
farming at a more commercial scale. The multi-stakeholder NGMRG has three 
shared objectives: meet the UK’s nature conservation obligations for geese, within 
the context of wider biodiversity objectives; minimise economic losses experienced 
by farmers and crofters as a result of the presence of geese; and maximise the value 
for money of public expenditure (Crabtree et al. 2010). The NGMRG receives 
scientific and technical guidance from the Goose Science Advisory Group (GSAG). 
The NGMRG, aware of the importance of local context for goose management, 
distributed decision-making and responsibility to specially formed Local Goose 
Management Review Groups (LGMGs, Figure 2), which were responsible for 
implementing the NGMRG objectives in their respective contexts. Each LGMG is 
funded by Scottish Government and coordinated by the local Scottish Natural 
Heritage (SNH) office along with representatives from local stakeholder groups; 
mainly Scottish Government, conservation organisations, farmers and crofters, and 
wildfowl shooters. LGMGs construct their own schemes by blending methods to 
manage geese and their impacts, such as population reduction, scaring, and farmer 
payments for goose feeding areas. All LGMGs use annual goose counts and harvest 
data to model goose populations and set future targets for shooting. 
Barnacle geese on Islay 
The Greenland population of barnacle geese, overwintering in Islay, have increased 
from c. 3000 in 1952 to a peak of 46,000 in 2016, with agricultural damage 
increasing greatly in the past 20 years (WWT 2017; McKenzie & Shaw 2017). 
Greenland barnacle geese are Annex 1 listed under Article 9 of the EC Birds 
Directive, requiring member states to take measures to ensure survival of the 
species and prohibiting hunting unless under specific circumstances. Management 
in Islay involves scaring, population reduction, designated refuge areas, and 
payments to farmers for sacrificial land (Figure 2, Mckenzie 2014; McKenzie & 
Shaw 2017). Conservation NGOs Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) 
and Wildfowl & Wetlands Trust (WWT) jointly lodged a complaint to the 
European Commission in contest to the population reduction of barnacle geese on 
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Islay (RSPB Scotland & WWT 2015) and withdrew their representatives from the 
NGMRG (Scottish Natural Heritage 2015). Local RSPB representatives are still 
involved in LGMGs at some locations. Payments to farmers account for £0.9m of 
the annual £1.6m goose management programme on Islay (Figure 2). The current 
Islay Sustainable Goose Management Strategy began in 2014 and runs until 2024 
(McKenzie 2014). 
Greylag geese across Scotland 
There are several breeding populations of native greylag geese at year-round 
locations in Scotland. Greylag geese have recovered from c. 500 breeding birds in 
the 1930s which were mostly restricted to the Outer Hebrides, to breed at various 
locations totalling c. 40,000 (Mitchell et al. 2012; Bainbridge 2017). A number of 
local greylag populations of 1,000 – 25,000 have caused damage to standing crops 
during the spring and summer growing season and to pasture intended for 
livestock throughout the year (Crabtree et al. 2010). Greylag geese are amber listed 
in the UK due to breeding localisation, but are classified by IUCN as Least Concern 
globally (Eaton et al. 2015; IUCN 2016). All birds in the UK are protected by law 
while nesting, and greylag geese are named in assessments of protected areas such 
as the South Uist Machair and Lochs RAMSAR site in the Uists, meaning the 
Scottish government have a responsibility to maintain breeding populations of the 
species locally (Scottish Government, 2019). Conversely, several UK wildfowl 
species including greylag goose are legally hunted during the winter open season 
(September to February). Agricultural damage caused by British greylag geese has 
resulted in four adaptive management pilot schemes in the Orkney Islands, the 
Uists, Harris & Lewis, and Coll & Tiree (Figure 2). Adaptive management is an 
iterative method of testing and monitoring management options to guide future 
decision making (McCarthy & Possingham 2007). Each pilot scheme allows 
additional hunting periods for controlled population reduction outwith the open 
season, carried out by volunteers and or paid shooters. No payments are made to 
farmers for sacrificial land in any of the adaptive management pilots, unlike the 
case in Islay (Figure 2) 
12 
 
1.3.3 Current status of goose conflict management in Scotland 
Management of geese in Scotland has key elements of conservation conflict 
management (Crabtree et al. 2010): National and local level participatory multi-
stakeholder processes are in place, using formally agreed and shared goals to 
implement goose management actions (Reed & Sidoli Del Ceno 2015); actions are 
knowledge-based using scientific methods (e.g. population modelling) together 
with local experience to mould best-practice strategies to the local context (Young, 
Searle, et al. 2016); and adaptive management allows for flexibility of practice from 
year to year, and the freedom to test novel ideas (McCarthy & Possingham 2007).  
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Figure 2 - Locations of goose conflict in Scotland. Label at each location shows species of 
goose for which the Local Goose Management Group LGMG is responsible for controlling. 
Greylag geese are resident, Greenland barnacle geese are overwintering migrants. Pop: 
goose population in 2016, Target pop: maximum value of the target population range in 
the respective LGMG plan, Cost: cost in £GBP allocated for 2016 (2014 for Islay). 1Greylag 
goose population in Orkney increases to over 75,000 from November to February due to 
overwintering migrants. References: Islay (McKenzie 2014; WWT 2017), Coll & Tiree (SNH 
2016), The Uists (Ferguson 2016), Lewis & Harris (MacFarlane 2016), Orkney Islands 
(Mitchell et al. 2016; Churchill 2016). Goose silhouettes produced by Tom Mason.  
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However, the conflict stubbornly persists. Lethal management of Greenland 
barnacle geese in Islay is still under legal challenge (RSPB Scotland & WWT 2015), 
and conservationists criticise the management project in the media for cruel 
shooting methods based on ‘fundamentally flawed’ science (Edwards 2018). In the 
Uists, community leaders use the media to hit out at goose managers for lack of 
funding (Howarth 2018), comparing the funding they receive (£48k (Ferguson 
2016)) unfavourably with that of the Islay goose project (£1.6m (McKenzie 2014)). 
Thus, goose conflict in Scotland as a case study is mature but still changing, with a 
high level of experience and knowledge available for analysis, and many years of 
forming and breaking collaborations between and within stakeholder groups. 
1.4 THESIS AIMS 
In this thesis I aim to assess the role of social interactions between actors in goose 
conservation conflict in Scotland. I will produce applied recommendations for 
managers and advance the understanding of the structures and processes of 
conservation conflict management more widely. 
 
Chapter 2: Social network analysis of interactions between individual 
and organisational actors in two Scottish goose conflicts 
Here, I use network modelling to see how the accumulation of interactions 
between individuals and organisations involved in the goose conflict shapes 
network scale function. I look to see if individuals are forming interactions in 
response to coordination and or cooperation problems, and how certain groups 
(e.g. organisations perceived as important), influence the formation of interactions. 
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Chapter 3: Understanding cooperation in conflict: learning from goose 
management in Scotland 
In Chapter 3, I explore the circumstances, actions and goals of the three main 
stakeholder groups in the conflict: conservation managers, shooters, and farmers & 
crofters. Using a framework for understanding strategic interactions populated 
with detailed interview data, I ask how and why individuals cooperate towards 
management of the conflict and what they perceive as barriers to cooperation. 
 
Chapter 4: The impact of uncertainty on cooperation intent in a 
conservation conflict 
I examine how three realistic sources of uncertainty, that pertaining to scientific, 
administrative or political knowledge, impact cooperation. Using a game theory 
derived experimental economics scenario, I see how intention to cooperate 
between individual crofters’ in the Uists is influenced by each type of uncertainty 
and what individual crofter characteristics are most important for describing 
cooperative behaviour. 
 
Chapter 5: How do we successfully manage goose conflict? 
Finally, I distil learning from Chapters 2, 3 and 4, through a conflict management 
tool to produce a set of policy interventions for building cooperation and preparing 
goose conflict management in Scotland for future surprises.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Social network analysis of 
interactions between 
individual and 
organisational actors in 
two Scottish goose conflicts 
 
 
Chris Pollard, Steve Redpath, Aidan Keane, Juliette Young and Nils Bunnefeld 
conceived the ideas and designed the methodology. CP collected the data with 
Kirsten Brewster. CP analysed the data and wrote the Chapter. Ryan McAllister 
contributed technical advice on network modelling. Drafts of the Chapter were 
commented on by SR, AK, JY, NB, RM, and Luc Bussière. 
  
18 
 
2.1 ABSTRACT 
The pattern of interactions between actors in a policy network: i) reflects the type 
of problems faced by members of the network, and ii) regulates its function to 
tackle these problems, including conservation conflict.  
We modelled policy networks to test for the prevalence of network configurations 
indicative of social processes associated with collective problem solving. Open / 
sparse network configurations represent a response to a coordination problem, 
where solutions are sought and implemented efficiently to tackle an agreed goal, 
whereas closed / dense network configurations represent a response to a 
cooperation problem, where goals are not shared, and for which solutions must be 
sought through negotiation. Network configurations indicative of each type of 
problem are not mutually exclusive, and can occur together in the same network. 
We interviewed 46 individuals involved in a conservation conflict surrounding the 
management of geese at two locations in Scotland, to determine their interactions 
with stakeholder organisations. 
Networks at both locations showed significant overrepresentation of 
configurations indicative of individuals’ responding to coordination problems. 
Additionally, network configurations indicative of individuals’ responding to 
cooperation problems were significantly overrepresented at one location (to a 
lesser extent than the coordination configurations) but not at the other location. 
Interactions between individuals and organisations which were both members of 
the formal local goose management group (LGMG) were not significantly under- or 
overrepresented. Organisations in the group were perceived as significantly more 
important in managing geese by individuals at both locations, and at one location, 
perceived importance was a significant predictor for the formation of interactions 
between individuals and organisations. 
Interaction networks in both locations were formed in response to, and have the 
function to tackle, coordination problems such as the practical management of 
geese. Interaction networks formed in response to, and having the function to 
tackle, cooperation problems were less prevalent. This may be a problem if 
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collective problem-solving requires negotiation, such as for managing conservation 
conflict. Networks at both locations would benefit from increasing interactions 
between individuals and organisations. This would prepare the network for future 
cooperation problems while additionally increasing creativity and knowledge 
sharing. 
2.2 INTRODUCTION 
Conservation conflicts occur where two or more actors with strongly held views 
clash over conservation management objectives and one actor is perceived to 
assert its interests at the expense of the other (Redpath et al. 2013). These typically 
wicked problems are widespread and damaging to conservation work and to the 
lives of people concerned. Ongoing efforts to develop conservation conflict 
management using social collaborative processes have yielded positive results 
(Dickman 2010; Colyvan et al. 2011; Butler et al. 2015; Fedreheim & Blanco 2017), 
although collaboration in the presence of large power disparities can result in 
tokenism (Redpath et al. 2015). Collaborative conflict management involves 
multiple actors working together to find and enact new ways of tackling issues, 
even though their respective objectives may be at odds. For example, a conflict 
surrounding the predation of commercially important salmon by seals in Scotland, 
was successfully resolved by engaging fishers, wildlife tourism operators, scientists 
and government in a multi-stakeholder process (Butler et al. 2015). The study of 
processes that regulate interactions between multiple actors is expanding rapidly 
in conservation science (Groce et al. 2018), but is underused in conservation 
conflict research. 
For any given conservation problem there exists a range of actors whose 
perspectives each contribute to or undermine the functioning of collaborative 
efforts. These actors can include organisations such as residential communities, 
special interest groups, unions, businesses, non-governmental organisations 
(NGO), government, or individuals. For example, in a conflict surrounding 
conservation of raptors on grouse moors in Scotland, the key organisations 
involved are a representative body for the shooting industry, a government funded 
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agency, and environmental charities, each advocating from different perspectives 
in the conflict (Hodgson et al. 2018).   
Individuals represent their own specific interests within a conflict, but can also 
identify with one or more organisations, via for example, employment, registered 
membership, demographic similarity, or shared values (Tajfel & Turner 1979). 
Individuals and or organisations can come together to create a policy forum, an 
issue bound intermediary organisation made up of diverse actors who interact 
repeatedly (Fischer & Leifeld 2015). Individuals can form interactions with 
organisations, if it is in their interests to do so, inside or outside a policy forum and 
the combination of these interdependent interactions (for example between fishers 
and government, in the salmon conflict (Butler et al. 2015)) forms network level 
structure.  It is possible to analyse network structure in a way that reveals both the 
social processes which cause interactions to form, and how well the network will 
perform collaborative functions such as problem solving (Lubell et al. 2012). 
A useful approach for examining social processes, network structure and 
collaborative problem solving is the Risk Hypothesis, which states that an actor 
will make a rational decision to form an interaction if the risk of doing so does not 
outweigh the benefit (Berardo & Scholz 2010). The relationships between problem 
solving, social processes, network structure and conservation are summarised in 
Table 2. Benefits come as three forms of social capital – bridging, bonding and 
linking – that help the actor solve problems through access to information, 
influence and or resources (Lubell 2013; Woolcock 2001). Firstly, bridging social 
capital involves a network structure of sparse interactions with centralised “hubs.” 
Holders of this type of social capital benefit from weaker interactions with lower 
transactional costs, whilst retaining high shared information and potential 
influence via interactions with a well-connected hub. Secondly, bonding social 
capital has stronger interactions and more clustered network structure.  
Information and influence flow through multiple redundant interactions (rather 
than from a central hub) so can be verified, enhancing trust and increasing ease 
with which defection (lying or breaking agreements) is detected and punished 
(Berardo & Scholz 2010). Thirdly, linking social capital involves preferentially 
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forming interactions with organisations perceived as more important in the 
network (Woolcock 2001). This is beneficial for gaining access to resources, 
influence or information. Depending on the type of problem faced, actors will 
collaborate in different ways, forming or breaking interactions based on the risks 
and benefits of bridging, bonding and linking capitals.   
Conservation problems involving unwanted impacts of biodiversity, where 
collaborating to meet agreed objectives is key, are examples of a coordination-type 
problem (Bodin 2017; Young et al. 2010). For instance, the successful management 
of invasive salt marsh cordgrass Spartina alterniflora in San Francisco Bay is partly 
the result of a collaborative stakeholder process centred around a small hub of 
experts responsible for coordinating most of the organisation and delivery of 
actions (Lubell et al. 2017).  
Table 2 - Problem types in social-ecological systems and how they manifest in social 
networks. 
 Coordination problem Cooperation problem 
Key attributes Actors agree on a shared 
goal 
Progress requires activities 
to be organised efficiently 
Actors do not agree on a 
shared goal 
Progress requires 
negotiation and 
deliberation 
Associated social capital Bridging  Bonding 
Associated network 
characteristics 
Sparse, with centralised 
hubs 
Dense, with redundant 
links 
Equivalent conservation 
management issue 
Biodiversity impacts Conservation conflict 
 
Individuals tackling coordination problems favour bridging social capital gained 
through a sparse, centralised network structure. Alternatively, conservation 
conflict is an example of a cooperation-type problem where actors have competing 
objectives which hinder progress, for example in the salmon conflict in Scotland 
fishers wanted to decrease the number of seals to protect their fishing 
opportunities and wildlife tourism operators wanted to keep seal numbers high for 
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their customers to view (Butler et al. 2015; Redpath et al. 2013). Here there is a 
greater chance that actors will defect. Networks formed in response to cooperation 
problems are characterised by individuals seeking bonding social capital gained 
though a dense, closed network structure (Berardo & Scholz 2010). 
In this chapter we investigate the social network of a conflict, which should 
(according to the Risk Hypothesis) be characterised by a preferentially closed 
network structure. We conceptualise our network as having two distinct levels 
(Wang et al. 2013), with one level comprising individual actors, and the other 
comprising interests. The pattern of interactions is generated by individuals 
interacting with organisations, with each organisation deemed to represent an 
organisational interest/perspective. How multiple interactions are structured 
together determines the network’s ability to address associated coordination and 
cooperation problems. We focus on conflicts involving Greylag goose (Anser anser) 
populations in Scotland that have recovered from historic lows to local hyper-
abundance, resulting in damage to arable crops and livestock pasture (Mitchell et 
al. 2010; Bainbridge 2017). The two broad viewpoints in the conflict are that 
agriculture should be protected from geese and that the geese and their habitat 
should be conserved. If an actor strongly holds one of these viewpoints over the 
other, they may find their objectives are competing with those of others when 
goose management is discussed. However, if they feel both viewpoints can be 
accommodated then non-competing or joint objectives may be possible. These are 
cooperation and coordination problems, respectively, both of which can occur 
simultaneously at network level (Berardo 2014).  
In two island locations, the Uists of the Outer Hebrides and the Orkney Islands, 
Scottish Government-backed local goose management groups (LGMGs) were 
formed. LGMGs in both locations are multi-stakeholder policy forums including 
representatives of conservation organisations, farming unions, land owners, and 
government as well as individuals unaffiliated with particular organisations, such 
as wildfowl shooters and farmers. LGMGs are the formal mechanism of decision-
making, giving them the greatest influence on goose management at their location. 
Membership of an LGMG is a characteristic of an individual or organisation that 
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could influence the preference of interaction formation, as actors attending a 
policy forum have repeated opportunities to interact with one another. Many 
individuals and organisations are impacted by or involved in goose management 
but do not have the opportunities to interact afforded via LGMG membership. 
Such individuals must gain information or influence (should they so wish) from a 
position outwith the LGMG. Individuals may prefer to form interactions with 
organisations whom they perceive to be important players in the goose 
management, to build linking social capital (Nohrstedt 2018). Engaging individual 
farmers to collaborate with any goose management interventions, particularly 
coordinated shooting or scaring of geese, is vital to the adaptive management 
schemes devised by the LGMGs. Farmers share similar characteristics such as 
values, employment and social demographics so would be expected to share 
similar interaction formation behaviour, impacting collaboration potential. 
To explore the processes that regulate interactions between actors in conservation 
conflict we ask two research questions. Firstly, are individuals forming interactions 
with organisations in response to coordination and or cooperation problems 
according to the risk hypothesis? Secondly, what influence do farmers, members of 
the LGMG, and organisations perceived as important have on the formation of 
interactions? We then discuss how the interaction network pattern of goose 
conflict in parts of Scotland impacts collaboration and suggest actions to tackle 
coordination and cooperation problems. 
2.3 METHOD 
2.3.1 Study areas 
Both study areas are island groups in Scotland; North Uist, Benbecula, and South 
Uist (hereafter, the Uists), are part of the Outer Hebrides off the North-West of 
Scotland, whilst the Orkney Islands lie off the North-East coast. The Uists have a 
population of 4,839, with a strong tradition of the small-scale farming in Scotland 
known as “crofting” where 94% of holdings are under 20 hectares in size (National 
Records of Scotland 2013; Scottish Government 2017). The Orkney Islands have a 
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higher population of 21,349 and farming is on a much larger, more commercial 
scale with only 63% of farms under 20 hectares (National Records of Scotland 2013; 
Scottish Government 2017).  
Both sites have a resident population of greylag geese which cause damage to 
arable crop and pasture (Bainbridge 2017). Goose numbers have increased since the 
early 1980s in these areas and the resulting increase in damage triggered creation 
of Local Goose Management Groups (LGMGs) by Scottish Government. LGMGs are 
semi-autonomous from Scottish Government and are made up of a range of 
stakeholders selected locally including individuals affected by the geese directly 
and those representing groups or organisations. The individuals and organisations 
on the LGMG in each area are not identical to each other and have changed over 
time, but representatives include farmers, local government, conservation 
organisations, land managers, and recreational wildfowl shooters (Churchill 2016; 
Ferguson 2016). Farmers in the Uists and the Orkney Islands are represented on 
the respective LGMGs by local elected members of national agricultural unions, 
and by individual farmers unaffiliated to any national group. Adaptive 
management pilot schemes were started in 2012 in both areas. The pilots share the 
same objectives; to test if a level of shooting could be determined and 
implemented to successfully decrease goose damage (via population management) 
whilst maintaining the conservation status of the geese (Ferguson 2016). Pilots use 
local shooters (paid and volunteer in the Uist, volunteers only in the Orkney 
Islands) to carry out lethal and non-lethal scaring of the geese, reducing the 
population and protecting crops, respectively (Churchill 2016; Ferguson 2016). 
2.3.2 Data collection 
Network data were collected during semi-structured interviews (26 interviews in 
the Uists in 2016 and 20 interviews in Orkney in 2015), initially with key informants 
who represented members of the LGMG. Respondents were asked to name formal 
or informal groups (hereafter, organisations) which were involved or impacted by 
goose management locally and whether they thought each organisation was a 
“small player” or “large player” regarding decision making and how (if at all) goose 
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management actions are ultimately applied (see Supporting information for 
interview guide). Respondents were then asked if they interacted with each named 
organisation to address one or more problem associated with goose management. 
Further respondents were selected via suggestion by those already interviewed 
(snowball sampling (Newing et al. 2011)). Social networks rarely have clear 
boundaries (Angst & Hirschi 2017), so saturation was deemed to have been reached 
when at least one person from all organisations named three times or more was 
interviewed. One organisation named four times (‘international shooting tourists’) 
was not interviewed as no representative of this organisation was suggested by 
respondents or that we could reliably identify. All interviews were audio recorded 
and transcribed later, except one in which extensive notes were taken. 
Respondents (hereafter, individuals) and organisations were coded as being 
farmers or not and as being members of the LGMG or not. Ethical approval for this 
study was granted by Biological and Environmental Sciences Ethical Review 
Committee, University of Stirling and respondents gave consent to their data being 
used. 
To measure the perceived importance of each organisation, we produced a mean 
importance score. This was calculated for every organisation by assigning each 
small player response a score of 1 and each large player response a score of 2, then 
taking the mean score per individual interviewed. 
2.3.3 Network data 
We analysed interaction data via social network analysis, a set of methods used to 
understand system level social processes through patterns of nodes and edges. In 
this study, nodes are one of two types of actors: individuals and organisations, and 
edges are the interactions between the actors. An individual formed a connection 
to an organisation when they stated they interacted with that organisation 
regarding goose management. Interactions formed between individuals and the 
organisations for which they worked were included in the analysis. The presence or 
absence of interactions between a small number of actors creates network 
configurations with simple properties. For example, in Figure 3, configurations A1 
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and A2 are the two simplest examples of a bipartite configuration with a central 
hub, as three actors are connected with the fewest interactions possible. These are 
star (also known as open) configurations. A3 is a configuration which better 
illustrates a network hub, with many otherwise unconnected actors branching off a 
central actor. B1 and B2 of Figure 3 show cycle (also known as closed) network 
configurations; the simplest bipartite cyclic network, and a network with more 
actors, respectively. In closed configurations information can flow to every actor 
through more than one pathway. As networks get larger than a few of actors, the 
number and diversity of these network configurations also increases. The under- or 
overrepresentation of configurations such as those in Figure 3, are the outcomes of 
social processes. For example, any open configuration in a network is consistent 
with actors seeking bridging capital in response to a coordination problem. In 
contrast, the presence of many closed configurations is consistent with actors 
seeking bonding capital in response to a cooperation problem (Berardo & Scholz 
2010). 
Exponential random graph modelling (ERGM) is a statistical method used to assess 
the prevalence of a configuration of interest, compared to what would be expected 
to occur randomly (Robins et al. 2012). ERGM takes into account the lack of 
independence between configurations due to their nestedness (for example, 
configuration A1 and A2 of Figure 3 are present as part of B1) (Robins et al. 2012). 
We tested the network for prevalence of configurations indicative of three types of 
social capital (bridging, bonding and linking) and for configurations measuring the 
influence of actor characteristics (farmers and LGMG members). A significant 
positive model parameter value for a configuration means that configuration is 
significantly overrepresented in the sample network. A significant negative 
parameter value means the configuration is significantly under-represented in the 
network. 
Initial analysis to determine network differences between the Uists network and 
the Orkney network indicated significant differences between the sites (see 
results). To learn about the influence of organisational actors common between 
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the two locations, we modelled a third network in addition to the Uist and Orkney 
networks; a combined network including all actors at both locations. 
 
Figure 3 – Examples of bipartite network configurations, in which connections can only be 
formed between unlike nodes. A1 and A2 are the simplest open, bridging configurations 
containing three connected nodes. A3 illustrates a centralised hub node, connected to 
many otherwise unconnected nodes. B1 is a simple closed, bonding configuration. B2 is a 
configuration with a greater number of actors connected cyclically. Squares and circles 
represent two different types of actors, for example individuals and organisations  
 
A model was fit for each of the three networks (Uist, Orkney and combined) using 
MPNet software (Wang et al. 2009; Wang et al. 2014). The software fixes the 
number of nodes in the model fit, but we chose not to fix the density (number of 
ties between nodes) of the network in order to maximise the amount of network 
space the modelling programme could explore. Models included the test 
configurations (Table 3) and additional single edge configurations (two nodes 
connected by one edge) to control for network density. All models included single 
edge configurations for any interaction, farmer interaction, and LGMG interaction. 
In the combined model, single edge configurations were also included to control 
for location of individual (either Orkney or the Uists). Models which converged 
were tested using the goodness of fit function in the MPNet software, which we set 
to create 10,000 random graphs using the parameter values from the model fit. The 
28 
 
random networks were then compared to the source network for all 
configurations, not only those in the model, to assess if the model was a good fit. 
Parameter and significance values of the models indicate the prevalence of the test 
configurations in the networks. 
2.3.4 Interactions & perceived importance 
We ran two linear mixed effects models to determine if organisational actors were 
perceived as more important when either formally involved in the management of 
the geese or were a national organisation. The first analysis had the binary 
response variable as to whether an organisation was named as a stakeholder, or 
not, by individual respondents. The second analysis had the binary response 
variable as to whether named organisational actors were perceived as either lower 
or higher importance. Predictor variables used in both models were: organisation 
being a member of the local LGMG (binary; yes/no), organisation having a national 
presence rather than just a local presence (categorical; local only / local & national 
/ national only), and location (the Uists or Orkney). Two random variables were 
included in both models to account for the grouping structure of the data. These 
were unique individual id, and organisation id. The area under the curve (AUC) of 
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) plots was produced for both models to 
assess their ability to correctly discriminate between a randomly chosen positive 
response and a randomly chosen negative response. A value ≥0.7 was considered as 
having acceptable discriminatory ability (Sommerville et al. 2010). 
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Table 3 - Hypotheses tested using exponential random graph model (ERGM) and the 
respective network test configurations related to each hypothesis. Squares represent 
individuals, circles represent organisations, and shading represents the level of perceived 
importance attributed to organisations in the network (with darker shades representing 
more importance). F indicates the actor is a farmer, and an actor with solid black outline is 
a member of the local goose management group. Overrepresented and underrepresented 
configurations will be significantly more or less prevalent in the network than would be 
expected by chance, respectively. 
Social process 
hypothesis 
Test configuration Network model 
prediction based on 
the focal social 
process hypothesis 
Bridging social 
capital will be low as 
interactions are not 
formed to solve 
coordination problems 
 
Configuration will be 
significantly 
underrepresented  
Bonding social 
capital will be high as 
interactions are formed 
to solve cooperation 
problems 
 
Configuration will be 
significantly 
overrepresented 
Linking social capital 
will be high as 
individuals 
preferentially interact 
with organisations 
perceived as more 
important 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Configuration will be 
significantly positively 
correlated with the 
mean importance score 
of the organisation 
Farmers will form 
similar interactions 
to each other as they 
share a similar 
management objective 
 
 
 
 
Configurations will be 
significantly 
overrepresented 
LGMG individuals will 
form interactions 
with each other or 
similar interactions 
to each other as they 
participate together in a 
policy forum 
 
 
 
 
Configurations will be 
significantly 
overrepresented 
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2.4 RESULTS 
A summary of the 46 participants by location and stakeholder group is shown in 
Table 4. Farmers interviewed in Orkney were all self-employed, working on their 
own family farm. Three had been in paid or voluntary roles in private or public 
agricultural organisations. No farmers interviewed were employees or members of 
conservation organisations. Of the two conservation managers interviewed both 
had worked as employees for Scottish Natural Heritage and neither took part in 
shooting or farming. Four shooters who volunteered for the goose management 
pilot were interviewed. All had fulltime jobs around which they fit the volunteer 
shooting. One shooter worked in the sport shooting sector, but none of the 
remaining three were employed in any conservation or agricultural role associated 
with goose management.  
In the Uists, four of the crofters interviewed relied on crofting for most of their 
income but all had sole control of their crofts. Eight crofters were members of the 
Scottish Crofting Federation. The two conservation managers interviewed had 
worked for Scottish Natural Heritage, one of whom was an active crofter. Of the six 
shooters interviewed, three were crofters, two were self-employed outside of the 
environmental sector and one employed within the environmental sector. Beyond 
employment as scarers through the LGMG, no shooters were employees of 
conservation organisations.  
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Table 4 - Number of interviewees by location, stakeholder group and membership of the 
local goose management group (LGMG) 
Location Stakeholder group Number of interviewees 
(formally involved via LGMG) 
Orkney Conservation manager 2 (2) 
 Farmer 9 (1) 
 Shooter 4 (3) 
 1Other 5 (2) 
The Uists Conservation manager 2 (2) 
 Crofter 212 (2) 
 Shooter 25 (3) 
 1Other 9 (3) 
   
1Other groups were butchers, government employees, conservation charity 
employees, Scotland’s Agricultural College (SAC) and estate employees 
2two informants were both crofters and shooters 
 
The exponential random graph models we parameterised for the Combined, Uists 
and Orkney networks are shown in Table 5. The Single edge configurations were 
included in models to control for network density. All other configurations were 
included to test social process hypotheses, with under- and overrepresentation of 
the configurations indicated by negative and positive parameter values, 
respectively (Table 5). All interactions between individuals and organisations for 
the combined, Uists and Orkney networks are shown in Figure 4. 
Open configurations were significantly overrepresented in all three models 
(parameter estimate combined: 0.709, P=0.002, Uists: 0.910, P=0.015, and Orkney: 
1.277, P=0.010). This opposes our social process hypothesis (Table 3) that the 
networks would show low bridging social capital, indicating instead that 
individuals would seek interactions to address coordination problems. Closed 
configurations were significantly overrepresented in the combined and the Uists 
model (parameter estimate combined: 0.617, P<0.001, Uists: 0.242, P=0.002), 
supporting our hypothesis of individuals seeking bonding social capital to address 
cooperation problems. This was not significantly the case in Orkney where closed 
configurations were no more or less prevalent than would be expected by chance 
(parameter estimate: 0.065, P=0.699). The positive correlation of interactions and 
perceived importance of organisations, as per our hypothesis of individuals seeking 
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linking capital, was significant in the Uists model (parameter estimate: 0.572, 
P=0.098) but not the combined (parameter estimate: 0.080, P=0.783) or Orkney 
model (parameter estimate: -0.054, P=0.887). Configurations representing 
interactions between individual members of the LGMG and organisational 
members of the LGMG were not under- or overrepresented in either the Uists or 
Orkney networks (parameter estimate Uists: 0.773, P=0.265, and Orkney: 0.439, 
P=0.495). The configuration representing shared interactions between LGMG 
individuals was underrepresented in the Uists model (parameter estimate: -0.977, 
P=0.074) but not the others (parameter estimate combined: -0.106, P=0.601, 
Orkney: -0.580, P=0.257). This rejects our hypothesis of preferential interaction 
formation between LGMG members. No configurations representing interactions 
shared between farmers were significantly under- or over represented, rejecting 
our hypothesis of farmers sharing similar patterns of interaction as each other.  
Organisational actors which are members of their local goose management group 
(LGMG) had a significantly higher predicted probability of being named as 
stakeholders (P(named) = 0.10; 95%CI = 0.02-0.42) than those which were not 
members (P(named) = 0.02; 95%CI = 0.01-0.04) (Table 6A). When an 
organisational actor had been named, they had a significantly higher predicted 
probability of being perceived as more important in goose management if they 
were a member of the LGMG (P(important) = 0.38; 95%CI = 0.10-0.78) than if they 
weren’t a member (P(important) = 0.20; 95%CI = 0.10-0.37) (Table 6B). There was 
no significant difference between organisational actors with a local only, local & 
national, or national only presence, in either model. The location (Uists or Orkney) 
had no significant effect in either model. The area under the curve value for 
receiver operating characteristic for the stakeholder and the importance models 
was 0.90 and 0.80, respectively, surpassing the acceptability threshold. 
The perceived importance of specific organisational actors in the management of 
geese is shown in Table 7. In both locations SNH were perceived as the most 
important organisational actors but more so in the Uists (importance score of 1.81) 
than in Orkney (score of 1.45). In the Uists the next five most important 
organisational actors were farmers (1.46), Storas Uibhist (1.12), North Uist Estates 
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(0.96), SCF (0.73), and RSPB (0.73). Of these perceived important organisational 
actors, only North Uist Estates are not on the Uists LGMG. In Orkney, following 
SNH, the next five most important organisational actors were RSPB (1.15), farmers 
(1.10), NFUS (0.95), SAC (0.85), and SGRPID (0.85). Here, it is only the RSPB which 
is not represented on the Orkney LGMG.  
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Table 5 - Exponential random graph model (ERGM) models for combined, Uists and Orkney 
networks. Squares represent individual actors, circles are organisational actors, F indicates actor is a 
farmer, actor with solid black outline is a member of the LGMG, and light/dark shaded circle 
represents the level of perceived importance attributed to organisational actors, as a continuous 
variable. Underrepresented configurations are indicated by a negative parameter value, 
overrepresented configurations by a positive parameter value. P value indicates significance of 
difference of parameter from random networks with equal number of nodes. a Uists and Orkney 
networks only contain Uists and Orkney edges, respectively. b organisational actors not listed as 
LGMG in combined model, as LGMG membership different in Uists and Orkney. 
Configuration Combined Uists Orkney 
Parameter P value Parameter P value Parameter P value 
Single edge 
 
-2.946 <0.001 -3.454 <0.001 -3.239 <0.001 
Open 
 
 
0.709 0.002 0.910 0.015 1.277 0.010 
Closed 
 
 
0.617 <0.001 0.242 0.002 0.065 0.699 
Single edge  
Uist only 
 
-1.065 0.035 NAa NAa NAa NAa 
Single edge  
Orkney only 
 
0.801 0.034 NAa NAa NAa NAa 
Farmer 
interactions 
 
-0.095 0.804 0.587 0.343 0.143 0.809 
 
-0.035 0.776 0.778 0.273 0.122 0.824 
 
0.036 0.752 -1.055 0.112 -0.183 0.658 
LGMG 
interactions 
 
0.023 0.956 0.777 0.247 0.239 0.703 
 
NAb NAb 0.773 0.265 0.439 0.495 
 
-0.106 0.601 -0.977 0.074 -0.580 0.257 
Perceived 
importance 
 
0.080 0.783 0.572 0.098 -0.054 0.887 
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Figure 4 - Network diagram for the combined, Uists, and Orkney networks. Squares 
represent individuals, circles are organisations, darker circles are actors perceived as more 
important. A solid black line around a square/circle represents the actor as a member of 
the local goose management group, except in the combined network where membership is 
not shown for organisations. 
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Table 6 - Model output of two generalised linear mixed effects models to predict how 
membership of the local goose management group and scale of an organisation affects if 
organisational actors are: A. named as stakeholders, or B. classed as important players, or 
not. Variable coefficients in bold are significant to P<0.05 
 Response variable  
 A. Organisational actors 
are named as 
stakeholders 
(binary; yes/no) 
B. Organisational actors 
named as stakeholders 
are classed as important 
players 
(binary; yes/no) 
Predictor variable Coeff. (SE) Pr(>|z|) Coeff. (SE) Pr(>|z|) 
Organisational actor is 
member of Local Goose 
Management Group 
 
1.92 (0.43) 
 
<0.001 
 
0.89 (0.45) 
 
0.048 
Local and / or national 
presence of organisational 
actor (compared to local 
only) 
 
Local & national 
National only 
 
 
 
 
 
1.32 (0.74) 
-0.09 (1.25) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.07 
0.94 
 
 
 
 
 
0.68 (0.55) 
0.75 (1.15) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.213 
0.513 
Location -0.09 (0.28) 0.76 -0.17 (0.29) 0.564 
     
Random variables Variance Variance 
Organisational actor 
identifier 
1.46 0.60 
Individual actor identifier 0.24 <0.001 
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Table 7 - Mean (±95% confidence interval) perceived importance of organisational actors 
in the Scottish goose conflict. Organisational actors got a score of 0 if they were not 
named as stakeholders, 1 if named as a less important stakeholder, and 2 if named as a 
more important stakeholder. Numbers in bold italics indicate the organisational actor is 
on the local goose management group in that location. NA indicates organisational actors 
not mentioned by any individual at that location. 
Organisational actor Combined Uists Orkney 
Local butcher 0.37 (0.18) 0.31 (0.24) 0.45 (0.27) 
Community council 0.13 (0.10) 0.19 (0.15) 0.05 (0.10) 
Farmers 1.30 (0.19) 1.46 (0.20) 1.10 (0.35) 
Livestock feed supplier 0.07 (0.07) 0.12 (0.13) 0.00 
National government 0.07 (0.09) 0.08 (0.15) 0.05 (0.10) 
Hotel 0.15 (0.10 0.04 (0.08) 0.30 (0.21) 
National Farmers Union Scotland 0.46 (0.23) 0.08 (0.10) 0.95 (0.41) 
National Goose Management Review 
Group 
0.11 (0.11) 0.12 (0.17) 0.10 (0.13) 
North Uist Estates 0.54 (0.23) 0.96 (0.33) 0.00 
Other 0.07 (0.07) 0.00 0.15 (0.16) 
Public 0.02 (0.04) 0.00 0.05 (0.10) 
Private land owner (Uist) 0.04 (0.09) 0.08 (0.15) 0.00 
Scottish Government Rural Payment 
Inspections Division 
0.67 (0.24) 0.54 (0.29) 0.85 (0.38) 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 0.91 (0.22) 0.73 (0.30) 1.15 (0.29) 
SAC Consulting 0.59 (0.22) 0.38 (0.27) 0.85 (0.36) 
Scottish Crofters Federation 0.43 (0.19) 0.73 (0.28) 0.05 (0.10) 
Goose management shooters 0.59 (0.23) 0.42 (0.27) 0.80 (0.39) 
Shooting supplies retailer 0.09 (0.08) 0.00 0.20 (0.18) 
Scottish Natural Heritage 1.65 (0.18) 1.81 (0.19) 1.45 (0.33) 
Storas Uibhist 0.63 (0.25) 1.12 (0.35) 0.00 
Shooting tourists 0.22 (0.14) 0.12 (0.13) 0.35 (0.26) 
Utilities 0.11 (0.09) 0.12 (0.13) 0.10 (0.13) 
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2.5 DISCUSSION 
We found evidence of interaction networks formed to build bridging, bonding and 
linking social capitals. Configurations indicative of bridging social capital were 
significantly overrepresented in both the Uists and Orkney networks, whereas 
bonding social capital was only overrepresented in the Uists, and to a lesser extent 
than bridging capital. Based on the Risk Hypothesis, bridging structures are 
preferentially formed in response to coordination problems and bonding structures 
to cooperation problems (Berardo & Scholz 2010). Why would individuals favour 
interactions formed in response to coordination problems when conservation 
conflict (with its competing objectives and high risk of defection) is more akin to a 
cooperation problem? 
Angst & Hirschi (2017) show patterns of interdependent interactions in a network 
can mature over time with ‘nascent’ bridging networks formed to solve simpler 
coordination problems growing into bonding networks to tackle cooperation 
problems. Without time-series network data it is not possible to confirm if goose 
management networks started forming in response to coordination problems or 
cooperation problems alone, or if both formed at the same time. However, 
interactions can be cultivated with formal participatory processes (Reed & Sidoli 
Del Ceno 2015) and the conception of LGMGs to specifically manage the 
conservation conflict (a cooperation problem) suggests that bonding interactions 
were prioritised via the policy forum of the LGMG. Bridging interactions would 
then have followed as the LGMGs made progress and the coordination problems 
associated with practical goose management, such as organising shooting, began to 
appear. 
The bridging configurations in all networks suggest a low risk situation, where a 
sparse number of interactions is adequate for tackling the problem. LGMGs were 
started in 2012 and operated goose scaring and population management activities 
at both locations, with teams of volunteers or paid shooters (Churchill 2016; 
Ferguson 2016). Organising and carrying out a goose management activity such as 
shooting towards an agreed objective, is a coordination problem. Additionally, 
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interacting with organisations which operate under familiar and trusted 
institutional rules is lower risk (Nohrstedt 2018). Individuals may have experience 
of LGMG managed pilot schemes over several years, and the organisations on the 
LGMG, such as Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH), farming or crofting unions, SAC 
Consulting (SAC) and Scottish Government each have a long history of working in 
rural Scotland. Existing network structures between these actors should be able to 
respond to coordination problems.  
Network configurations indicative of bonding social capital were significantly 
overrepresented in the Uists, but not in Orkney. This suggests individuals in 
Orkney are not responding to a cooperation problem and see the level of risk as 
lower than individuals do in the Uists. In Orkney the conservation charity RSPB, 
resigned its representative from the LGMG in 2014, citing goose management as an 
agricultural issue rather than a biodiversity issue (Churchill 2015). RSPB at the 
national scale have strong views in support of goose conservation in Scotland to 
the point of lodging a complaint to the European Commission in contest to the 
management plan to shoot barnacle geese (Branta leucopsis) on Islay (RSPB 
Scotland & WWT 2015) and withdrawing their representative from the NGMRG 
(Scottish Natural Heritage 2015). The lack of an RSPB representative in Orkney will 
decrease the diversity of views on their LGMG leading on average to an increase in 
trust, decrease in transaction costs, and fewer bonding configurations required 
between the remaining members of the LGMG. The RSPB remain a member of the 
LGMG in the Uists, adding a different voice to the group potentially decreasing 
trust, increasing transaction costs and promoting more closed network 
configurations (Berardo & Scholz 2010). This may cause a future headache for 
goose management in Orkney should a cooperation problem arise and RSPB felt 
the need to act unilaterally. An emerging cooperation problem would by definition 
include competing objectives between stakeholders, and an increase in the risk of 
defection. A lack of bonding social capital through redundant interactions in the 
Orkney network would decrease both verification of information, and detection 
and punishment of defection (Berardo & Scholz 2010). Decreasing diversity itself 
narrows the breadth of knowledge available for problem solving and decreases 
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legitimacy of processes (Reed & Curzon 2015; Mason, Pollard et al. 2018). 
Reforming interactions with RSPB or forming new interactions would come at a 
high transaction cost (Reed & Curzon 2015). All these factors together would result 
in goose conflict worsening in Orkney. 
Individuals in the Uists (but not Orkney) preferentially formed interactions with 
organisations that were perceived to be more important in goose management 
supporting our hypothesis that linking social capital played a part in individuals 
forming interactions. Building linking social capital in this way can increase access 
to superior knowledge and resources (Woolcock 2001). Membership of the LGMG 
was the only significant predictor variable for perceived importance of an 
organisation. Location was not a significant predictor meaning organisations at 
one location did not have an average perception of importance greater than the 
other location. It is unsurprising that organisations on the LGMGs are perceived as 
important, as they may have been selected for membership of the LGMG for a 
reason which is also reflected in individuals’ perception of importance, for 
example, political or financial authority, specialist skills (shooting or ecology), or 
land ownership (Reed et al. 2009). Membership of the LGMG may itself also have 
enhanced the perceived importance of an organisation. There are two prominent 
examples of organisations perceived as important but not on their respective 
LGMG (Table 7). In the Uists, North Uist Estates is the fourth highest ranked 
organisation out of a total of 19, ranking higher than five of eight LGMG members. 
In Orkney, RSPB has the second highest perceived importance out of a total of 18, 
ranking higher than six of seven LGMG organisations. Both of these organisations 
had previously been on the group but had decided to exit. On average, individuals 
perceive these two organisations to be important even though they are not 
formally involved in management of the geese. This could be because they gained 
importance as members of the LGMG previously, and individuals aren’t aware of 
the change of circumstances, because they are formally involved with wider 
parallel issues such as wildfowling (North Uist Estates) or bird conservation 
(RSPB), or simply because they wield influence from outwith the LGMG. Our data 
cannot distinguish between these or other reasons for perceived importance. We 
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can show that perceived importance of an organisation is not entirely due to 
formal participation in goose management and that in the Uists at least, this 
characteristic of organisations appears to influence the formation of the network. 
Amongst individual members of the LGMG there was no evidence of preferred 
interaction with LGMG organisations. In the Uists configurations indicative of 
individual LGMG members sharing similar interactions as each other were 
underrepresented. We can therefore infer that LGMG members at this location are 
choosing not to form interactions with LGMG organisations, which was in 
opposition to our hypothesis. These results are surprising as the LGMG is an 
example of a policy forum designed to bring together individuals and organisations 
for interaction, often in person (Fischer & Leifeld 2015). Actors in a policy forum 
are assumed to be rational and instrumentalist in their actions and lobby for their 
preferred solution in a visible and legitimate venue (Fischer & Leifeld 2015). The 
results suggest that individuals who attend LGMG meetings do not feel they are 
forming interactions just because they are in the same room and perhaps 
participating in the same conversation with organisation representatives. Our 
results show that interactions do occur between individuals and organisations in 
the LGMG, just that they are not more or less prevalent than would happen by 
chance, even given the increased contact opportunities offered through the policy 
forum.  
Our hypothesis of farmers sharing similar preferences for interactions was not 
supported by the analysis. Farmers are a diverse stakeholder group with a wide 
range of perspectives and behaviours on agricultural issues (Austin et al. 2001; Sok 
et al. 2018). This is reflected in our results even on the partisan topic of goose 
management. 
Limitations of the study 
Interactions between individuals may support or undermine the bipartite network 
investigated, providing coordination and cooperation problem solving ability. 
Social network analysis of natural resource management rarely includes causal 
analyses of the relationship between network structure and environmental 
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outcomes, and typically lacks time series data (Groce et al. 2018; Nohrstedt 2018). 
This study does not address those gaps directly, but offers a comparison of two 
superficially similar networks, which have undergone the same interventions via 
establishment of a policy forum to manage conservation conflict. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
Modelling of network structure helps us understand the connections between the 
social processes governing interaction formation and the collaborative problem-
solving capability of a network. We found differences in network structure 
between two superficially similar conflicts which could result in distinct abilities to 
deal with emerging cooperation problems.  
Over the recent years of the pilot adaptive management projects, collaboration 
between actors may have focussed on the coordination problem of practical goose 
management rather than the cooperation problem of conflict management. The 
policy forums of the LGMG did show the common interactions that might be 
expected, and organisations perceived as important drive interaction formation but 
are no longer formally involved. Geese damaging crops remains a problem in both 
locations, and across Scotland (Bainbridge 2017) so it may be time to stimulate the 
network for greater cooperative capacity, particularly in Orkney. Actively widening 
the boundaries of the network to introduce redundant interactions across locations 
would be beneficial by increasing creativity and knowledge sharing through 
diversity of views, but also through bonding social capital, verifying potentially 
unsatisfactory local interactions. The status of collaboration with important 
organisations which are not formally involved in goose management could benefit 
from re-evaluation. This could mean overcoming a very high transaction cost, 
particularly as previous streamlining of LGMG membership decreased diversity of 
viewpoints. Advantages of policy forums such as the LGMGs include legitimacy, 
transparency, engagement across society and access to quality information 
(Nohrstedt 2018). These strengths may risk being undermined if perceived 
importance lies elsewhere and individuals seek linking social capital outwith the 
LGMG.  
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2.7 SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
Summary interview guide 
Questions from which data included in the analyses of this chapter are shown in bold 
 
Section 0 – Interview details  
Location 
Interview number 
Date  
 
Section 1 – Background  
Age 
Gender 
Residence (current, previous) 
Occupation / role (current, previous)  
 
Section 2 – Views on geese  
Describe your views on the geese  
Describe the impacts of the geese on you and others 
 
Section 3 – Stakeholder analysis  
Please list all the stakeholders (including yourself, individuals, groups, and 
organisations) involved with or impacted by geese in [Orkney or the Uists]  
For yourself –  
Regarding management of geese:  
• What is your goal and why?  
• What actions do you take to achieve your goal?  
• What additional actions could you take to achieve your goal?  
• What stops you from taking these additional actions?  
• Are you an important player in goose management and if so, how?  
 
For each of the stakeholders listed, regarding management of geese:  
• What is their goal and why?  
• Do you interact with this group and if so, how?  
• What actions do this group take to achieve their goals?  
• What additional actions could they take to achieve better outcomes?  
• What stops them from taking these additional actions?  
• Is this group an important player in goose management and if so, how?  
 
Section 4 – Opportunities & threats  
Other than geese, list the major threats that you cope with in your occupation / role  
Describe how these threats compare with the impacts of geese.  
Describe how the future would be if management actions did not resolve the goose 
issue and the population increased significantly  
Describe how the future would be if management actions did resolve the goose issue 
and the goose population decreased significantly  
 
Section 5 – Additional information  
Do you have any additional comments or information regarding what we’ve discussed 
today? 
44 
 
 
45 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Understanding cooperation 
in conflict: learning from 
goose management in 
Scotland 
 
 
Chris Pollard, Steve Redpath, Aidan Keane, Juliette Young and Nils Bunnefeld 
conceived the ideas and designed the methodology. CP collected the data with 
Kirsten Brewster. CP analysed the data and wrote the Chapter. JY contributed 
technical advice on data analysis. Drafts of the Chapter were commented on by JY 
and NB. 
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3.1 ABSTRACT 
To effectively manage conservation conflicts there is a need to gauge the 
prevalence of, and potential for, cooperative behaviours in the people involved. 
Using in-depth stakeholder interviews, we investigated how and why individual 
members of three important stakeholder groups (farmers & crofters, conservation 
managers, and shooters) cooperated with one another and what barriers they faced 
to cooperation. We framed our research with Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework, which seeks to understand the cooperative and non-
cooperative behaviour of individuals in a social-ecological system. Data are 
collected across seven framework criteria (actor, position, action, information, 
control outcome and payoff) to build a holistic picture of individuals’ behaviour. 
We conducted 46 semi-structured interviews with people in two locations in 
Scotland, who were involved in a conservation conflict surrounding the 
management of geese. 
We identified three important dimensions of cooperation in the conservation 
conflict: i) the formal structure of distributed decision-making for goose 
management in Scotland is welcomed but suffered from a lack of vertical and 
horizontal interactions; ii) members of a stakeholder group who superficially 
would share a similar goal, showed extensive heterogeneity not only in goal, but 
also their personal circumstances; iii) the complexity of the conflict resulted in 
emergence of novel trade-offs during management activities, affecting how 
stakeholders cooperate with one another. Stakeholders identified barriers to 
cooperation as political (the influence of important actors), knowledge 
(incomplete understanding of the natural system) or operational (due to 
legislation, high cost or low skill). 
 The lack of horizontal and vertical links between widely distributed groups meant 
shared learning and the perception of fairness suffered. Building up horizontal and 
vertical interactions could bypass political and knowledge barriers. A false belief in 
uniformity among stakeholder groups can be the source of poor system 
understanding, so developing wider or alternative representation is required to 
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prevent this. For long-term, complex issues, identification and discussion of trade-
offs to avoid poor outcomes is needed throughout the process, not just during the 
planning stages.  
3.2 INTRODUCTION 
Conservation conflicts are complex and often result in negative outcomes for 
biodiversity and people (Redpath et al. 2015). Conflicts occur when two or more 
parties with strongly held beliefs clash over conservation objectives and when one 
party is perceived to assert their actions to the detriment of another (Redpath et al. 
2013). Fostering cooperation within and between parties builds trust, facilitates 
learning, and develops networks for long-term problem solving; all of which can 
contribute to conservation conflict management (Reed & Sidoli Del Ceno 2015; 
Young, Searle, et al. 2016; Bodin 2017). Characteristics of cooperative behaviours 
include sharing information, exploring others interests and needs, working 
together on a problem, and actively seeking win/win solutions (Pound 2015). To 
manage conservation conflicts effectively there is a need to gauge the prevalence of 
and potential for, cooperative behaviours by the individuals involved. 
The damage of crops by hyper-abundant geese is a well-characterised conservation 
conflict and there are multiple examples of goose conflict management schemes in 
Europe and North America (e.g. Tombre et al. 2013; Eythórsson et al. 2017b; Fox & 
Madsen 2017). In Scotland, greylag geese Anser anser have been increasing in 
number since the 1980s at several locations causing a corresponding increase in 
crop damage (Bainbridge 2017). Scottish Government have been involved with the 
conflict since the mid-1990s, but in 2012 committed to trialling participatory, 
multi-stakeholder processes for developing local goose management schemes 
(Bainbridge 2017). Throughout the history of formal goose management in 
Scotland, cooperative behaviours will have been promoted, discussed, 
implemented and rejected, both individually and collectively, formally and 
informally, shaping the conflict. To understand the role of cooperation in the 
goose conflict in Scotland and for lessons in conflict management more widely we 
ask the research questions: 
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• How and why do individuals cooperate towards the management of a 
conflict? 
• What do people identify as the barriers to cooperation? 
We focus on the three main stakeholder groups in two Scottish island locations 
which have greylag goose management schemes: farmers, conservation managers 
and wildfowl shooters. Our research was structured using the Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom 2011). The IAD is a general 
framework developed for understanding the institutions governing common pool 
natural resource management (Orach & Schlüter 2016). The IAD’s focus on 
cooperative interactions between individuals in a social-ecological context, make it 
a flexible framework useful for approaching a range of social-ecological policy 
issues, particularly at local scales, including adaptive co-management (Whaley & 
Weatherhead 2014). Individuals in the IAD are assumed to be boundedly rational 
fallible learners; that is, they make rational decisions (including honouring 
commitments and promises) under uncertain circumstances, sometimes making 
mistakes but potentially learning from the experience (Ostrom 2011; Orach & 
Schlüter 2016). 
The IAD explicitly places those stakeholder interactions within a context of 
biophysical resources, community attributes, and rules (both formal and informal). 
The elements of the framework and how they relate to each other are designed to 
provide a logical method linking the exogenous biophysical, community and rules 
together with the endogenous person-person interactions, revealing cause and 
effect relationships (Ostrom, 2011).  
This makes the IAD particularly relevant for studying conservation conflicts in 
which the person-person interactions can only be understood within the wider 
context of the biodiversity management in question. In the goose conflict system, 
major elements of the conflict fit into the building blocks of the IAD: wild geese, 
agriculture, geographical location (biophysical); farming culture, multi-scale 
conservation organisations, geographical location (community); and national 
hunting laws, local goose management plans, individuals’ crop protection 
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strategies (rules). The IAD can accommodate all explanatory variables of 
biophysical, community, and rule types by assigning them to one of a fixed number 
of defined criteria. This is the crucial first step in understanding a complex social-
ecological system from what can seem a messy tangle of interacting variables and 
processes (McGinnis, 2011). The seven criteria together form an Action Situation; a 
description of interactions between individuals within their biophysical, 
community and rules context (Figure 5, Table 8) (Ostrom 2011). Many actions 
situations may arise from the description of a social-ecological system as described 
using the IAD. 
Examples of IAD application to conservation problems include: conflict in multi-
use forests (Wilkes-allemann et al. 2015); payment for ecosystem services (Barton 
et al. 2017); competing intercoastal zone management options (Ware 2017); and 
wildlife reserve management (Rastogi et al. 2014). In this chapter we construct a 
picture of cooperation in the goose conflict using action situations, then explore 
the interactions described to address our research questions. 
Figure 5 – The Institutional Analysis and Development Action Situation (Ostrom 2011) 
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Table 8 – Summary description of the seven criteria of the Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework (Ostrom 2011) 
1. 1. Actor 
A description of the individuals and stakeholder groups in the system. Cooperative interactions 
between people who are similar are different to those between people who aren’t (Tajfel & Turner 
1979). Within a stakeholder group, an individual may be more independent, choosing when and 
how to cooperate with similar people. Alternatively, their behaviour choices may be more 
restricted, for example as an employee following the rules of their employer. Outwith a 
stakeholder group, people may overlap between groups (for example, farmers who also shoot 
geese) or be firmly part of one stakeholder group.  
 
2.  
3. 2. Position 
An actor’s Position is the context of their role, describing what is satisfactory about their status 
quo, what is not satisfactory and why. An individual’s perceptions of their own positions and 
positions of others determines what cooperative or non-cooperative actions an actor feels are 
realistically available. 
 
4.  
5. 3. Actions 
Actors are aware of various cooperative and non-cooperative actions available to help them 
achieve their goals. Individuals have perceptions of whether specific actions are or will be 
successful and of the barriers associated with the action. 
 
6.  
7. 4. Information 
Individuals are boundedly rational, fallible learners; the information available will influence their 
behaviour, but the information and their ability to process it are not perfect. People will use 
shortcuts such as trusted interactions with other people or groups, to process the information 
(Ostrom et al. 1994). 
 
8.  
9. 5. Control 
Actors cannot always do what they want to do. Individuals are impacted by Controls, limiting or 
enhancing their choices of action. Controls which impact cooperative behaviour may take the 
form of formal laws, imbalances of actor influence, access to resources (including funding), or 
competing priorities. 
 
10.  
11. 6. Outcomes 
Actors will make predictions about the results of their actions and the actions of others. These 
Outcomes and the cause and effect processes leading up to them, will influence choices made by 
actors. We explored the potential cause and effect processes and outcomes in the goose conflict 
through two scenarios; if goose damage was brought under control (i.e. the problem was 
resolved) and if the goose population continued to increase (unresolved). 
 
12.  
13. 7. Payoff 
The balance of costs and benefits of an action are the Payoff. Individuals are assumed to be 
fallible learners who make rational decisions based on their own calculated payoffs, but also vary 
due to personal interactions such as keeping promises and reciprocity (Ostrom 2011). 
Cooperation between individuals may lead to a preferential payoff. 
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3.3 METHODS 
3.3.1 Study areas 
North Uist, Benbecula, and South Uist (hereafter, the Uists) make up part of the 
Outer Hebrides island chain situated of the North-West coast of Scotland. The 
Orkney Islands (hereafter, Orkney) lie off the North East of Scotland. The Uists are 
a crofting community, with a strong tradition of subsistence farming on small-scale 
farms known as crofts. Orkney is also highly agricultural, but with larger, more 
commercial farms. Holdings over 20 hectares account for 6% of all farms in the 
Outer Hebrides (which include the Uists) and 37% of all farms in Orkney. 
Improved grassland accounts for 9% and 61% of total grazing in the Outer 
Hebrides and Orkney, respectively (Scottish Government 2017). The Uists have a 
population of 4,839 whereas Orkney has a population of 21,349 (National Records 
of Scotland 2013). 
Greylag geese (Anser anser) are amber listed in the UK due to breeding localisation 
and are named in assessments of protected areas such as the South Uist Machair 
and Lochs RAMSAR site in the Uists, meaning the Scottish government have a 
responsibility to maintain breeding populations of the species locally (Scottish 
Government, 2019) However, they are classified as Least Concern globally and can 
be legally hunted during the winter open season (September to February) (Eaton et 
al. 2015; IUCN 2016). In the Uists, counts of around 6,200 resident greylag geese 
were made in 2016, up from 1,100 in 1986 (Paterson 1987). In Orkney a count of over 
24,000 resident geese was made in 2016 where no breeding was recorded in the 
1980s (Mitchell et al. 2016). A larger population of Icelandic greylag geese 
overwinter in Orkney, increasing the population by an additional 60,000 – 90,000 
from November to February (Brides et al. 2018). In the Uists there is also a small 
but growing population of migratory Greenland barnacle geese (Branta leucopsis).  
Wild goose populations can cause a range of ecosystem services and disservices 
(Buij et al. 2017). Disagreements about how service and disservice trade-offs are 
managed can cause conservation conflict (Ceaușu et al. 2018). Geese in Orkney and 
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the Uists afford predominantly cultural services of benefit to birdwatchers, 
conservationists, wildfowl hunters, and researchers. Provisioning disservices from 
geese are through crop damage where they are regarded by farmers as a pest. 
Goose management is like other common pool agricultural pest management. 
Preventing direct damage caused by geese at the field or farm level is in the 
interests of the private individual, but on the landscape scale benefits accrued from 
farmer actions are non-excludable, impacting people beyond the farm scale as 
goose populations change in size and location (Zhang et al. 2007). 
To coordinate landscape scale goose management, Scottish Government created 
Local Goose Management Groups (LGMGs) in 2012 in several areas across Scotland 
including in Orkney and the Uists. Prior to and slightly overlapping this in the 
Uists was a four-year EU funded scheme led by the Royal Society for the Protection 
of Birds (RSPB) called Machair Life that aimed to improve conservation of the 
globally important machair habitat on the west coast of the islands (Machair Life+ 
2014). This scheme included coordinated goose scaring by employees paid through 
the scheme to protect crofts, but no population reduction. 
LGMGs are semi-autonomous, managed locally by Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH) 
and reporting via a central SNH coordinator to a National Goose Management 
Review Group (NGMRG). LGMGs consist of a range of local stakeholders including 
farmers or crofters affected by the geese directly and individuals representing 
groups or organisations. Groups represented on the LGMG in each area are not 
identical and have changed over time, but include farmers, local government, 
conservation organisations, land managers, and recreational wildfowl shooters 
(Churchill 2016; Ferguson 2016). Both LGMGs began pilot schemes in 2012 to 
control greylag geese using adaptive management. The goose management pilots 
had the same objectives; to test if a level of shooting could be determined and 
implemented to successfully decrease goose damage (via population management) 
whilst maintaining the conservation status of the geese (Ferguson 2016). Pilots use 
local shooters (paid and volunteer in the Uist, volunteers only in Orkney) to carry 
out lethal and non-lethal scaring of the geese to reduce the resident greylag 
population and protect crops (Churchill 2016; Ferguson 2016). Greylag geese are 
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also shot during the open season and can be shot out of season only under licences 
issued in order to protect crops. There is no open season for Greenland barnacle 
geese due to their higher conservation status, a species that has caused 
conservation conflict via crop damage elsewhere in Scotland (McKenzie & Shaw 
2017).  
3.3.2 Recruitment and interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted between June and September 2015 in 
Orkney (n = 20), and between August and September 2016 in the Uists (n = 26) 
similar to the methodology set out in Young et al. (2018). For the interview guide, 
see 3.8 Supporting Information. We first identified key informants for interview at 
both locations, based on their formal association with goose management (for 
example as a member of the LGMG). Additional informants were identified by 
those already interviewed (snowball sampling (Newing et al. 2011)). Two 
informants in the Uists contacted CP following a request in the local newspaper for 
views on geese. During interviews we asked informants to list all stakeholder 
groups associated with goose management and determined data collection 
saturation as when at least one person from all stakeholder groups listed three 
times or more was interviewed. No-one from a stakeholder group named four 
times (‘international shooting tourists’) was interviewed as no member of this 
group could be identified. The first three interviews conducted were used as a pilot 
study, resulting in small alterations in the questions used (see 3.8 Supporting 
Information) and the data from the pilot interviews was included in the analysis. 
Orkney interviews were conducted in person (13) or by phone/Skype (7). CP led all 
interviews except one, which KB conducted alone. KB, NB and AK were present for 
14, 10 and 5 interviews, respectively. Uists interviews were conducted solely by CP, 
in person (24) or by phone (2). Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 2 hours, 
with a mean of 1 hour. Written notes were taken during interviews and all were 
recorded using Smart Recorder app (SmartMob v1.8.0), apart from one in which 
the informant declined recording, so more detailed notes were taken. All 
recordings were transcribed verbatim by CP. Ethical approval for this study was 
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granted by Biological and Environmental Sciences Ethical Review Committee, 
University of Stirling and respondents gave consent to their data being used. The 
participant consent form is in 3.8 Supporting Information.  
3.3.3 Interview structure and coding 
In order to allow analysis of the conflict using the Institutional and Analysis 
Development (IAD) framework, we developed a semi-structured interview guide 
(interview guide in 3.8 Supporting information) in which each question was 
designed to collect information from the informant on one or more of the IAD 
criteria. Development of the final interview guide followed a short pilot study (see 
Section 3.3.2 above). The IAD framework was not discussed with informants during 
interview and instead the questions were grouped into five less abstract sections - 
Background, Views on geese, Stakeholder analysis, Opportunities & threats, and 
Additional information. Table 9 shows each of the five sections, a shortened 
version of the questions asked therein (full interview guide in Supporting 
information), and for which of the IAD criteria those questions were expected to 
provide data. 
Data analysis was conducted in two sequential phases: firstly, we organised the 
responses using a pre-defined coding structure based on the IAD criteria; then 
secondly, thematic analysis was used to draw out themes of cooperation from the 
coding-structured data, both from within, and across the IAD criteria. 
The first phase of analysis involved simplification by coding interview transcripts 
using a hierarchy of pre-defined nodes (Table 10). As we wished to ultimately 
describe the conflict in terms of the IAD criteria, the highest level of coding 
contained nodes for each of those criteria; Actor, Position, Actions, Information, 
Control, Outcomes, and Payoff. Below six of the seven parent nodes (the Actor 
node had no pre-defined sub-nodes) were nodes relating to the stakeholder groups 
about which informants were talking. We split these by our stakeholder groups of 
interest; Conservation manager, Farmer, and Shooter. We also included an Other 
group. Four IAD criteria (Position, Actions, Control, and Payoff) we used child 
nodes from each stakeholder group to separate responses from informants either 
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talking about their own stakeholder group, or each of the other stakeholder 
groups. This was to allow us to compare how informants saw their own situation 
with how others perceived their situation to be. One IAD criterion, Information, 
contained pre-defined sub-nodes of Action and Payoff, followed by a split into 
nodes relating to each stakeholder group other than their own. This was to capture 
what informants perceived to be the practical options (actions) and ultimate goals 
(payoffs) available to stakeholder groups other than their own. Finally, one IAD 
criterion, Outcomes, had a pre-defined set of sub-nodes in which to code 
responses relating to how informants described the potential outcomes or a 
Resolved, or Unresolved, conflict. 
The second phase of analysis involved thematic analysis, starting at the lowest level 
of the pre-defined coding structure in each IAD criteria, to draw out important 
themes in stakeholder perceptions of the conflict, focussing on cooperation within 
and between stakeholder groups. Ultimately three important themes were 
identified: Location & Scale; Heterogeneity of farmers & crofters; and Emerging 
shooter trade-offs. A number of barriers to cooperation were also found, which we 
described separately. 
Interview transcriptions were coded using the IAD framework on NVivo11 software 
(QSR International 2017) by CP.  
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Table 9 – Questions (shortened questions shown here) were grouped into five sections 
during interviews. Each question aimed to collect information for one or more of the seven 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework criteria (full interview guide in 
3.8 Supporting information), shown here by  ✓. Section 5 was not designed to provide data 
on a specific IAD criteria, but could capture information on any of the criteria, as shown 
by (✓). 
  IAD criteria analysis nodes 
Interview 
section Questions  1 
A
ct
o
r 
2 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
3 
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ct
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n
s 
4
 I
n
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o
n
 
5 
C
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n
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o
l 
6
 O
u
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o
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s 
7 
P
a
y
o
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1 
Background 
Age ✓ ✓      
Gender ✓ ✓      
 Residence ✓ ✓      
 Occupation / role ✓ ✓      
         
2 
Views on 
geese 
Describe the impacts of 
geese on you and others  ✓  ✓  ✓  
         
3 
Stakeholder 
analysis 
Please list the stakeholders 
(including self) involved or 
impacted by geese 
✓ ✓  ✓    
 (then for each stakeholder 
in the list) 
       
 What is your/their goal?    ✓   ✓ 
 How important and 
influential are you/they? 
 ✓  ✓ ✓   
 How do you interact with 
them? 
  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
 What actions do/could 
you/they take? 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
         
4 
Opportunities 
and threats 
Describe how you see the 
future if the goose issue is 
resolved/unresolved 
     ✓ ✓ 
 Comparing to issues of 
geese, what other threats 
do you have to deal with in 
your role? 
    ✓  ✓ 
5 
Additional 
information 
Any further comments or 
questions? (✓) (✓) (✓) (✓) (✓) (✓) (✓) 
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Table 10 – Pre-defined node and sub-node structure of the first phase of interview analysis 
with number of sources and references. Following analysis of the Actor node, all other 
nodes were separated into sub-nodes based on the main stakeholder groups of interest 
(Conservation managers (CM), Farmers, Shooters). Sub-nodes were then split further, 
depending on the parent node. 
Node Sub-
nodes 
  Sources References 
1 Actor    46 189 
2 Position CM Self-stated  4 22 
  Stated by others  40 123 
 Farmers Self-stated  24 239 
  Stated by others  38 83 
 Shooters Self-stated  9 60 
  Stated by others  28 62 
 Others Self-stated  16 126 
  Stated by others  46 289 
3 Actions CM Self-stated  3 43 
  Stated by others  45 223 
 Farmers Self-stated  23 151 
  Stated by others  41 168 
 Shooters Self-stated  9 54 
  Stated by others  38 100 
 Others Self-stated  12 51 
  Stated by others  45 253 
4 Information CM Actions Stated by farmers 9 46 
   Stated by shooters 22 114 
  Payoffs Stated by farmers 6 11 
   Stated by shooters 21 59 
 Farmers Actions Stated by CM 4 28 
   Stated by shooters 10 29 
  Payoffs Stated by CM 4 14 
   Stated by shooters 1 13 
 Shooters Actions Stated by CM 4 16 
   Stated by farmers 18 42 
  Payoffs Stated by CM 4 5 
   Stated by farmers 7 12 
5 Control CM Self-stated  3 7 
  Stated by others  44 140 
 Farmers Self-stated  21 120 
  Stated by others  34 104 
 Shooters Self-stated  8 24 
  Stated by others  21 48 
 Others Self-stated  16 61 
  Stated by others  44 244 
6 Outcomes CM Resolved  2 2 
  Unresolved  5 10 
 Farmers Resolved  17 20 
  Unresolved  21 39 
 Shooters Resolved  3 3 
  Unresolved  7 16 
 Others Resolved  9 9 
  Unresolved  16 32 
7 Payoff CM Self-stated  5 22 
  Stated by others  43 113 
 Farmers Self-stated  18 42 
  Stated by others  39 98 
 Shooters Self-stated  7 21 
  Stated by others  17 29 
 Others Self-stated  18 49 
  Stated by others  45 246 
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3.4 RESULTS 
The results are organised in turn by each of the Institute Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework criteria. 
3.4.1 Actor - a description of the individuals and stakeholder groups in the system 
The majority of the 46 study informants were men (80.0% in Orkney, 80.8% in the 
Uists, 80.4% overall), with all the remainder of the sample being women. In 
Orkney, farmers were all self-employed, working on their own family farm. Three 
had been in paid or voluntary agricultural roles with Scottish Government Rural 
Payments and Inspections Division (SGRPID), SAC Consulting (SAC) or National 
Farmers Union, Scotland (NFUS). No farmers were employees or members of 
conservation organisations. Of the two conservation managers interviewed in 
Orkney both had worked as employees for SNH. None were either wildfowlers or 
farmers. Four shooters who volunteered for the goose management pilot were 
interviewed. All had fulltime jobs around which they fitted the volunteer shooting, 
including one who worked in the sport shooting sector. None of the remaining 
three shooters were employed in any conservation or agricultural role associated 
with goose management. In the Uists, four of the crofters relied on crofting for 
most of their income but all had sole control of their crofts. Eight crofters were 
members of the Scottish Crofting Federation (SCF).  The two conservation 
managers interviewed had worked for SNH in the Uists, including one active 
crofter. Of the six shooters interviewed, three were crofters, two were self-
employed outside of the environmental sector and one employed within the 
environmental sector. Beyond employment as scarers through the LGMG, no 
shooters were employees of conservation organisations. Informant codes by 
location, stakeholder group and membership of the local goose management group 
(LGMG) are shown in Table 11. 
  
59 
 
Table 11 – Informant codes by location, stakeholder group and membership of the local 
goose management group (LGMG) 
Location Stakeholder group Number of 
informants 
(formally involved 
via LGMG) 
Informant code 
Orkney Conservation manager 2 (2) OC1-OC2 
 Farmer 9 (1) OF1-OF9 
 Shooter 4 (3) OS1-OS4 
 1Other 5 (2) OG1-OG5 
The Uists Conservation manager 2 (2) UC1-UC2 
 Crofter 212 (2) UF1-UF12 
 Shooter 25 (3) US1-US5 
 1Other 9 (3) UG1-UG9 
1Other groups were butchers, government employees, RSPB, SAC Consulting (SAC) and 
estate employees 
2two informants were both crofters and shooters 
3.4.2 Position - an actor’s Position is the context of their role 
Farmers & crofters 
The main three challenges listed by farmers and crofters were (in no ranked order): 
uncertain weather, the high financial costs associated with farming in a remote 
location and the negative impacts of geese. The extent to which these challenges 
affected farmers and crofters varied between individuals, indicating heterogeneity 
of position of this stakeholder group. For example, on an individual level, farmers 
and crofters described high levels of uncertainty regarding goose damage on a day-
to-day or even year-to-year basis. They knew however that damage was not totally 
random as improving their land through reseeding of rough grazing land or adding 
fertilizer attracted more geese. A Uist crofter who didn’t receive any protection 
from the local goose management scheme said: “every time you improve your land 
you get more geese, then it’s worse than zero sum. And it’s completely outwith my 
control.” (UF1). 
Traditional crofting practices in the Uists are vital to conservation of the machair 
habitat, a complex dune grassland habitat found only in Western Scotland and 
Ireland (Stewart 1999). Pride in traditional crofting practices was strong 
particularly as these practices are seen as unique to the location, having died-out 
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elsewhere in Scotland. Goose damage was widely blamed for the ongoing move 
away from traditional methods towards increased mechanisation. 
Conservation managers 
The degree of success or failure, as defined by the objectives of the NGMRG and 
the individual LGMG in each location, are ultimately borne by SNH both at a local 
and national scale. SNH staff can find themselves in a position of having to 
navigate the space between local and national scales. For example, support for 
using goose meat sales to aid financial sustainability of goose management was 
unanimous amongst conservation managers at both locations, but the necessary 
legislative steps to make the meat sale scheme financially viable need to be taken 
at national level.  
Shooters 
In Orkney, volunteer shooter teams provide crop protection and population 
reduction alongside their fulltime jobs. Shooters were proud of being able to help 
farmers and felt that they and the project were successful. 
Orkney is a popular tourism destination for wildfowl hunting and geese shot by 
paying customers contribute a large proportion of the population reduction 
targets. Several shooters explained how during the open season Orkney farmers 
would guarantee the shooting rights for their land to professional shoot guides in 
exchange for payment. This allowed shoot guides exclusive rights to take paying 
customers on those farms should geese congregate there. The volunteer shooters 
said this could often exclude them from locations they had shot throughout their 
lives. They then assigned high value on their opportunity to shoot as part of the 
goose management pilot as they had regained access to shooting. 
In the Uists, informants emphasised how hard shooting was due to the adaptive 
behaviour of the geese and that other stakeholders have never appreciated the 
difficulty of implementing a successful shooting programme, always expecting to 
see success over an unrealistically short timeframe. 
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3.4.3 Actions - actors are aware of various actions available to achieve their goals 
The themes of location & scale, heterogeneity of farmers & crofters, and emerging 
shooter trade-offs, and the barriers to cooperation, were evident throughout the 
informant responses on actions available to themselves and others. 
Location & scale 
The formal actions carried out by SNH in both locations included organising the 
LGMG meetings, set-up and coordination of shooting, monitoring and reporting of 
results, financial planning and communications. Locally, SNH were seen to act as 
the link between stakeholders in each location and the central goose management 
governance processes, in the form of the National Goose Management Review 
Group (NGMRG). There was sometimes tension between the local and national 
scale with respect to the actions which could or should be taken. For example, 
goose meat sales in both locations were seen as a success. SNH in Orkney spent 12 
months organising the correct permissions to ensure the carcasses could be sold 
locally. Many shooters, farmers and conservation managers campaigned to allow 
sale of meat to consumers off-island. This would generate income locally, including 
for goose management. The same views were held in the Uists. Neither project 
currently has permission to sell meat beyond their local community, for example to 
mainland Scotland. A conservation manager believed previous efforts at lobbying 
had been successful in terms of agreement with national bodies to get “geese put 
on the pest species list or more easily a generally licence issued for both shooting and 
for sale [of goose meat]” (UC1), but that implementation quickly lost momentum 
and the agreed changed did not occur. 
Farmer & crofter heterogeneity 
One crofter in the Uists summarised how the varied positions of crofters meant 
that cooperative actions were difficult to coordinate; “There’s probably some people 
who aren’t that fussed, if they’re not necessarily relying on that crop to feed cattle, 
[protecting crops from geese is] not as important to them” (UF3). 
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In Orkney however, informants perceived the problem that some farmers would 
not take action even though they did suffer negative impacts from geese. A typical 
criticism from one Orkney farmers was “how many farmers complain about the 
geese problem and out of that many, how many of them phone the department? 
[They would] much rather sit at home complaining, than actually do something” 
(OF7). 
Emerging shooter trade-offs 
Shooters in Orkney saw the actions of shoot tour companies paying farmers for 
exclusive shooting rights as putting their own recreational shooting opportunities 
under pressure. The demand for commercial goose shoot tourism during the open 
season has strong financial incentives, especially when geese are at a premium later 
in the open season. One shooter described how a market for shooting rights was 
created “[shoot tour operators will] buy out all the farms on Orkney. So it’s quite 
common to have competition because some will go to the farmers and offer them 
more money” (OS4). In the Uists, shooters involved in the goose management pilot 
were under a different pressure when deciding on their actions. Shooters cannot 
achieve high numbers of geese shot without allowing a large flock to build up, but 
a larger flock can cause more damage to crops and so poses a greater danger for 
crofters. Shooters must first make a judgement call on the trade-off between 
leaving flocks to build and increased risk of crop damage, then communicate that 
judgement to potentially worried crofters. One shooter (US5) said that the “stakes 
were high” when making such decisions.  
Barriers 
Farmers in Orkney faced operational barriers to shooting more geese themselves, 
such the closed season, limited licenses and the high amount of paperwork 
required to own a gun, that prevented them shooting geese. Crofters in the Uists 
faced similar barriers. SNH allowing a widening of the open season was suggested 
as a low-cost action by farmers in both locations and shooters in Orkney. However, 
shooters in the Uists weren’t confident there were enough skilled shooters to take 
advantage of such a legislative change. SNH had backed a drive to recruit more 
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young shooters in principle but had not taken any actions (including providing 
funding) to increase capacity directly. In the Uists, one further barrier to more 
effective shooting was the knowledge gap caused by a difficulty in measuring 
offtake accurately. There is no requirement for shooters to record the number of 
geese shot during the open season, so SNH rely on voluntary submissions of bag 
data which wasn’t always recorded, stored or accessible. 
Farmers and crofters listed various practical actions to scare geese from their land 
including scarecrows, positioning farm vehicles in fields, kites which mimic birds 
of prey, goose rockets, and gas guns, or personally chasing the geese away. 
However, the ease of scaring geese decreases over time as geese become 
habituated. Farmers and crofters also described the agricultural adaptations they 
had already made wholly or in part to reduce the impact of the geese. Orkney 
farmers discussed switching to less vulnerable crops such as oats. A common 
practice was to add fertiliser to goose damaged grass fields to aid recovery. In 
extremis, farmers talked of reducing livestock numbers due to loss of winter feed 
and grazing to geese. 
Scaring geese or adapting agricultural practices to accommodate or avoid goose 
damage requires overcoming operational barriers of cost and time, which are often 
borne solely by the individual farmer, even in the presence of the goose 
management pilots. One crofter sums up the task of having to constantly scare 
geese: “I want it done, but I want someone else to do it” (UF10). Thus, farmers and 
crofters in both locations justified inaction due political barriers of a lack of 
influence. One crofter/shooter from Uist described how “most crofters are just fed 
up. You stop complaining. You stop getting in touch with agencies” (US1). Political 
barriers caused Uist crofters to disengage from formal processes. For example, 
many crofters are members of the Scottish Crofting Federation (SCF) which had 
sent numerous letters to the press, organised a petition to Scottish Government, 
and taken a seat in the NGMRG. Individuals from the Uists then chose to leave the 
NGMRG, due to perceived lack of progress, with one prominent SCF representative 
summarising their reason for disengaging; “Look, nothing’s happening, you just feel 
like they’re laughing at you” (UF7). 
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3.4.4 Information - information available to actors will influence their behaviour 
Location & scale 
Informants across stakeholder groups and locations perceived inconsistencies in 
relationships between representatives of organisations involved in goose 
management locally, and those operating at a other scales and locations.  
Most Orkney and Uist farmers perceived SNH as seeking a pragmatic balance 
between reducing goose damage and maintaining species population. Views of 
SNH not caring about farmers in Orkney were expressed either as the organisation 
prioritising geese over people or that their actions were purely performative to 
meet a government remit. An Orkney farmer said “I don’t actually know what 
[SNH] would want to achieve. I think they wanted to be seen to be doing something, 
now that we’ve got a cull they can sort of turn around and say you know “we’ve done 
something”” (OF5). In the Uists the local SNH manager was seen in a positive light, 
but there were less positive feelings towards SNH. Crofters were typically cynical 
about the inconsistencies of goose management funding between locations, and 
that SNH at the national scale was responsible. One crofter said “I’ll expose [SNH]. 
Islay have been getting compensated to the tune of a million pounds for the last 
twenty years. We’ve been getting more geese here and doing farming as well. I would 
say that’s a good case for discrimination.” (UF2). The RSPB were also seen by many 
across stakeholder groups as a nationally influential organisation, which was 
driven by a mostly urban membership who did not have experience of the context 
of goose management in Scotland. It was felt that this would result RPSB acting to 
exert influence, to the detriment of a successful goose management pilot. One 
crofter summarised that “there are so many birdy folk in the country nowadays, that 
are members of RSPB or whatever, that they could bring a lot of pressure to bear on 
RSPB to stop the cull because it just sounds such a barbaric way to do it” (UF11). 
Informants who had experience working for SNH agreed that they were indeed the 
link between local and national scales of goose management. Communication 
within the organisation mirrored this structure, with top-down sharing of 
information via a central coordinator. Direct communication between goose 
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management scheme locations across Scotland was limited to occasional staff 
meetings which potentially lead to missed opportunities for shared learning. One 
conservation manager affiliated with the SNH noted “It would be just as easy for 
[pilot goose management schemes across Scotland] to share information we don’t do 
that, we’re not in touch with each other really” (UC1).  
Beyond SNH, the lack of practical information being shared across locations and 
scales from those with technical experience to those without, meant enthusiasm 
for a management strategy could be misplaced. For example, egg-oiling or pricking 
was suggested as potentially useful by shooters and farmers in both locations. 
These practices involve finding the nest of the goose and either dipping the eggs in 
oil or pricking a hole in the shell, both of which prevent the embryo developing. 
Those who had actually had practical experience egg-oiling, were almost always 
less enthusiastic. An experienced shooter explained what they learnt from their 
own attempts at egg-oiling: “First year it worked very well, there were no broods 
anywhere. The second year I did it they were all deserting” (US3). This opinion of the 
method was rare amongst informants, even though experienced shooters were seen 
as having an expert role in the goose management pilots, suggesting that this type 
of crucial information was not being adequately shared. 
Farmer & crofter heterogeneity 
Conservation managers at both locations perceived farmers and crofters to share a 
single goal of achieving reduction in goose numbers. Conservation managers also 
felt that those farmers who had engaged with the project were pragmatic, having 
shown compromise on goose population targets. A conservation manager 
described their positive relationship with farmers on the Orkney LGMG: “we are 
very lucky in the fact that the folk that are on the group you know will discuss and 
will listen” (OC2). However, this was in contrast to interactions with Orkney 
farmers beyond the group, as farming representatives were expected to perform 
this role on behalf of the LGMG.  
Shooters in both locations held negative perceptions of farmer and crofter goals 
and how they influence behaviour. A shooter in Orkney said “Some farmers would 
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like everything to be wiped out that’s not cattle and anything that’s […] on their farm 
that’s not paying them” (OS3), and another in Uist perceived crofter’s goal to be 
“Getting other people to do their work. There is a whole lot more they could be doing 
themselves” (US4). 
Crofters themselves described their ongoing goal as being able to maintain their 
unique lifestyle. For example, one crofter indicated the importance of keeping 
cattle, rather than converting to keep sheep “[crofters] don’t want to stop crofting. 
It’s their lifestyle. They don’t keep many sheep here because they’re cattle crofters, 
that’s what they do best, that’s what they enjoy doing. So, to grow their crops and 
feed their cattle over the winter, and have sheep as an aside, is ideal for them” (UC2). 
Several farmers in Orkney suggested that they would not share successful goose 
scaring tactics with farming neighbours if there was the incentive of geese staying 
away from their own crops. The majority of farmers, however, did talk with each 
other about damage suffered and potential scaring techniques, in person and on 
social media. In the Uists one crofter actively involved in many community 
activities, summarised how heterogeneity of views wasn’t a problem within the 
island community, because of how families remain on the island for generations, 
“you have to live here for hundreds of years and if you make a mistake, they’ll be 
talking about it in three generations. I’m not sure if that helps, it makes the meetings 
much more civil” (UF1). 
Emerging shooter trade-offs 
Shooters in Orkney want to be involved in the goose management pilot in order to 
increase their opportunities for shooting. One conservation manager said “the 
reason [the shooters are] involved is because they love shooting and this is an 
opportunity, […] them being involved in [the goose management pilot] means they 
get a chance to do goose shooting at times when other people can’t” (OC2). 
Relationships between farmers and particular shooting groups were described by 
both the farmers and the shooters as having a preference for exclusivity. One 
farmer described that “we work with the one group […] we know them, trust them”. 
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In the Uists, all stakeholders perceived shooters in the Uists as primarily aiming to 
contribute to the project via goose population control and crop protection. Many 
shooters in the Uists indicated their frustration that some crofters felt they didn’t 
need to take responsibility for their own goose scaring and pushed all the 
responsibility onto the shooters and the pilot scheme. A typical Uist shooter 
comment was “some of the crofters are unbelievable. They offer no protection for 
their crofts. It’s mind boggling” (US5). Another shooter indicated the difficulty of 
providing the service to the crofters: “we try and keep them happy but just not sure 
it’s possible sometimes” (US3). This view of the relationship was sometimes 
confirmed by crofters also, for example one crofter described meeting a shooter on 
the machair “they all listen, but that’s it. No action. They just go with what the 
bosses say” (UF9). 
Barriers 
Many stakeholders identified information barriers that impacted cooperation on 
goose management. Goose counts are used as the quantitative indicator at both 
locations to track success of population control and in modelling of goose 
population trends to dictate actions (Ferguson 2016; Churchill 2016). The 
uncertainty in the counts was acknowledged as a problem by all stakeholders, 
acting as a knowledge barrier to better management. Stakeholders critiqued both 
methods and results. In Orkney the Wildfowl & Wetlands Trust conduct a robust 
annual goose count, the data from which informs the subsequent year’s goose 
management and published in a technical report e.g. Mitchell et al. (2016). 
Shooters and farmers were not involved with population data collection in Orkney 
and criticised timing the annual count during the cull period, as it interfered with 
shooting. In the Uists, practical difficulties led to less robust counting methods 
than Orkney and greater uncertainty in the population estimates. One Uist shooter 
disputed the figures from the goose count, “[the Uist LGMG] say the number’s 
reducing but I’m not so sure. Maybe in certain areas they are reducing. It all depends 
on the day you do the count, what the weather’s like” (US5). SNH in the Uists 
indicate that the counting method is the same every survey but acknowledge that 
there will be many uncounted geese. Count transects do not cover the entire area 
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particularly on the less accessible east side of the islands. More accurate 
evaluations face a operational cost barrier. However, counts in the Uists are 
conducted collaboratively with crofters, conservation managers and shooters all 
taking part to produce the data together. 
Despite criticism of the count data and the desire for more robust data, individuals 
from all stakeholder groups at both locations actually downplayed these sources of 
uncertainty in the goose management pilot as a whole, stating that the 
management plans were good, but the schemes needed to be scaled up. Barriers to 
success were based on number of skilled shooters and the amount of funding. One 
Uist crofter gave a common viewpoint that “you need more of it. It’s all you can do. 
[…] It takes money and resources to pay people to scare” (UF2). 
3.4.5 Control - individuals are impacted by Controls, altering their choices of action 
Location & scale 
Stakeholders generally agreed that organisations which spanned scales held much 
of the control. All stakeholders saw SNH as a major player in goose management in 
both Orkney and the Uists. One typical comment was from a Uist crofter: “SNH are 
the biggest player, that’s what’s I’m getting at. They’ve got the most power, the most 
influence. They are an arm of government. They advise on the policy, they’re the ones 
that feedback. They are absolutely central, absolutely key” (UF8). The differences 
between the national scale influence of SNH and the local was emphasised 
repeatedly, with local representatives characteristically described as “very helpful” 
(OS1) by an Orkney shooter, and “fantastic” (UF1) by a Uist crofter. 
Farmer & crofter heterogeneity 
Orkney farmers felt that as a group they did not have as much influence on goose 
management as other actors “[we are] likely important but not a big player” (OF9). 
An Orkney conservationist felt farmers are important players as “without their 
lobbying pressure nothing would have been done” (OG4) and a shooter thought 
“farmers are an important player as they have to give permission [to shoot]” (OS3).  
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One informant who conducted had farmer surveys described how farmers 
individually had different amounts of control: “there’s lots of smaller farmers who 
just feel quite helpless about the situation” (OG5). 
In the Uists, crofters had mixed views on how important and influential they felt 
they were in goose management, with some saying crofters were a major player 
and others saying the opposite. One crofter summed it up “Well crofters are the 
most effective [at goose management actions], but honestly in terms of influence […] 
honestly in lots of ways, I’d say pretty low down the scale” (UF8). Individuals from 
other stakeholder groups also had varied views on the potential for crofters to take 
control. One informant thought crofters had “very little to do with goose 
management. They just suffer the consequences” (UG4), but a non-farming LGMG 
member described some crofters as influential: “They are fairly political savvy, they 
know how to motivate their local politicians to try and get things done and they are 
not afraid to influence people to try and get what they want” (UG3). 
A major source of control over crofters was seen to be their commitment to 
crofting culture, more so than in other areas in Scotland. One informant 
elaborated on how they are unlikely to be dissuaded from crofting, regardless of 
current or warnings of future hardships: “if it’s in your blood you can’t see past it 
and you carry on regardless. Cos’ we’re always hoping for next year, this year’s bad 
next year’s going to be good. And if you listen to you accountants they will say “och!” 
You turn a deaf ear to that” (UF10). 
Emerging shooter trade-offs 
Shooters themselves and people in other stakeholder groups all saw shooting 
expertise as very important to goose management in both locations. A shooter in 
the Uists said “[the shooters] are the essential part. They are the foundation of it all” 
(US4). An Orkney informant thought “[shooters] are playing a key role in actually 
carrying out the shooting [and they] are professional folk out there who can do the 
management work” (OG2).  
Barriers 
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Farmers and crofters expressed that the challenges of high costs of a remote 
location and extreme weather, which act as operational barriers to engaging in the 
additional costs of goose management. They also perceive political barriers in the 
form of a lack of influence. One Orkney farmer commented “[SNH] will listen, but 
they are up themselves like “we’re SNH you aren’t telling us what to do. We’ll decide 
what we’re doing”” (OF8). 
Shooters in the Orkney pilot are volunteers, whose level of shooting is controlled 
by time and cost implications. Potentially using the numerous sport-shooters to 
reduce the resident goose population during the winter open season faced a 
knowledge barrier of being able to preferentially target a resident bird over a 
migratory bird. 
Time and money limitations are constraints for shooting in the Uists also, but 
there is also a knowledge barrier of a limited number of local individuals capable of 
performing the job. One older, more experienced shooter worried about who 
would take over duties as the current shooters grew older, “Who’s replacing? 
Because there isn’t anybody else. Maybe one or two others, who are of similar age to 
us who would be able to continue.” (US5). 
3.4.6 Outcomes – the predictions actors make about the results of their actions 
Farmer & crofter heterogeneity 
A massive reduction in goose damage would result in little practical change for 
Orkney farmers, but considerably less stress. One said “We’d carry on the same. I’d 
say we’ve carried on the same for a lot of years” (OF9) another farmer felt “It’d be 
one less worry in your mind. You lay in bed in the morning and you hear all these 
geese going over and you have to get up and have a look” (OF8). However, an 
Orkney conservation manager wondered if a subset of farmers would still not be 
happy, with an older conflict replacing the current one “if we ever managed to get 
the resident population down to the level that […]  is causing less damage, whether or 
not farmers would then just go back to complaining about the wintering geese or 
not?” (OC2). 
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In the Uists, one crofter summarised the cause and effect process of a reduction in 
goose numbers “Bring the numbers down, less geese, […] less damage, more crops 
harvested, […] less stress” (UF3). Fewer geese could mark a return to traditional 
crofting, “a lot of crofters together might only have twenty acres of corn, so if they do 
even one acre of traditional harvesting if would make a difference on the Machair” 
(UF7). 
Farmers in Orkney felt an increase in geese would force them to reduce barley 
production and as a result have to decrease livestock numbers. One farmer said, 
“it’ll get to the stage when it’s not feasible to grow barley here” (OF7). However, one 
Orkney farmer mentioned how many farmers had already adapted to continue 
farming: “I don’t think anybody would jack it in because of geese. I think folk have 
changed; I know a couple of farmers have just stopped growing crops now because 
they can’t grow crops because of geese but they’re still farming” (OF2). 
Stakeholder in the Uists noted the majority of crofters had stopped the more 
traditional practices in response to geese and offered a bleak picture if goose 
numbers continued to rise. One predicted that “Crofting would more or less cease. 
It is not all that healthy at the moment. I think if the geese numbers are daft and go 
up any more it’ll just be curtains for crofting” (UF6). The unique machair habitat of 
the Uists was often mentioned as being a potential casualty of increased goose 
numbers. Specifically, the loss of cattle would impact biodiversity. One crofter 
described the cause and effect processes “It’s all one big circle that benefits the 
environment. So if people weren’t keeping the cattle, which might be the case with a 
lot more geese, then the environment would suffer” (UF4). 
Emerging shooter trade-offs 
Sport shooters were concerned with personal trade-offs of a successful population 
reduction scheme. One shooter from Orkney who ran a shoot tourism business 
said “a lot of these businesses like myself would not want [geese], wiped out because 
that would obviously mean the end of business for all of us” (OS3). In the Uists a 
goose population so low as to not require scaring was seen as advantageous to the 
local sport shooting industry by one shooter as the geese would be easier to shoot 
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by paying customers: “at the moment [the geese] never settle in one place enough to 
be able to shoot any numbers so [the scaring is] bit of a mixed blessing you know” 
(US3). 
Shooters in Orkney felt that increased goose numbers would not negatively affect 
them. One said “I don’t really think it would affect me personally” (OS4). In fact, one 
shooter said there may be positive effects “if it got worse it would get better for me 
basically, for the shooting side of things” (OS2). One shooter described how sport 
shooters and a subset of farmers would also be happy “There’s so many guys 
making money from it you know the farmers are making money from the [shooters]” 
(OS4).  
3.4.7 Payoff – the balance of costs and benefits of an action 
Location & scale 
The stated pilot schemes objectives of reduced damage to agriculture and 
maintenance of the conservation status of the greylag geese are the primary goals 
of SNH in both locations (Ferguson 2016; Churchill 2016), as they are derived from 
those of the national scale project. However, there was tension between local and 
national when greater detail was required, for example on bag targets. An Orkney 
conservation manager said: “people started to really apply for [shooting] licenses in 
the summer […] when there was about 7,000-10,000 resident geese [but] the national 
group didn’t accept that, they have suggested that the target is 9,000-11,000. […] but 
my feeling is […] the figure that we go for is the one that can be maintained” (OC2). 
Practical aspects of what it takes to maintain the goose population, includes 
determination of where SNH’s money is best spent to try and find resolutions that 
benefit all sides. A conservation manager described the importance of cooperation 
with local people, “we want to be seen as an organisation who will try and help and 
compromise and find resolutions and while we do have regulatory roles as well that’s 
one side of us and the other side is working with communities” (OC1). In the Uists 
SNH also emphasised dual goals, one conservation manager said the SNH goal was 
“basically to preserve the geese and preserve the benefits of crofting, side by side” 
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(UC2). Another explained that they are satisfied with balancing outcomes between 
crofters at the local scale and scientists at the national scale, commenting “I think 
we’ve come up with a fairly sensible solution there, that the crofters are mostly happy 
with and the scientists that are working on the population models are fairly happy 
(UC1). 
Farmer & crofter heterogeneity 
Farmers interviewed in Orkney all wanted to see goose population reduction but 
disagreed on the ultimate goal. One farmer said “there wouldn’t be one single 
farmer who would say ach no, keep a few. Not one” (OF2). Whilst another 
contradicted this sentiment “There’s not a farmer wanting to destroy wildlife, I can 
guarantee you that. I don’t think any farmer want the geese at zero” (OF8). Crofters 
in the Uists also responded with a range of goals: “There’s lots of crofters […] who 
have some kind of arable activity. And there are lots of crofters who keep […] sheep, 
they don’t grow anything, […] the geese aren’t a huge problem for them and they 
probably are sympathetic to other crofters but are ambivalent in themselves” (UF8).  
Those crofters who did want a reduction in goose numbers typically aimed to “get 
them under control, or maybe move to a different habitat” (UF5). Or more 
specifically “to see them reduced by half” (UF11). 
Emerging shooter trade-offs 
The volunteer shooters in Orkney like to engage in their pastime. One shooter said 
“We want to see the geese here as well ‘cause we enjoy going for a shoot you know it’s 
a hobby as well” (OS4). Those involved in shooting businesses indicated trading-off 
a commercial goal with sympathy to farmers: “what we would generally like to see is 
shoot good numbers, keep the clients happy, keep the money coming in but at the 
same time have a population that is not doing too much harm to the crops” (OS3). 
In the Uists, shooters talked more of achieving the goose management pilot goals. 
One shooter said “It’s about covering [the area for shooting] effectively. One can’t 
ask for more” (US4). Compared to shooters in Orkney, the enjoyment Uist 
individuals got from the act of shooting geese was mixed. One older shooter said 
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“I’m quite keen on geese. I’m getting a bit idle now in my old age, I don’t go out now 
unless I’m sure I’m going to shoot well into double figures. […] No, I enjoy shooting 
geese, it’s fun” (US3).  
3.5 RESULTS SUMMARY 
3.5.1 Cooperation in Scotland’s goose conflict 
The bringing together of the seven criteria of the IAD into the descriptive action 
situation of goose management and conflict in Orkney and the Uists paints a 
picture of common themes and barriers to cooperative interactions. 
Individuals took part in cooperative interactions across various locations and 
scales. Sharing of information between LGMGs was via interaction of the local SNH 
manager and a central SNH coordinator rather than directly between local 
individuals of all stakeholder groups. Issues were raised regarding differences in 
local and national goals. For example, in the case of the sale of goose meat all local 
actors wished to cooperate to expand the market for the geese, albeit to meet 
differing goals. The difficulties in accurately monitoring offtake of geese where 
there is greater market incentive to shoot illegally were perceived to be a legitimate 
concern for conservation organisations at the national level, who would strongly 
resist the changes in legislation needed. Crofters in the Uists were aware of the 
disparity in funding between their local LGMG and another in Scotland, causing 
resentment due to the perceived unfairness. 
The independence of the farmers and crofters lacks the structure of organisations 
or multi-stakeholder processes such as the LGMG, which can be designed to foster 
cooperation. Many actors from different stakeholder groups agreed that 
cooperation by farmers and crofters would benefit goose management. Other 
stakeholder groups perceived farmers and crofters to have a universal goal of a 
massive reduction of geese, although this wasn’t the whole story. Even where goals 
were similar, the heterogeneity of farmer and crofter positions made cooperation 
more difficult. For example, crofters growing crops with neighbours who kept only 
sheep may both want to decrease goose numbers but would have different 
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motivation to spend valuable time and money cooperating with scaring activities. 
Information sharing on scaring tactics was common both through personal 
relationships and publicly on Facebook. Some suggested they withheld useful 
information if it meant they could make their land less desirable to geese 
compared to surrounding land. However, truthful, cooperative behaviour when 
communicating with others was seen as a necessity in the close community of the 
Uists, where defection would lead to long-term reputational damage. Cooperation 
for lobbying was successful. Orkney farmers and Uist crofters had achieved 
creation of the LGMGs to manage the geese in their respective locations. Individual 
Uist crofters had taken this further and represented crofting at national goose 
management meetings.  
At each location, shooters felt under pressure from another group due to 
competing goals. In Orkney the positions, actions and goals of sport shooting 
companies and farmers align during the open season resulting in exclusive farm 
access sold to shooting companies. Local shooters felt that this exclusion 
controlled their opportunities to engage in their pastime. This resulted in 
enthusiasm for the access to shooting as part of the pilot scheme, benefitting the 
goose management pilot with a pool of highly skilled volunteer labour. In the 
Uists, shooters require a build-up of geese at one site in order to shoot the high 
numbers required for population control. Crofters want to protect their crops so 
many will scare any geese and are encouraged to do so. Scaring affected the 
behaviour of the geese making them less likely to build up in large numbers and 
warier of people.  
3.5.2 Barriers to cooperation 
Barriers described by informants were grouped into three broad categories: 
political barriers present due to the influence of important actors; operational 
barriers formed of legislation or cost; and knowledge barriers surrounding 
incomplete understanding of the natural system (Table 12). 
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Table 12 – Barriers to cooperation as described by informants in the goose conflict in 
Scotland, grouped into similar types 
Political barriers (the influence of important actors) 
• Farmers often felt that conservation managers heard their concerns but gave them 
low priority when decision-making 
• Crofters cooperating on the national goose group felt they were not listened to and 
disengaged with the process 
• Influential conservation interests were a limit to the locally supported expansion of 
goose meat processing and sale 
• More efficient methods of goose control may be unpalatable to the public and 
therefore would be unacceptable to elected representatives 
 
Knowledge barriers (incomplete knowledge of the natural system) 
• Lack of systematic testing for effective scaring techniques; 
• Goose counting methods with high uncertainty leading to lack of trust in 
population estimates; 
• Dissemination of experiences from those who had tried egg-oiling and pricking; 
• Indistinguishability of resident from migratory greylag geese in Orkney preventing 
targeted shooting during the open season. 
 
Operational barriers (legislation, cost or skills) 
• Increased crop protection or population control by farmers and crofters requires 
their valuable time and financial resources 
• Increased efficiency of shooting in the Uists was limited by the lack of shooting 
skills 
• Increased access to shooting requires licences (both for gun ownership and out of 
season bags) 
• Widening the open season, expanding goose meat sales or lowering the protected 
status of the geese would require legislation changes 
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3.6 DISCUSSION  
Encouraging cooperative behaviours between people involved in a conservation 
conflict is a widely advocated approach for conflict management (Pound 2015), 
including those involving geese (Fox et al. 2017). Collecting data using the 
Institution Analysis and Development (IAD) framework gave us seven sets of 
interconnected data (as in Figure 5), one for each of the criteria. From these sets 
we identified three common themes of cooperation within the goose conflict that 
could be applicable to fostering cooperation in other conservation conflicts. 
3.6.1 Location & scale 
Goose management is decentralised allowing local stakeholders to devise 
management appropriate to the local context. Distributed decision-making is 
advantageous for conflict management as it allows adaptability of actions to the 
context and avoids the lack of ownership and low level of acceptance of a purely 
top-down approach (Reed & Sidoli Del Ceno 2015; Mason, Pollard et al. 2018). But 
no structure or process is a panacea for social-ecological problems (Ostrom et al. 
2007). Opportunities for local stakeholders to engage in cooperative behaviours are 
influenced by external connections, both horizontal (across space) and vertical 
(e.g. different tiers of an organisation) (Armitage et al. 2009). Horizontal impacts 
on cooperation were seen when Uist crofters felt they were be treated unfairly 
compared to goose management schemes elsewhere in Scotland, as has been 
reported by others (Howarth 2018). Vertical impacts were present where a diverse 
range of local stakeholders agreed that expanding the market for goose meat sales 
would be a positive action, but it was perceived that national conservation 
organisations would not allow it to happen.  
Information sharing within the formal goose management network travelled 
vertically up and down via a central SNH coordinator, rather than horizontally 
between LGMGs. Horizontal information sharing between other stakeholder 
groups was not seen. This meant that useful information would only be shared (if 
at all) via a network centred upon a conservation affiliated source at a national 
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level. Information transfer through a central ‘hub’ in this way is efficient, but only 
desirable if the hub is trusted by the rest of the network (Berardo & Scholz 2010). 
Responses from farmers and crofters indicate this not to be the case. For example, 
we found support amongst many farmers, crofters and shooters to use the practice 
of egg-oiling in order to control geese, despite little experience of the method. The 
potential impact on the conflict of this is displayed as an action situation in Figure 
6. Conservation managers also had little experience but did not agree with egg-
oiling. Those who did have experience of egg-oiling (a small number of shooters) 
felt it was not a practical solution, agreeing with conservation managers. However, 
this information was only shared through the single conservation source rather 
than via the shooters and thus whether to conduct egg-oiling remained a point of 
debate. Contrastingly in a goose management scheme in Norway and Denmark, 
information spread by a network of lay individuals was seen as a likely contributor 
to positive hunter attitudes (Holmgaard et al. 2018). A network structure conducive 
to solving complex problems (denser and with more redundancy) is not mutually 
exclusive to an efficient network (built around centralised hubs) (Berardo & Scholz 
2010). Management of conservation conflict is heavily context dependent (White et 
al. 2009; Young, Jordan, R. Searle, et al. 2013) and in long-running conflicts context 
will change with time. Developing horizontal and vertical network connections is 
valuable for coping with change. 
 
Figure 6 - Action situation describing how scale and location impacts the goose conflict 
using the example of disagreements over egg-oiling as a goose population control method 
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3.6.2 Farmer & crofter heterogeneity 
It was perceived by most informants from other stakeholder groups, that farmers 
and crofters shared a common goal of achieving a large reduction in goose 
numbers. However, although farmers and crofters acknowledged themselves that 
this was their main goal, within those groups there was a wide spectrum of goals 
from total eradication to a sustainable population. This finding reflects findings of 
other researchers who have warned that the false belief in uniformity among 
stakeholder groups is partly responsible for continued poor understanding of 
socio-ecological systems (Ostrom et al. 2007). Some farmers and crofters indicated 
a preferred goal of personal crop protection which led to uncooperative behaviour 
when they said they would keep successful scaring tactics to themselves rather 
than share with others. At a landscape scale, pest protection becomes a common 
pool resource problem, as an individual who does no crop protection may benefit 
from the effort put in by an active neighbour (Zhang et al. 2007). In addition to 
variations in goals, farmers and crofters often held different positions. For example, 
they did not necessarily suffer the same impact. This led to farmers and crofters 
themselves perceiving that others in their stakeholder group would not cooperate 
with one another. The impacts of farmer heterogeneity on the conflict as shown as 
an action situation in Figure 7. 
Our findings confirmed that farmers are a diverse stakeholder group with a 
complex range of perceptions regarding environmental management (Teixeira et 
al. 2018). Farmers and crofters are the most numerous stakeholder group directly 
involved in the goose conflict in Scotland, so their participation may be reliant on 
representative individuals or groups. Increasing diversity of group(s) involved with 
the participatory process, even within stakeholder groups, can produce benefits 
such as increased creativity for problem solving (Enayati 2002). 
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Figure 7 - Action situation describing how farmer and crofter heterogeneity impacts the 
goose conflict 
3.6.3 Emerging shooter trade-offs 
Actively seeking win-win outcomes is a cooperative behaviour promoted for 
conservation conflict management (Redpath et al. 2013; Pound 2015). It is well 
recognised in the conservation field that trade-offs between different stakeholder 
goals often prevent perfect win-win scenarios being realised; trade-offs are the 
norm (McShane et al. 2011). The three objectives set by the NGMRG acknowledge 
this, giving equal weighting to goose conservation, crop damage prevention and 
cost efficiency. Often trade-offs are discussed during the planning phase of a 
project, rather than throughout (Hirsch et al. 2011). This was apparent in both 
Orkney and the Uists where different trade-offs involving shooters have emerged. 
In the Uists, there was a trade-off between shooters who need flocks of geese to 
congregate so large hunting bags can be attained and crofters who need to protect 
their crops by scaring geese. The benefits of population reduction to the 
community and benefits of crop protection to the individual were in competition. 
Orkney shooters enthusiastically volunteered to be part of the scheme as their 
opportunities to shoot during the open season had diminished through farmers 
giving exclusive shooting access to paying companies. This seems like a potential 
win-win, but as circumstances change and expansion of the shooting is required 
(as is planned), shooters may become wary of losing their newly acquired shooting 
privileges to others, for example hired marksmen. If the shooters fought to 
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maintain the status quo, the scheme could become locked-in to the current 
method of population reduction, potentially creating a conflict within a conflict 
and failure to meet scheme objectives. The impacts of this trade-off as displayed as 
an action situation in Figure 8. 
Goose conflict management in Scotland has already approached trade-offs 
positively by establishing multi-stakeholder processes and working towards plural 
objectives. The capacity of conservation management systems to adapt to new 
challenges is not well understood (Mcleod et al. 2016) but many local individuals 
interviewed are fully aware of these emerging trade-offs which is a good starting 
point from which to approach adaptation. Participatory methods for this include 
scenario planning (Peterson et al. 2003) or games (Redpath, et al. 2018). 
 
Figure 8 - Action situation describing how an emerging shooter trade-off impacts the 
goose conflict, using the example of volunteer shooters in Orkney defending their 
opportunity to shoot 
3.6.4 Barriers to cooperation 
Political barriers to cooperative behaviour existed due to the perception that some 
actors were more important and had more influence than others. Large 
organisations including government, have access to information and staying power 
that gives them considerable advantages over small, community organisations or 
individuals (Henmati 2002). Farmers and crofters accused larger organisations of 
tokenism, which can occur when there are large power disparities in participatory 
processes (Redpath et al. 2015). This indicated that for all the successes of the 
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distributed decision-making of the LGMGs, many farmers and crofters do not (yet) 
feel engaged. This is not sufficient for truly participatory processes (Reed 2008).  
Knowledge barriers are the result of incomplete understanding of the system. 
Uncertainty is inevitable and makes decision-making tougher (Polasky et al. 2011). 
The use of best-practice methods to deal with uncertainty can have undesirable 
outcomes in complex systems (Mason, Pollard et al. 2018) and this was seen in 
comparison of goose counting at the two locations. In the Uists, all stakeholder 
groups were involved in the goose counts which involved a count on a single day 
twice-yearly and missed out much of the geographical area of the islands. Many 
crofters questioned both the methodology and the outcome but agreed with SNH 
that the method was the best available for use in the management of the geese. 
Contrastingly, in Orkney the Wildfowl & Wetlands Trust produce a more accurate 
and robust count of the geese. Counting requires shooting to cease but is 
scheduled during a period of August when shooters are most active in population 
reduction. This resulted in conflict between shooters and conservation managers. 
There were also several operational barriers which prevented stakeholder from 
carrying out practical cooperative actions, such as a skills shortage in shooting in 
the Uists. Inability to implement agreed tasks effectively can undermine decisions, 
hard won through cooperative behaviour (Agrawal & Gibson 1999). 
3.6.5 Methodology and theoretical considerations 
We concentrated on three main stakeholder groups involved in the goose conflict 
in Scotland. We did not include individuals who had not been directly involved in 
goose conflict in at least one of the locations. It is clear that regional or national 
scale actors have a large influence on the cooperative behaviours of individuals 
through vertical interactions. To address this, we decided to include their influence 
as externalities to the local conflicts, rather than expand data collection to ‘off-
island’ informants. The snowball sampling used may have been biased by the social 
networks of the initial key informants (Reed et al. 2009). We were primarily 
concerned with cooperation around the LGMGs, which themselves have a low 
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number of members and we interviewed representatives from all the groups 
consistently named by informants in the stakeholder identification. 
Conservation conflict is a sensitive subject which can result in biased responses 
from face-to-face interviews (St. John et al. 2010). Informants can avoid certain 
questions or answer dishonestly to avoid losing face, revealing illegal activities or 
politically charged or socially unacceptable actions (St. John et al. 2010; Drury et al. 
2011). To partially counteract this, we assured informants of confidentiality prior to 
interviews which is known to improve honest responses (Singer et al. 1995). 
Manipulation of researchers during interviews happened on several occasions as 
informants actively encouraged the interviewer to pass on sensitive comments 
specifically criticising other individuals and stakeholder groups (we did not) to try 
and affect change. This only occurred with farmers and crofters talking about 
conservation managers, suggesting that they viewed the researchers as having 
access to or influence over conservation groups.  
The IAD framework we used was designed for the purpose of increasing 
understanding of the institutions surrounding natural resource management, so 
assumes a natural resource is the foundation of the system, then builds complexity 
upwards by adding individual behaviour (Ostrom 2011). We took advantage of 
framing conflict as a trade-off between ecosystem services and disservices (Ceaușu 
et al. 2018), to fit geese into the role of a natural resource about which individuals 
interact. This allowed us to answer our research questions by focusing data 
collection into seven specified criteria and then using the relationships between 
those criteria as proposed by Ostrom (2011) in the action situation (Figure 5), to 
draw out common themes. A general advantage to this framework is the ability to 
explore emergent themes in a consistent and therefore comparable way. More 
specifically it ensures that the criteria and relationships identified as common 
across systems of natural resource institutions are suitably investigated and 
important constituents of themes are not overlooked.  
However, using the IAD for studying conservation conflict is not without 
limitations. Firstly, although the IAD is grounded in the individual scale, it is most 
often applied at aggregate level missing heterogeneity within groups (Orach & 
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Schlüter 2016). The reason for this became clear as we explored the variability 
between individuals, but due to resource constraints on data collection and 
analysis we did not explore upwards through institutional scales to fully 
understand the vertical relationships which were so often mentioned as important 
by our informants. Secondly, individuals in the IAD are boundedly rational, fallible 
learners, assuming individual learning through trial and error. The model of policy 
change in the IAD is gradual, stepwise and unidirectional, through learning and 
cooperation (Ostrom 2011; Orach & Schlüter 2016). These models of behaviour and 
change fit well for an IAD evaluation of local adaptive co-management (Whaley & 
Weatherhead 2014), but in conservation conflict, cooperative learning is plagued 
by complexities of perceived impartiality and trust (Redpath et al. 2015; Young, 
Searle, et al. 2016). If using the IAD for understanding conservation conflict, 
learning itself must be viewed as a value laden process. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
This work adds to the literature regarding cooperation between stakeholders in 
conservation conflict in three ways. Firstly, distributed participatory processes still 
need to be considered as part of a whole, or may paradoxically risk the loss of 
cooperation at local scales. Evaluation of horizontal and vertical links between 
distributed groups can achieve gains through shared learning and avoid losses 
from perception of unfairness. Secondly, heterogeneity of stakeholder groups 
should be represented appropriately according to the level of the process – 
representation of farmers by, for example a union official, is appropriate at the 
national level, but the same strategy fails to include the diversity of stakeholder 
positions and goals at the local level, hindering cooperation. Finally, the propensity 
of stakeholders to cooperate will change with the emergence of new trade-offs. As 
adaptive management projects experiment and update to changing circumstances, 
so conservation conflict management should be encouraged to do the same. 
Conservation conflict is a complex problem and the structures and processes to 
manage it need to mirror this. 
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3.8 SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
Pilot interviews 
The first three interviews (all Orkney) were conducted on the same day and were 
used as a pilot for the interview guide. Questions additional to those on the pilot 
question list, were asked during the course of the pilot interviews as conversation 
developed and so small changes were made to the interview guide for the main 
study. Questions removed were: How would you describe resolution? How has the 
list of stakeholders changed over time? Is [stakeholder] making progress towards 
their goals? Are you part of [stakeholder] and do you have influence? Is 
[stakeholder] an important player regarding impact on you personally? How does 
[stakeholder] see the threats you have to cope with? Questions added were: What 
actions [stakeholder] take to achieve their goals? Do you interact with this group 
and if so, how? Data collected during the pilot were included in the final analysis. 
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Interview guide 
Section 0 – Interview details  
Location 
Interview number 
Date  
Section 1 – Background  
Age 
Gender 
Residence (current, previous) 
Occupation / role (current, previous)  
 
Section 2 – Views on geese  
Describe your views on the geese  
Describe the impacts of the geese on you and others 
 
Section 3 – Stakeholder analysis  
Please list all the stakeholders (including yourself, individuals, groups, and 
organisations) involved with or impacted by geese in [Orkney or the Uists]  
For yourself –  
Regarding management of geese:  
• What is your goal and why?  
• What actions do you take to achieve your goal?  
• What additional actions could you take to achieve your goal?  
• What stops you from taking these additional actions?  
• Are you an important player in goose management and if so, how?  
 
For each of the stakeholders listed -  
Regarding management of geese:  
• What is their goal and why?  
• Do you interact with this group and if so, how?  
• What actions do this group take to achieve their goals?  
• What additional actions could they take to achieve better outcomes?  
• What stops them from taking these additional actions?  
• Is this group an important player in goose management and if so, how?  
 
Section 4 – Opportunities & threats  
Other than geese, list the major threats that you cope with in your occupation / 
role  
Describe how these threats compare with the impacts of geese.  
Describe how the future would be if management actions did not resolve the 
goose issue and the population increased significantly  
Describe how the future would be if management actions did resolve the goose 
issue and the goose population decreased significantly  
 
Section 5 – Additional information  
Do you have any additional comments or information regarding what we’ve 
discussed today?  
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Participant Consent Form 
I have been informed: 
• Of the aim of the project; 
• That my responses will be kept confidential within the research team and I will not be 
identified or identifiable in any report resulting from this research; 
• I have the right to access the data files containing my responses at any time in the 
future. 
Initial: __________ 
 
I agree to take part in this study: 
 
_____________________ ___________________  ______________________ 
Name of participant   Date    Signature 
 
 
_____________________ ___________________  ______________________ 
Name of investigator   Date    Signature 
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on cooperation intent in a 
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4.1  ABSTRACT 
Stakeholder cooperation can be vital in managing conservation conflicts. 
Laboratory experiments show cooperation is less likely in the presence of 
uncertainty. Much less is known about how stakeholders in real-life conservation 
conflicts respond to different types of uncertainty. 
We tested the effect of different sources of uncertainty on cooperative behaviour 
using a framed field experiment and interviews. The experiment compared a 
baseline scenario of perfect certainty with scenarios including either: i) scientific 
uncertainty about the effectiveness of a conflict-reduction intervention; ii) 
administrative uncertainty about intervention funding; or iii) political uncertainty 
about the extent of community support. We applied these scenarios to a 
conservation conflict in the Outer Hebrides, Scotland, involving the management 
of geese to simultaneously meet both conservation and farming objectives. We 
asked 149 crofters (small scale farmers) if they would commit to cooperate with 
others by helping fund a goose management plan given the three sources of 
uncertainty. 
On average, intention to cooperate was highest (99%) in scenarios without 
uncertainty, and lowest under administrative uncertainty (77%). Scientific 
uncertainty and political uncertainty both had less of an effect, with over 95% of 
crofters predicted to be willing to cooperate in these scenarios. Crofters who 
indicated concern for other crofters suffering the impact of geese were more likely 
to cooperate. The longer an individual had been a crofter, the less likely they were 
to cooperate. 
Crofters’ intention to cooperate is high but lessened by uncertainty, especially over 
the commitment from other stakeholders such as government, to cooperate on 
goose management. Existing cooperation on goose management may be at risk if 
uncertainty isn’t reduced outright or commitments between parties are not 
strengthened. This has wide applicability, supporting the need for researchers and 
government advisers to: i) determine how uncertainty will impact intention of 
stakeholders to cooperate; and ii) take steps (such as uncertainty reduction, 
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communication, or acceptance) to reduce the negative impact of uncertainty on 
cooperation. 
4.2 INTRODUCTION 
Conflicts in conservation are ubiquitous around the globe and are damaging to 
both conservation efforts and people’s lives (Redpath et al. 2013). Fostering 
cooperation between stakeholders with conflicting values is a priority of 
conservation conflict management as it builds trust and reduces conflict, both 
under experimental conditions and in real-life (Yamagishi 2005; Young et al. 2016). 
One important factor that reduces the chances of achieving cooperation in conflict 
is uncertainty, which will generally decrease the tendency to trust and cooperate 
(Rapoport et al. 1996). Rittel & Webber (1973) describe three broad sources of 
uncertainty in social ecological systems (SES): scientific uncertainty from 
incomplete knowledge of the research system; political uncertainty regarding 
power relationships and values; and administrative uncertainty surrounding cost 
and responsibilities. 
Experimental economics methods have been used to test cooperation in collective 
action problems (Cárdenas & Ostrom 2004), including in the presence or absence 
of uncertainty. For example, Barrett & Dannenberg (2012) used lab experiments 
with volunteers to investigate decision making in the context of climate change 
negotiations, showing that uncertainty of the position of an emission threshold 
resulted in lower cooperation than uncertainty surrounding the impacts of 
exceeding that threshold. However, volunteers in a lab setting will act differently 
to stakeholders in a real-world situation (Levitt & List 2007). Working with 
stakeholders involved in a conservation conflict (rather than with volunteers) and 
framing the experiment in a way which reflects a real collective-action problem, 
allows real-life aspects of the conflict such as knowledge of the system, underlying 
values and perceptions of others, to be taken into account. Here we use an 
experimental economics method to explore how three types of uncertainty 
(scientific uncertainty, administrative uncertainty, and political uncertainty) 
influence the intention to cooperate of people in a real-life conservation conflict. 
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Conservation conflicts involving the damage of crops by wildlife are widespread 
globally (Treves et al. 2006). In Northern Europe, reduction of agricultural yield 
due to grazing of wild geese is a well-documented problem (Cusack et al. 2018; 
Simonsen et al. 2017).  Methods for reducing goose damage to crops include 
regulating population (e.g. shooting), non-lethal scaring, or providing sacrificial 
feeding areas (Fox et al. 2017). Stakeholders involved in a goose conflict can include 
those who: suffer directly from goose damage; wish to maintain the conservation 
status of the geese and their habitat; are responsible for scientific support of 
management; are required to fulfil practical management activities; and, provide 
funding or practical support. Mapping the specific stakeholders and uncertainties 
has been identified as an important step in understanding the context for 
conservation conflict management (Redpath et al. 2013), however less is known 
regarding how cooperative behaviour of stakeholders in a conflict is affected by 
different sources of uncertainty. 
In this paper we test how scientific, administrative and political uncertainties 
impact on stakeholders’ willingness to cooperate on goose management in the 
Outer Hebrides, Scotland. Resident greylag goose (Anser anser) numbers there 
have been increasing steadily from historic low points in the mid-twentieth 
century, to record highs. While this is seen by many as a conservation success 
story, the geese are responsible for damage to arable crops and to pasture intended 
for livestock. (Mitchell et al., 2010; Bainbridge, 2017). The majority of agricultural 
activity in the Outer Hebrides takes place on crofts; small-scale farms of typically 5 
ha, culturally unique to the more remote and less productive areas of the 
Highlands and Islands of Scotland. Crofting is regarded historically and legally as a 
distinct category of farming in Scotland and is recognised by Scottish Government 
as being vital in maintaining the population of remote areas, supporting local 
businesses, and managing important natural habitats (Scottish Government 2016). 
Crofters (farmers of croft land) impacted by geese essentially take part in a form of 
public goods game, where they each choose whether to voluntarily contribute to 
the maintenance of a non-excludable, non-rivalrous public good (cooperate with 
goose management by contributing to scaring actions), or not (defect). Defection is 
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less costly in the short term where benefits of the public good can be obtained 
without contribution (elsewhere called free-riding) but runs the risk of losing the 
benefits should enough others do the same. 
Presenting crofters with a set of four public goods scenarios for goose management 
- a baseline with no uncertainty and three treatments with differing sources of 
uncertainty - we aimed to: 
1. examine how crofters’ intention to cooperate was influenced by different 
types of uncertainty 
2. determine which variables (e.g. crofting location, time spent as a crofter, 
experiences of goose damage) were most important for describing 
cooperative behaviour. 
4.3 METHOD 
4.3.1 Study area 
North Uist, Benbecula, and South Uist (hereafter, the Uists), are part of the Outer 
Hebrides; an island chain off the North-West coast of Scotland, UK. The Uists 
provide year-round habitat for greylag geese which damage both arable crop and 
pasture (Bainbridge 2017). Non-lethal goose scaring methods have limited success 
(Simonsen et al. 2016). Greylag geese can be legally shot during a winter open 
season (September to February). Out of season, geese can be shot under license 
only. 
Goose management efforts had been ongoing for over a decade, but in 2012 a new 
multi-stakeholder local goose management group (LGMG), funded by the Scottish 
Government was created in the Uists. Stakeholders include crofters, government, 
conservation organisations, croft owners and recreational wildfowl shooters 
(Ferguson 2016). A five-year adaptive management pilot was designed to test if 
shooting levels could be managed to decrease goose damage whilst maintaining 
the conservation status of the geese (Ferguson 2016). The goose management pilot 
uses a mixture of volunteer and paid shooters who spend several hours a day in 
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designated areas, carrying out lethal and non-lethal scaring throughout August and 
September. The goose management pilot covers areas on the western side of the 
Uists where the arable crops are grown and uses population modelling of the geese 
to determine annual shooting targets (Ferguson 2016). 
4.3.2 Crofter recruitment and data collection 
In August 2016 a list of all crofts in Uist (N=1579) was obtained (Registers of 
Scotland 2016). Potential interviewees were sequentially approached down a 
randomised copy of the list, until the end of the data collection campaign in 
November 2016. This resulted in 149 crofters agreeing to be interviewed. We 
conducted the data collection face-to-face to ensure crofters’ understanding of the 
questions and to capture qualitative responses accurately. Information from 
crofters on themselves, their crofting and their experiences of goose impact was 
collected using a structured questionnaire, to allow statistical analyses on the data 
collected (Newing et al. 2011). For full recruitment, pilot and collection methods, 
see 4.7 Supporting Information. Ethical approval for this study was granted by 
Biological and Environmental Sciences Ethical Review Committee, University of 
Stirling. 
4.3.3 Willingness to pay 
Crofters were asked if they would be willing to pay (WTP) an annual fee along with 
other crofters, for a project which would completely mitigate all the negative 
impacts of the geese, using a contingent valuation technique (Pearce et al. 2002). 
Those who were unwilling to pay were asked to give reasons. The responses were 
then coded post-hoc using theoretical thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke 2006). 
Those who responded that they would be willing to pay were then asked to 
indicate how much they would pay annually into a fund with other crofters for 
100% mitigation of the negative goose impacts (hereafter, the WTP amount or 
Cwtp). The primary aim was to identify a WTP amount for each individual which 
could then be used in the subsequent cooperation scenario. This was done to 
account for individual differences in value placed on goose impact reduction. The 
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stated WTP amount was then repeatedly used in each cooperation scenario (see 
below). Where crofters were willing to pay but could not specify an amount, the 
modal WTP amount identified during piloting (£50 year-1) was used for Cwtp. 
4.3.4 Cooperation scenario 
We presented crofters with four scenarios, each detailing a hypothetical goose 
management plan, using summary cards (see Figure 10, Supporting information) 
Crofters could choose to either support the plan (intention to cooperate), or not 
(intention to defect). Both choices incurred a cost to the crofter, a resulting 
reduction in goose impact, and a threshold number of crofters that would be 
required for the management plan to be enacted. This choice is akin to a public 
good game, where the crofter’s payoff (a utility function made up of the sum of the 
level of goose impact and cost of joining a goose management plan) is dependent 
on their own course of action as well as the actions of others (to meet the 
threshold number required) (Table 13). The goose management plan outlined in 
the Baseline scenario resulted in a decrease of negative goose impact (Cd) down to 
half the current impact levels. The WTP amount (Cwtp) previously stated by the 
crofter was for 100% reduction in negative goose impact. Therefore, the cost to 
each crofter (Cmp) of a management plan which achieved half that reduction as is 
the case in the baseline scenario, was 0.5Cwtp. The management plan was presented 
as receiving partial payment from government funds equal to 0.25Cwtp, so a 
cooperating crofter would receive a 50% reduction in goose impact for a Cmp = 
0.25Cwtp. This resulted in a total payoff to the crofter of Cd + Cmp = 0.5Cwtp + 
0.25Cwtp = 0.75Cwtp. However, the hypothetical management plan needed the 
number of crofters signing up (Nc) to be at least half of all the crofters in the Uists 
(N). If this threshold (Nc/N) was not reached, crofters did not pay anything (Cmp = 
0) but there was no goose impact reduction (Cd = Cwtp), so total payoff Cd + Cmp = 
Cwtp + 0 = Cwtp. Choosing to defect always set Cmp = 0. The crofter then suffered the 
full negative impact if the threshold was not reached (as above), or if the threshold 
was reached the crofter received the benefit of impact reduction without paying for 
the cost.  
96 
 
Three other scenarios were the same as the baseline, but each contained a single 
type of uncertainty (Table 13): 
• The ‘Scientific’ scenario was described to crofters as representing managers’ 
incomplete knowledge of goose ecology resulting in uncertainty to impact 
reduction, Cd. 
• The ‘Administrative’ scenario was described as representing managers’ 
incomplete knowledge of public funding for the management plan resulting 
in uncertainty to the cost of the plan to the crofter, Cmp.  
• The ‘Political’ scenario was described as representing managers’ incomplete 
knowledge of how much support would be needed for the plan to be 
initiated, resulting in uncertainty to the threshold of cooperation required 
from crofters, Thuc. 
The baseline was always presented to crofters first, and the order in which the 
following three treatments were presented was randomised. The fixed annual costs 
remain the same so as time increases, the average payoffs for all four scenarios are 
equivalent (Table 13). To evaluate the crofters’ beliefs about how others would 
behave in the same scenario, we used a wager method. After each decision, crofters 
were asked to estimate what percentage of all the crofters in the Uists would 
cooperate, by splitting a hypothetical £20 wager between 20 equal cells each 
representing a 5% block of the population. For example, if the crofter thought that 
between 46% and 55% of others would cooperate, they would write “10” in each of 
the “46-50%” and “51-55%” cells. If the crofter felt they could not estimate or they 
felt there was an equal chance of all outcomes, they would write “1” in each of the 
20 cells.  A fixed wager allows crofters to express confidence in their prediction, 
responding with the wager spread over a large or small range.   
4.3.5 Statistical analyses 
To examine how uncertainty affects the intention to cooperate, as well as which 
background and impact experience characteristics most strongly predict intent to 
cooperate, we ran four linear mixed effects models. Analyses were focused on how 
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intention to cooperate and willingness to pay for goose management were 
influenced by three groups of variables. Firstly, the value a crofter places on 
cooperation may depend on their current situation including size of their croft, the 
extent of their crofting experience or their existing access to goose management 
support via the croft owner or LGMG. Secondly, intention to cooperate may stem 
from wanting to mitigate personal impacts of geese such as time and money costs. 
We also include variables to capture crofters wishing to mitigate goose impacts on 
their community or on natural habitats. Finally, crofters who are aware of existing 
goose management through formal organisations may support cooperation with 
other crofters, or conversely believe that responsibility lies elsewhere. The 
individual variables for each of the groups are shown Table 14.  
  
98 
 
Table 13 – Crofter payoff (per year) matrices under four treatments of varied uncertainty. 
Here, payoffs are costs to the crofter, so rational behaviour seeks to minimise total costs 
under each treatment. Total cost to the crofter in bold, is the sum of the respective cost of 
management plan (Cmp) and the cost of the negative goose impacts (Cd). Table 19 
(Supporting information) shows a worked example. 
Scenario Cooperation 
threshold 
Cooperate Defect 
Baseline Nc < 0.5N Cmp = 0 
Cd = Cwtp 
 
= Cwtp 
Nc ≥ 0.5N Cmp = 
0.25Cwtp 
Cd = 0.5Cwtp 
= 0.75Cwtp 
Cmp = 0 
Cd = 
0.5Cwtp 
= 0.5Cwtp 
 
Scientific 
 
Duc=Dlow or Dhigh, 
where  
P(Dlow)=P(Dhigh)=0.5 
Nc < 0.5N Cmp = 0 
Cd = Cwtp 
 
= Cwtp 
Nc ≥ 0.5N Cmp = 
0.25Cwtp 
Cd = Duc 
= 0.25Cwtp+Duc 
Cmp = 0 
Cd = Duc = Duc 
  
Administrative 
 
Cuc=0 or Chigh, 
where 
P(0)=P(Chigh)=0.5 
Nc < 0.5N Cmp = 0 
Cd = Cwtp 
 
= Cwtp 
Nc ≥ 0.5N Cmp = Cuc 
Cd = 0.5Cwtp = Cuc+0.5Cwtp 
Cmp = 0 
Cd = 
0.5Cwtp 
= 0.5Cwtp 
 
Political 
 
Thuc=Thlow or Thhigh, 
where 
P(Thlow)=P(Thhigh)=
0.5 
Nc < Thuc Cmp = 0 
Cd = Cwtp 
 
= Cwtp 
Nc ≥ Thuc Cmp = 
0.25Cwtp 
Cd = 0.5Cwtp 
= 0.75Cwtp 
Cmp = 0 
Cd = 
0.5Cwtp 
= 0.5Cwtp 
  
Nc, total number of crofters choosing “cooperate”; N, total population of crofters in the Uists; Cmp, 
cost of management plan; Cd, cost of negative goose impacts; Cwtp, crofter WTP to eliminate all 
current negative goose impact; Cuc, cost of management plan under uncertainty; Chigh=0.5Cwtp, high 
cost; Duc, cost of negative goose impacts caused under uncertainty; Dlow=0.25Cwtp, low level of 
damage; Dhigh=0.75Cwtp, high level of damage; Thuc, threshold number of crofters choosing 
“cooperate” required for management plan to be enacted under uncertainty; Thlow=0.25N, low 
threshold; Thhigh=0.75N, high threshold. 
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Table 14 - Variables measured for modelling intention to cooperate and willingness to pay 
for goose management. Not all predictor and random variables were included in all 
models. 
Groups of variables Variables measured (units) 
Crofting experience 
Representing individuals’ 
connection to crofting 
and access to support 
CE1: Time spent as a crofter (years) 
 
CE2: Area of crofting land (Hectares) 
 
CE3: Croft owner identity (North Uist Estate, Storas Uibhist 
community estate, Scottish Government or owner occupier) 
 
CE4: Township in Local Goose Management Group area 
(yes or no) 
Impact of geese 
Representing the range of 
direct impacts geese have 
on crofters 
IG1: Goose damage on their croft (yes or no) 
 
IG2: Incurring of financial costs due to crop loss (yes or no) 
 
IG3: Incurring of financial costs from scaring geese (yes or 
no) 
 
IG4: Incurring of time costs from scaring geese themselves 
(yes or no) 
 
IG5: Personal concern about damage to natural habitats by 
geese (yes or no) 
 
IG6: Personal concern about damage to other crofters’ crops 
(yes or no) 
 
IG7: Damage suffered compared to other crofters in the 
Uists (less, similar, more, or unsure) 
Formal organisations 
Representing engagement 
with formal groups 
involved in goose 
management 
FO1: Member of the Scottish Crofting Federation (yes or no) 
 
FO2: Awareness of the existing goose management plan (yes 
or no) 
 
Random variables 
Included to account for 
the structure of the data 
R1: Location of crofter (township) 
 
R2: Crofter identification (unique study identification 
number) 
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Firstly, for each analysis a ‘global’ model was built containing the predictor and 
random variables thought relevant to that analysis. The function “dredge” (R 
package MuMin) was then used on the global models to build and rank models by 
finite-sample corrected Akaike information criterion values (AICc) calculated using 
maximum likelihood. No interactions between variables resulted in a better fitted 
model, according to AICc. Best fitting models (ΔAICc<2) were retained and were 
then standardised by dividing the continuous fixed variables by two standard 
deviations allowing direct comparison of coefficients between continuous and 
binary variables (Gelman 2008). 
The area under the curve (AUC) of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) plots 
was calculated for all models with a binary output variable to assess the ability of 
each model to correctly discriminate between a randomly chosen positive response 
and a randomly chosen negative response. A value of 0.7 or greater was considered 
as having acceptable discriminatory ability (Sommerville et al. 2010). 
All model analyses were done in RStudio version 1.0.136, running R version 3.1.2., 
and using R packages lme4 (Bates et al. 2014), glmmADMB (Bolker et al. 2012) and 
pROC (Robin et al. 2011). 
4.3.6 Intention to cooperate 
Two global models were built to investigate intention to cooperate. The first 
willingness to pay (WTP) global model included all crofters, whereas the second 
only included those advancing to the cooperation scenario. Both models have a 
binary response variable (Cooperate / Defect), so we used generalised linear mixed 
effects models (GLMMs) with binomial error structure and a logit link. For 
Predictor variables included in the WTP global model (see Table 14): CE1-4, IG1-6 
and FO1-2. Following simplification of the first global model, only predictor 
variables which were significant in at least one of the best fitting models were 
included in the global model for the cooperation scenario (CE1, CE4, IG3-4, IG6, 
FO1-2). Residential location (R1) was included as the random variable for both 
models, and unique identifier (R2) was included in the cooperation scenario model 
only, as it contained repeated measurements from individuals. The cooperation 
101 
 
scenario model also included the study treatment predictor variable, uncertainty 
type (scientific, administrative, political, or baseline/no uncertainty). 
4.3.7 Willingness To Pay - amount 
The WTP amount global model used the same predictor and random variables as 
the WTP global model above. The response variable was amount willing to pay in 
British Pounds. We used a zero-inflated mixed effects model with a negative 
binomial distribution, which accounts for the large difference between mean and 
variance of the responses and the high number of zeros in the data caused by those 
unwilling to cooperate (Zuur et al. 2010). 
4.3.8 Perception of others’ intention to cooperate 
Predictor variables included in this global model were the same as for the 
cooperation scenario, with the addition of the measure of how crofters compared 
their own goose damage with that of others (Table 14, IG7) and a binary predictor 
(cooperate / defect) variable indicating if the crofter had chosen to cooperate 
themselves under the equivalent scenario. We again used generalised linear mixed 
effects models (GLMMs) with binomial error structure and a logit link. Data were 
collected as a wager. Crofters readily engaged with this method, however responses 
were mostly constrained to a narrow numerical range, and models with continuous 
responses failed to converge. Consequently, we converted these data into a binary 
output. If the wager ≥£10 across the range 51-100%, we recorded that the crofter 
believed that the threshold of Uist crofters required to initiate the goose 
management plan would be passed. 
4.4 RESULTS 
Crofters had a mean (± SD) age of 58 (± 14) years and had been crofting for 32 (± 
19) years. Of the crofters contacted (n=254), we interviewed 149. The remaining 105 
either could not be contacted (49), were assessed as inappropriate for interview 
due to, ill health or on advice of family members (22) or declined to be interviewed 
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(34). All best fitted models had ΔAICc ≤ 2 (Tables 20 - 23 (Supporting information) 
for the output of all best fitted models). Results from the simplest (lowest number 
of predictor variables) of each best fitted model and predicted effect sizes are 
described below and in Table 16 and Table 17. Population level data for each 
predictor variable used in the models can be seen in Supporting Information. 
4.4.1 Intention to cooperate 
Most of the crofters who were interviewed (76.5%; 95%CI = 69.1-82.6%) were 
willing to pay for goose management. Reasons for crofters being unwilling to 
cooperate (UTC) are shown in Table 15. The most common reason under no 
uncertainty was that geese didn’t affect them enough. In the presence of each type 
of uncertainty, the most common reason given for UTC behaviour was the 
unsatisfactory risk of a worse outcome compared to the baseline scenario. 
Crofters’ concern for others and their time as crofters were the two significant 
predictor variables (Figure 9, Table 16). The longer an individual had been a crofter 
the lower the predicted probability of cooperation (e.g. 10 years of crofting P(coop) 
= 0.75; 50 years of crofting P(coop) = 0.51) and crofters who showed concern for 
others had a higher predicted probability of cooperation than those who didn’t (at 
mean time crofting (32 years), showing concern for others P(coop) = 0.86, no 
concern for others P(coop) = 0.63) (Table 17). Fixed effects accounted for 13% of 
total variation in the model but there was essentially no variation between 
locations. There was no significant difference (assessed by AICc) between models 
with and without the random variable. The area under the curve (AUC) of the 
receiver operating curve (ROC) was 0.72. 
Under all treatments of the cooperation scenario, most crofters were willing to pay 
for goose management.  Under the uncertainty scenarios, type of uncertainty was 
the only significant predictor variable for intention to cooperate (Figure 9, Table 
16). In the absence of uncertainty (baseline), predicted probability of cooperation 
was >0.98 (Table 17). The presence of each of the three types (scientific, 
administrative and political) significantly decreased the predicted probability of 
cooperation compared to the baseline. The greatest effect was seen in the 
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administrative scenario (P(coop) = 0.77), followed by small but significant effects 
with scientific (P(coop) = 0.93) and political (P(coop) = 0.98) (Table 17). Fixed 
variables accounted for 26% of the total variation and variation due to random 
variables accounted for 44% (Rm2 = 0.26, Rc2 = 0.70). The AUC of the ROC for this 
model was 0.96. 
4.4.2 Willingness To Pay - amount 
The modal WTP amount was £50 year-1 and the mean £59.81 year-1. Cost of goose 
scaring (time) and concern for others suffering damage were the two significant 
predictor variables for WTP amount (Figure 9, Table 16). A crofter who hadn’t 
spent time scaring geese and wasn’t concerned for others would pay £34.16 (Table 
17), whereas those who had spent time scaring geese were willing to pay £73.98 and 
those indicating concern for others would pay £52.27. The model variance 
attributable to crofter location (random variable) was 0.13 (Table 17). 
4.4.3 Perception of others’ intention to cooperate 
Individual cooperation, type of uncertainty, membership of SCF and perceived 
relative level of goose damage (Figure 9, Table 16) were all significant predictor 
variables for perception of others’ cooperation. Compared to a baseline (of 
individual cooperation, no uncertainty, no membership of SCF and a perceived 
average level of goose damage, P(coop) = 0.93), the presence of each type of 
uncertainty had a negative effect on predicted probability of cooperation (Table 
17). Again, the greatest effect was seen with administrative uncertainty (P(coop) = 
0.36), followed by scientific (P(coop) = 0.63), and then political (P(coop) = 0.65). 
Compared to the baseline model those who perceive they have suffered less than 
average damage were less likely to predict others as cooperating (P(coop) = 0.35). 
Having the perception of suffering more damage than others or a “don’t know” 
response had no significant impact, compared to those who had a perception of 
average damage. Compared to the baseline model, crofters who didn’t cooperate 
themselves were less likely to predict others would cooperate also (P(coop) = 0.10). 
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Fixed variables account for 27% of the total variation and variation due to random 
variables accounted for 62% (Rm2 = 0.27, Rc2 = 0.88). The AUC of the ROC was 0.99. 
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Figure 9 - Standardised effect size (±95% confidence intervals) of predictor variables on: 
intention to cooperate with other crofters on a cooperative goose management plan under 
different types of uncertainty (A) or with no uncertainty (B); amount willing to pay into a 
cooperative goose management plan (C); and crofters’ prediction of others to cooperate 
(D). Outputs are from the simplest, best-fitting models. Effect sizes have been 
standardised *(P<0.05); **(P<0.01); ***(P<0.001). Full model outputs in tables 20-23 
(Supporting information), for plots A-D, respectively. 
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Table 15 - Reasons given by crofters for choosing not to cooperate in the willingness to pay 
(WTP) and in the three scenarios with uncertainty. n=138 for WTP and 97 for the other 
three scenarios. Crofters were asked if they were WTP for goose management and if they 
indicated they would, then they were given four further choices (cooperation scenarios). 
The Baseline treatment is not included in the table as there were no non-cooperation 
responses. Sum of percentages may be greater than 100% as crofters could give more than 
one reason. 
 Scenario type (number of non-cooperation 
responses) 
 Cooperation scenario 
Reason WTP (34) Scientific 
(13) 
Admin. 
(29) 
Political (7) 
The issue doesn’t affect me 
enough 
12 (35.3%)  1 (7.7%) 3 (10.3%) 1 (14.3%) 
I will be leaving crofting 
soon 
 
7 (20.6%)    
Goose management is not 
possible 
3 (8.8%)    
Non-crofting groups should 
(also) contribute funding 
8 (23.5%)  12 (41.4%)  
Crofters should be 
individually responsible  
4 (11.8%)   1 (14.3%) 
Not enough other crofters 
will cooperate 
 2 (15.4%) 1 (3.4%) 3 (42.9%) 
There is too much risk 
 
 9 (69.2%) 15 (51.7%) 3 (42.9%) 
Uncertainty gives excuse for 
poor management 
 1 (7.7%)  1 (14.3%) 
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Table 16 - Standardised effect size of predictor variables on: intention to cooperate with 
other crofters on a cooperative goose management plan under different types of 
uncertainty (A) or with no uncertainty (B); amount willing to pay into a cooperative goose 
management plan (C); and crofters’ prediction of others to cooperate (D). Outputs are 
from the simplest, best-fitting models. Effect sizes have been standardised *(P<0.05); 
**(P<0.01); ***(P<0.001) 
Predictor variable 
A  
Cooperation 
scenario 
B 
Absence of 
uncertainty 
C 
Willingness 
to pay - 
Amount 
D 
Perception 
of others 
Goose damage wrt Uist 
average: 
Less damage 
More damage 
Don’t know 
    
 
-3.16* 
-3.82 
0.22 
Membership of SCF    -2.54 
Time as a crofter  -0.97*   
Cost of goose scaring (time)   0.78***  
Concern for others  1.30* 0.43*  
Uncertainty type: 
Scientific 
Administrative 
Political 
 
-3.20*** 
-4.57*** 
-2.10* 
  
 
 
-1.84** 
-2.94*** 
-1.76** 
Individual cooperation    3.45*** 
Random effects included Location; 
Participant 
Location Location 
  
Participant 
Receiver operating 
characteristic;  
Area under curve 
0.96 0.72 NA 0.99 
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Table 17 – Example model predictions to illustrate how combinations of significant predictor 
variables affect: Probability of intention to cooperate, P(coop) (models A, B and D), or 
willingness to pay amount, £ (model C). Only the simplest, best-fitting models are shown. All 
values in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals.  
Selected model structure Model prediction 
 
A  Cooperation scenario P(coop) 
Baseline 
  +Scientific Uncertainty 
  +Administrative Uncertainty 
  +Political Uncertainty 
0.98 (0.97-1.00) 
0.93 (0.81-0.98) 
0.77 (0.58-0.89) 
0.98 (0.91-0.99) 
 
B  Willingness to pay P(coop) 
132 years crofting - concern for others 
 
132 years crofting + concern for others 
 
10 years crofting - concern for others 
 
50 years crofting - concern for others 
0.63 (0.45-0.78) 
 
0.86 (0.78-0.92) 
 
0.75 (0.45-0.92) 
 
0.51 (0.10-0.91) 
 
C  Willingness to pay - Amount Willingness to pay amount (£) 
-cost of goose scaring - concern for others 
 
-cost of goose scaring + concern for others 
 
+cost of goose scaring - concern for others 
34.16 (24.22-48.18) 
 
52.27 (31.60-86.48) 
 
73.98 (47.51-115.18) 
 
D  Perception of others P(coop) 
Goose damage wrt Uist: 
2Baseline   
  -same damage + less damage 
   
  +Scientific Uncertainty 
   
  +Administrative Uncertainty 
   
  +Political Uncertainty 
  
   -Individual cooperation 
 
0.93 (0.64-0.99) 
0.35 (0.11-0.71) 
 
0.63 (0.34-0.85) 
 
0.36 (0.16-0.65) 
 
0.65 (0.35-0.86) 
 
0.10 (0.19-0.43) 
132 years is the mean time crofting 
2Baseline model for comparison: Goose damage wrt Uist (same) - uncertainty + Individual 
cooperation - membership of the SCF 
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4.5 DISCUSSION  
4.5.1 How uncertainty affects crofters’ intention to cooperate 
When faced with a choice of discrete courses of action, people generally select those 
with lower uncertainty (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Lundhede et al. 2015). This 
expectation is supported by our findings, with the presence of scientific uncertainty 
(from incomplete knowledge of the research system), administrative uncertainty 
(surrounding cost and responsibilities) and political uncertainty (regarding power 
relationships and values) each significantly decreasing the predicted probability of 
cooperation compared to a baseline scenario with no uncertainty.  
Administrative uncertainty causes the largest decrease in terms of probability of 
cooperation. The administrative treatment was presented as uncertainty about 
whether public funding would be able to either pay all the cost of the management 
plan (thus, free for the crofter) or pay nothing toward the plan (doubling the cost to 
the crofter compared with other treatments). A view of shared responsibility was 
evident under the scenario of administrative uncertainty as the second most given 
reason for defecting was that others should contribute to goose management (Table 
15). In this case administrative uncertainty caused crofters to question the 
commitment of another stakeholder group, causing defection. 
The negative effect of scientific uncertainty on probability of cooperation was small 
but statistically significant. Scientific uncertainty was framed as full enactment of 
management actions but with ecological uncertainty of how actions would affect the 
geese and the resulting level of damage caused. Here, defecting crofters did not 
mention other stakeholders (as with administrative uncertainty), so seemed to be 
reacting to uncertainty directly (Table 15). In this scenario, general aversion to 
uncertainty may be contributing to much of the decrease in intention to cooperate 
(Lundhede et al. 2015). 
Compared to the baseline scenario, the decrease in effect size under political 
uncertainty was very small but significant. The uncertainty in this scenario affected 
how many other people crofters thought might need to get involved, but also changed 
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the conditions for accessing benefits without contribution. The small effect size means 
we cannot separate decreased probability of cooperation under political uncertainty 
from the general negative utility experienced from any type of uncertainty (Lundhede 
et al. 2015).  
4.5.2 Describing crofters’ cooperative behaviour 
Financial loss via goose damage was not a significant predictor variable for any model. 
Crofters were more likely to cooperate on a goose management plan and would pay 
more into such a plan when they indicated concern for others suffering from goose 
impacts. This pattern of cooperation would be expected if goose management 
payments were seen more as a charitable donation than self-serving (Park & Lee 2015). 
The probability of cooperation decreased with increased time as a crofter. This result 
may be driven by crofters approaching retirement as 20% of crofters who chose to 
defect gave the reason that they were exiting crofting soon.  
Many crofters chose to defect but not one crofter indicated that they were aiming to 
gain benefits without contributing. Crofters may not want to gain benefits this way 
because they see it as unfair, or they wouldn’t want to be seen as being unfair by their 
community. Small agricultural communities have strong reciprocal relationships 
between individuals (Sutherland & Burton 2011), which can decrease behaviour 
perceived as unfair (Ostrom 2010a).  
The mean WTP amount of £59.81 year-1 was similar to the £29.67 year-1 (£44.27, 
adjusted for inflation) which Hanley et al. (2003) showed in a willingness to accept 
study for hypothetical goose population increase in Islay, Scotland. Those who have 
spent their own time scaring geese were willing to pay more into a cooperative goose 
management plan. Successful goose scaring is resource-intensive, as the geese 
repeatedly become accustomed to the methods used which then must be changed 
(Simonsen et al. 2016). Our results indicate that the opportunity costs associated with 
scaring geese are important enough to significantly increase WTP amount in the Uists. 
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4.5.3 Predicting others behaviour 
The largest predictor of whether crofters thought others would cooperate with each 
management scheme was their own preference to cooperate or defect. All types of 
uncertainty were also significant in the same direction and in the same rank order as 
with crofters’ own choices. Individual crofters believed other crofters in the Uists 
would act similarly to themselves and did not indicate they thought others would 
attempt to gain benefits without contributing. Both these crofter predictions are 
consistent with the false consensus effect, where people project their own behaviour 
onto others (Ross et al. 1977).  
4.5.4 Limitations of the method 
The use of contingent valuation methods to accurately value goods and services has 
been criticised. For example, WTP suffers from hypothetical biases, differences 
between willingness to pay and willingness to accept values for similar goods, and 
assumptions about how goods may be embedded in one another (Hausman 2012). 
Hypothetical bias can be reduced by offering payments based on decisions made in 
the experiment, but it can unrealistically incentivise individualistic behaviour (Vohs et 
al. 2008). Using the WTP amount from this study would not be appropriate for costing 
of a Uist goose management funding scheme. Where good, independent data are 
available for goose management costs, a discrete choice experiment between 
alternative management actions could elicit a more accurate value than our 
contingent valuation (Johnston et al. 2017). The WTP variables in our modelling did 
not include a measure of personal wealth or income, which may be expected to have a 
significant influence on WTP amount (Pearce et al. 2002). The aim of identifying an 
individual WTP amount for each crofter to use in the cooperation scenario was 
achieved with our method. 
We focused on the predictor variables that significantly affect cooperation and on the 
difference between the treatments. However people also tend to overestimate WTP 
amount when responding to scenario questions compared to real life situations 
(Murphy et al. 2004) and without social interaction people overestimate theirs and 
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others’ propensity to cooperate (Vlaev 2012). Steps were taken to minimise biases of 
methodological origin, such as by discussing the scenarios in a neutral way. Crofters 
predicted that others would make very similar choices to themselves, which suggests 
any bias towards wanting to appear in a good light extended beyond themselves to 
promoting the community as a whole. Separating bias from the social norms which we 
are trying to study is an ongoing challenge in field studies such as this. 
4.5.5 Management implications of multiple system uncertainties 
The three sources of uncertainty affected crofters’ intention to cooperate in different 
ways. In the presence of administrative uncertainty, defecting crofters indicated that 
other groups should shoulder some of the burden caused by uncertainty. In the 
presence of scientific uncertainty, no actions by any other group were mentioned as 
being involved in crofter cooperation. In the presence of political uncertainty (and in 
general) cooperating crofters were confident that others would act like them and not 
try to gain benefits without contributing. Prior to management actions being 
developed, an important step is for managers to understand the societal dimensions of 
a conflict, including stakeholder roles and actions (Young et al. 2016). Our study shows 
that managers should also include an assessment of how stakeholders’ actions may 
change under different sources of uncertainty, especially if sources are associated with 
particular stakeholder groups. 
Once relationships are better understood, steps can then be taken to cope with 
uncertainty. Firstly, uncertainty could be reduced by filling scientific research gaps 
such as the relative efficacy of scaring techniques or goose crop selectivity (Fox et al. 
2017). But the application of increased ecological knowledge alone may have 
suboptimal impact on conflict if other types of uncertainty are not also addressed. 
Reducing reliance on uncertain external funding by increasing local fundraising may 
then decrease the administrative uncertainty which caused the greatest decrease in 
intention to cooperate. Secondly, in addition to technical solutions for uncertainty 
reduction, stakeholders should indicate a high level of commitment to the process 
(Henmati 2002). Longer-term partnerships between managers and scientists are 
advantageous (Moore et al. 2017) and transparent communication of commitment 
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could lessen the effect that associated uncertainties can have on intention to 
cooperate. Finally, embracing the inevitable uncertainty can bring positive benefits, 
such as opportunities for learning, increased stakeholder engagement, and 
adaptability (Pe’er et al. 2014). Explicitly including multiple types of uncertainty in 
established participatory decision-making techniques (such as multicriteria decision 
making or scenario planning) may decrease the negative impact of uncertainty on 
levels of cooperation, even though the calculated level of uncertainty has not reduced 
(Mason, Pollard et al. 2018).  
Cooperation in the Uists over goose management has been established through 
formation of the multi-stakeholder LGMG and previous commitment to the five-year 
adaptive goose management pilot. The current level of cooperation between 
stakeholders may be at risk if future goose management plans cannot reduce 
administrative uncertainty (for example, by securing funding) nor demonstrate 
commitment to the project (for example, by enshrining another multi-year plan). 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
Our work illustrates the potential differences in stakeholders’ response to uncertainty 
in the form of cooperation. Using a framed field experiment involving stakeholders 
who live in the locality of the conflict (rather than volunteers in lab experiments) 
meant that the experimental treatments applied were not just choices of payoff 
maximisation, but instead potentially evoked reasons for cooperative decision-making 
based on stakeholders’ context. Reducing scientific uncertainty, at which conservation 
practitioners are likely to be most skilled, may not be the most important gap to fill if 
stakeholders do not perceive it as important. Variation in behavioural response to 
uncertainty can be taken into account throughout the conflict management process to 
target the most effective ways to either preferentially reduce uncertainty itself or 
increase the acceptance of uncertainty amongst stakeholders. Both tactics mark a way 
forward to reducing the impacts that uncertainty can cause. 
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4.7 SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
Crofter selection 
In August 2016 there were 1579 crofts in the Uists (Registers of Scotland 2016). 1502 of 
the crofts had a named ‘principal occupier’. Duplicates of individuals with the same 
name and residential address were excluded resulting in a population of crofters 
N=1149. Residential addresses not in the Uists were also excluded. The order of corfters 
in the list was then randomised and potential interviewees approached, starting at the 
top of the list. Of the crofters contacted (n=254), we interviewed 149. The remaining 
105 either could not be contacted (49), were assessed as inappropriate for interview 
due to, ill health or on advice of family members (22), or declined to be interviewed 
(34). Crofters were most often interviewed alone, but where family members were 
present and some discussion occurred, the responses of the crofter named from the 
random sample were used. 79.2% of crofters in Scotland are aged between 41 and 80 
years old (Crofting Commission 2017). The mean (±standard deviation) age of crofters 
sampled was 58.1 (±13.9) years, so 83.3% of those interviewed were between 41 and 80 
years old. 
An additional 11 crofters were randomly selected for a pilot prior to the main study, 
which resulted in alterations to the questionnaire to include a wider range of potential 
goose impacts, and to develop the communication materials explaining the 
cooperation scenario. The pilot data were not used in the final analysis. 
  
115 
 
Data collection sheet 
Outer Hebrides– goose management data collection 
Part 1 – Background 
Name: Age: Male / Female 
Time living in Uists: Time spent as crofter: 
Location of croft(s): Landowner: 
Total area of croft(s): Area of cropped croft(s): 
Geese 
on 
croft(s): 
2009 
Absent/present 
Nesting/damage 
2013 
Absent/present 
Nesting/damage 
2016 
Absent/present 
Nesting/damage 
Current level of 
goose damage 
compared to other 
crofts 
Township Less Same More 
Don’t 
know 
All of Uists  Less Same More 
Don’t 
know 
List membership of: 
Farming / crofting  
(e.g. SCF, local): 
 
Agri-environment 
schemes: 
Conservation 
(e.g. RSPB, local) 
Shooting 
(e.g. BASC, local) 
Awareness of Uist Goose Management Group:                             Yes / No 
Rate success of Uist Goose Management scheme:         1            2            3            4            
5 
                                                                                               poor                                            
excellent 
Don’
t 
kno
w 
 
Do geese impact you in any of these ways? (Tick all that apply) 
 Eat seed 
 Eat crop 
 Soil fields 
 Trample grass / 
increase wet area 
 Force changes in your 
crofting practice 
 Negative impacts on 
people you care about 
 Costs to replace seed 
 Costs to replace crop / 
buy feed 
 Costs for scaring equip. 
 Noise bothers you 
 Risk of disease to 
livestock 
 Stress 
 
 Other: 
_______________ 
 Your time spent scaring 
 Your time spent at 
meetings about geese 
 Damage to natural 
habitat (Machair) 
 Negative impact on 
other wildlife 
 
 Other: 
_______________ 
 
Given the impacts listed above, if possible would you 
pay a fee to mitigate all of these impacts? 
Yes / No 
How much would you be prepared to pay each year 
to mitigate all of the impacts? 
£ 
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Part 2 – Scenario decisions 
Decision Description Sign 
up 
Reasons 
1 Baseline 
Yes / 
No 
 
 
0
-5
%
 
6
-1
0
%
 
11
-1
5%
 
16
-2
0
%
 
21
-2
5%
 
26
-3
0
%
 
31
-3
5%
 
36
-4
0
%
 
4
1-
4
5%
 
4
6
-5
0
%
 
51
-5
5%
 
56
-6
0
%
 
6
1-
6
5%
 
6
6
-7
0
%
 
71
-7
5%
 
76
-8
0
%
 
8
1-
8
5%
 
8
6
-9
0
%
 
9
1-
9
5%
 
9
6
-1
0
0
%
 
                    
 
2  
Yes / 
No 
 
 
0
-5
%
 
6
-1
0
%
 
11
-1
5%
 
16
-2
0
%
 
21
-2
5%
 
26
-3
0
%
 
31
-3
5%
 
36
-4
0
%
 
4
1-
4
5%
 
4
6
-5
0
%
 
51
-5
5%
 
56
-6
0
%
 
6
1-
6
5%
 
6
6
-7
0
%
 
71
-7
5%
 
76
-8
0
%
 
8
1-
8
5%
 
8
6
-9
0
%
 
9
1-
9
5%
 
9
6
-1
0
0
%
 
                    
 
3  
Yes / 
No 
 
 
0
-5
%
 
6
-1
0
%
 
11
-1
5%
 
16
-2
0
%
 
21
-2
5%
 
26
-3
0
%
 
31
-3
5%
 
36
-4
0
%
 
4
1-
4
5%
 
4
6
-5
0
%
 
51
-5
5%
 
56
-6
0
%
 
6
1-
6
5%
 
6
6
-7
0
%
 
71
-7
5%
 
76
-8
0
%
 
8
1-
8
5%
 
8
6
-9
0
%
 
9
1-
9
5%
 
9
6
-1
0
0
%
 
                    
 
4  
Yes / 
No 
 
 
0
-5
%
 
6
-1
0
%
 
11
-1
5%
 
16
-2
0
%
 
21
-2
5%
 
26
-3
0
%
 
31
-3
5%
 
36
-4
0
%
 
4
1-
4
5%
 
4
6
-5
0
%
 
51
-5
5%
 
56
-6
0
%
 
6
1-
6
5%
 
6
6
-7
0
%
 
71
-7
5%
 
76
-8
0
%
 
8
1-
8
5%
 
8
6
-9
0
%
 
9
1-
9
5%
 
9
6
-1
0
0
%
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Table 18 - The mean cost of negative goose damage under uncertainty (Duc), mean cost of the 
management plan under uncertainty (Cuc), and mean threshold number of crofters choosing 
“cooperate” required for management plan to be enacted under uncertainty (Thuc) are equal to when 
no uncertainty is present, respectively. Thus, on average, all three treatment scenarios have equal costs 
and thresholds as each other and the baseline scenario. 
Source of 
uncertainty per 
scenario 
Mean uncertainty 
Scientific 
Duc  
 
= (P(Dlow)*Dlow) + (P(Dhigh)*Dhigh) 
= 0.5*0.25Cwtp + 0.5*0.75Cwtp 
= 0.125Cwtp + 0.375Cwtp 
= 0.5Cwtp 
Administrative 
Cuc  
 
= (P(0)*0) + (P(Chigh)*Chigh) 
= 0 + 0.5*0.5Cwtp 
= 0.25Cwtp 
Political 
Thuc  
 
= (P(Thlow)*Thlow) + (P(Thhigh)*Thhigh) 
= 0.5*0.25N + 0.5*0.75N 
= 0.125N + 0.375N 
= 0.5N 
N, total population of crofters in the Uists; Cuc, cost of management plan under uncertainty; Chigh = 
0.5Cwtp, high cost; Duc, cost of negative goose impacts caused under uncertainty; Dlow = 0.25Cwtp, low 
level of damage; Dhigh = 0.75Cwtp, high level of damage; Thuc, threshold number of crofters choosing 
“cooperate” required for management plan to be enacted; Thlow = 0.25N, low threshold; Thhigh = 0.75N, 
high threshold; P=0.5, probability of each alternative.  
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Figure 10 - Summary cards for cooperation scenario. Willingness to Pay (WTP) amount stated by crofter  was recorded by the researcher in the box marked “D 
value” in the top right-hand side of the BASELINE card. The researcher then filled in the spaces on each card occupied with grey text, with the appropriate value. 
1/4D for BASELINE, ECOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY and MANAGEMENT UNCERTAINTY. 1/2D for ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY. The BASELINE scenario card 
was always presented first, followed by the remaining three in a random order. The researcher would take the crofter through the scenario, describing the two 
choices and the potential outcomes and answering any questions. The reseracher would then ask for the crofter to make their choice and give their reason why. 
This was then repeated for the remaining scenarios. Uncertainty types were renamed to aid communication: ECOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY is Scientific 
Uncertainty in this articlle, ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY is Administrative Uncertainty and MANAGEMENT UNCERTAINTY is Political Uncertainty 
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Interview script guide 
A. Introduction script 
This short exercise is all about how and why crofters make decisions surrounding 
goose management. It involves a goose management scheme invented by me. As you 
will see, this management scheme is quite simple and is designed to find out about 
decision making rather than promote or suggest any particular solution.  
Answers to the questions and any other interactions during the exercise are 
confidential and you can withdraw your participation at any time should you so 
wish. 
There are two parts to the exercise. Part one starts with a few background questions 
about you followed by a tick box section about ways the geese on Uist impact you.  
Part two presents four scenarios for a goose management scheme. The first scenario is 
the simplest “baseline” scenario and the following three are slight variations on that 
baseline. Once each scenario has been explained in turn, I will ask you to answer “Yes” 
or “No” to whether you would sign up to the scheme and why. I will also ask you to 
estimate how popular you think such a scheme would be. 
Do you have any questions so far? 
 
B. Presentation of scenarios 
Baseline scenario 
You’ve said that you think it’s reasonable to pay £D for a 100% decrease in negative 
impact of the geese but imagine a more realistic scenario. In this potential project, 
crofters would pay in and the government would match that amount for every crofter. 
But the project wouldn’t be able to guarantee 100% reduction of impact – only a 50% 
reduction. So because there’s only half the reduction and the government is paying 
half of the cost, the crofter only pays a quarter of £D which is £0.25D per year. 
Also, for the project to go ahead, at least half of all the crofters on the islands would 
need to sign up. That’s North Uist, South Uist and Benbecula. 
So the choice you have is either to sign up to the project, pay the £0.25D, add your 
name to the list to get over that threshold of half all crofters and potentially benefit 
from the 50% reduction. Or alternatively, don’t sign up, which would cost you 
nothing. You may still get the benefit of the 50% reduction if enough other people sign 
up, but the project will have 1 fewer person towards meeting that “half all crofters” 
threshold. 
What do you think? Would you sign up for the project or not? 
So I want to know what you think other crofters would do in this scenario. If I gave 
you £20 to wager in pound coins, what percentage of crofters across the Uists do you 
think would sign up? You can split the £20 across more than block if you like; for 
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example, if you thought it would be between 90% and 100% of people then you could 
put £10 on each block. 
Ecological uncertainty scenario 
Ok, this scenario is very similar. Again the government pays in the same amount as 
the crofters so it will again cost you £0.25D per year. Again at least half of all crofters 
are needed for the project to go ahead. But this time, there is ecological uncertainty in 
that a 50% reduction in the impact of the geese cannot be guaranteed. 
The ecologists say there is a 1 in 2 chance that there will be a smaller, 25% reduction in 
impact and a 1 in 2 chance that there will be a larger 75% reduction in impact. It’ll 
either be more than the baseline scenario or less. 
Given that you don’t know for sure which it will be year on year, would you still sign 
up (not sign up) in this scenario? Why? 
Now, again, how many other crofters do you think would sign up to this project given 
that we won’t know exactly how much the reduction in impact will be? Will it be 
similar to the previous scenario, more, less? 
Economic uncertainty scenario 
Ok the third scenario is slightly different again. This time we go back to guaranteeing 
a 50% decrease in the impact like the first scenario. This time though, there’s 
uncertainty surrounding the amount of money the government can put in. Every year, 
there is a 1 in 2 chance that the government will be able to pay for the whole thing and 
crofters won’t have to pay anything. But there is a 1 in 2 chance that they can’t pay 
anything and crofters will have to make up the difference. So a 1 in 2 chance that you 
pay nothing and a 1 in 2 chance that you pay £0.5D.  
Given that you don’t know for sure how much it will cost year on year, would you still 
sign up (not sign up) in this scenario? Why? 
And how many other crofters do you think would sign up to this project given that 
they don’t know what the cost would be. How will it compare to the two previous 
scenarios? 
Management uncertainty scenario 
Ok, the final scenario is very similar again. This time there is a guaranteed 50% 
reduction in impact and the government is back to paying the same as the crofters, so 
you will be paying £0.25D per year again. This time though, there is uncertainty in 
how many crofters are required to sign up in order for the project to go ahead. It 
would either be 25% of all the crofters or 75% that would be needed. 
Given that you don’t know how many people are needed for it to happen, would you 
still sign up (not sign up) in this scenario? 
And how many other crofters do you think would sign up to this project given that 
they don’t know how many others are needed to make it happen. How will it compare 
to the other scenarios? 
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Table 19 - Example of equations in Table 13, if Willingness to Pay amount (Cwtp) = 50GBP 
Scenario Cooperation 
threshold 
Cooperate Defect 
Baseline Nc < 0.5N Cmp = 0 
Cd = Cwtp =50 
 
= 50 
Nc ≥ 0.5N Cmp = 
0.25Cwtp         
=12.5 
Cd = 0.5Cwtp 
=25 
= 37.5 
Cmp = 0 
 
Cd = 
0.5Cwtp 
=25 
= 25 
Scientific 
 
Duc=Dlow or Dhigh, 
where  
P(Dlow)=P(Dhigh)=0.5 
Nc < 0.5N Cmp = 0 
Cd = Cwtp =50 
 
= 50 
Nc ≥ 0.5N Cmp = 
0.25Cwtp 
=12.5 
Cd = Duc  
=12.5  
or 37.5 
= 25 or 50 
Cmp = 0 
Cd = Duc 
=12.5  
or 37.5 
= 12.5 or 37.5 
  
Administrative 
 
Cuc=0 or Chigh, 
where 
P(0)=P(Chigh)=0.5 
Nc < 0.5N Cmp = 0 
Cd = Cwtp =50 
 
= 50 
Nc ≥ 0.5N Cmp = Cuc 
= 0 or 25 
Cd = 0.5Cwtp 
=25 
= 25 or 50 
Cmp = 0 
Cd = 
0.5Cwtp 
=25 
= 25 
 
Political 
 
Thuc=Thlow or Thhigh, 
where 
P(Thlow)=P(Thhigh)=
0.5 
Nc < Thuc Cmp = 0 
Cd = Cwtp =50 
 
= 50 
Nc ≥ Thuc Cmp = 
0.25Cwtp 
=12.5 
Cd = 0.5Cwtp 
=25 
= 37.5 
Cmp = 0 
Cd = 
0.5Cwtp 
=25 
= 25 
  
Nc, total number of crofters choosing “cooperate”; N, total population of crofters in the Uists; Cmp, cost 
of management plan; Cd, cost of negative goose impacts; Cwtp, crofter WTP to eliminate all current 
negative goose impact; Cuc, cost of management plan under uncertainty; Chigh = 0.5Cwtp, high cost; Duc, 
cost of negative goose impacts caused under uncertainty; Dlow = 0.25Cwtp, low level of damage; Dhigh = 
0.75Cwtp, high level of damage; Thuc, threshold number of crofters choosing “cooperate” required for 
management plan to be enacted under uncertainty; Thlow = 0.25N, low threshold; Thhigh = 0.75N, high 
threshold. 
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Table 20 - Full range of response, predictor, study treatment, and random variables used in 
generalised linear mixed effects models 
Response variable Description (units) 
 
Willing to 
cooperate 
Willingness to sign up to a hypothetical goose plan (yes/No) 
Willingness to pay Amount willing to pay for a hypothetical goose plan (£ per year) 
Prediction of 
crofters’ response 
Prediction of whether at least half of the population of crofters on Uist would 
sign up to a hypothetical goose plan (Yes/No) 
 
Predictor 
variables 
 
 
Area of croft Sum area of land worked, including rough grazing and apportionments of 
machair and hill grazing as reported by the crofter (Hectares) 
Croft owner The organisation from which the croft(s) is leased (North Uist Estates/Owner 
Occupier/ Scottish Government/Stòras Uibhist) 
Membership of the 
Scottish Crofting 
Federation (SCF) 
Membership of the crofters’ representative organisation, SCF at the time of the 
interview (Yes/No) 
Time as a crofter Time active in crofting (years). If the crofter responded that they had been a 
crofter all their lifetime or since they had been a child, the value was calculated 
by subtracting 10 from the crofter’s age 
Township within 
LGMG shooting 
area 
Resident in a township within the area covered by the LGMG goose 
management pilot (Yes/No) 
Awareness of the 
LGMG 
Awareness that there is a multi-stakeholder group on Uist which works to 
manage wild geese (Yes/No) 
Extent of goose 
damage 
Damage to land compared to perceived goose damage on an average Uist croft 
(less/same/more/don’t know) 
Goose damage 
suffered in 2016 
Goose damage had occurred in the calendar year up to the interview (Yes/No) 
Concern for natural 
habitats 
Concern that geese are damaging or will damage natural habitats of the Uists 
(Yes/No) 
Cost of goose 
damage (financial) 
Money paid to replace damaged crops or seed (Yes/No) 
Cost of goose 
scaring (financial) 
Money paid for goose scaring equipment, such as rockets or kites (Yes/No) 
Cost of goose 
scaring (time) 
Spent time scaring geese themselves in person (Yes/No) 
Concern with 
others suffering 
damage 
Negative impact of goose damage on other people is an impact on them also 
(Yes/No) 
 
Study treatments 
 
 
Uncertainty type Type of uncertainty present during the treatment (Baseline (no 
uncertainty)/Ecological/Economic/Management) 
Personal 
cooperation 
Willingness to cooperate from Q3 (Yes/No). included as an interaction with 
Uncertainty type 
 
Random variables 
 
 
Unique subject 
identifier 
Accounting for repeated measurements for each crofter 
Residential location Accounting for similarities between crofters from the same township 
(township name)  
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Population level data for predictor variables 
Crofters had a mean (± SD) age of 58 (± 14) years and had been crofting for 32 (± 19) 
years. Age and time crofting were strongly correlated (Spearman’s rho = 0.627, 
p<0.001), so time crofting was chosen as the variable to be used in subsequent analysis. 
At least one interview was conducted in each of 70 townships across the Uists. The 
sample was split North Uist (40.3%), Benbecula (16.8%), and South Uist (43.0%). The 
primary croft owner for most crofters interviewed was either North Uist Estates 
(33.6%) or Stòras Uibhist (53.0%), with the remainder resident on a croft owned by 
Scottish Government (8.1%) or owner occupiers (5.4%). The mean total crofting area 
in use was 31.6 (± 48.2) ha. In 2016 (the year of interview) one or more geese were 
reported present on 89.9% (95%CI = 84.1-93.8%) of crofts across the Uists and 73.8% 
(95%CI = 66.2-80.2%) of crofters reported goose damage to their croft. 22.8% (95%CI = 
16.8-30.2%) of crofters were members of the Scottish Crofting Federation (SCF) and 
79.9% (95%CI = 72.7-85.5%) were aware that there is a local goose management group 
(LGMG) which runs a plan aiming to manage the geese. 27.5% (95%CI = 21.0-35.2%) 
and 25.5% (95%CI = 19.2-33.1%) of crofters interviewed had paid money to replace 
damaged crop or for goose scaring equipment, respectively. 41.0% (95%CI = 33.4-
49.0%) had spent their own time scaring geese. 65.8% (95%CI = 57.8-72.9%) of crofters 
felt that geese are having a negative impact on the natural habitat in the Uists and 
74.5% (95%CI = 66.9-80.8%) felt concern for crofters in the Uists other than 
themselves who suffer goose damage.
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Table 21 - Model selection for Cooperation scenario. Top fitted (ΔAICc<2) generalised linear mixed effects models to determine what variables predict whether a 
crofter will be willing to pay for a hypothetical goose management plan under uncertainty. Full list of predictor variables see Table 14, only predictor variables 
which appeared in one or more of the top models are included here N=113. LGMG: local goose management group. Coefficients in bold are significant to p<0.05. 
 Model label 
 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F 
Predictor variable Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) 
Crofting 
1Time as a crofter     -0.57 
(0.56) 
0.31   -0.41 
(0.58) 
0.49   
Township within 
LGMG shoot area 
      0.58 
(0.73) 
0.42   0.44 
(0.72) 
0.54 
Experience of goose impact 
Cost of goose scaring 
(time) 
            
Formal organisations 
Awareness of LGMG   -1.14 
(0.85) 
0.18     -0.99 
(0.86) 
0.25 -1.07 
(0.85) 
0.21 
Scenario treatment  
Uncertainty type: 
Scientific 
 
Administrative 
 
Political 
 
-3.20 
(0.94) 
-4.57 
(0.99) 
-2.10 
(0.93 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
0.02 
 
-3.21 
(0.94) 
-4.58 
(0.99) 
-2.10 
(0.93) 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
0.02 
 
-3.22 
(0.95) 
-4.59 
(1.00) 
-2.12 
(0.94) 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
0.02 
 
-3.20 
(0.94) 
-4.57 
(0.99) 
-2.10 
(0.93) 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
0.02 
 
-3.22 
(0.94) 
-4.60 
(1.00) 
-2.12 
(0.94) 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
0.02 
 
-3.20 
(0.94) 
-4.58 
(0.99) 
-2.10 
(0.85) 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
0.02 
Random variable (variance) 
Location  3.50  3.28  3.45  3.39  3.26  3.23  
Participant number 1.30  1.32  1.24  1.30  1.29  1.29  
Model fit 
AICc 269.9  270.0  270.9  271.3  271.6  271.7  
1 Effect sized standardised to allow direct comparison of coefficients throughout the model 
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 Model label 
 2G 2H 
Predictor variable Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) 
Crofting 
1Time as a crofter     
Township within 
LGMG shoot area 
    
Experience of goose impact 
Cost of goose scaring 
(time) 
0.29 
(0.61) 
0.63 0.30 
(0.60) 
0.62 
Formal organisations 
Awareness of LGMG   -1.14 
(0.85) 
0.18 
Scenario treatment  
Uncertainty type: 
Scientific 
 
Administrative 
 
Political 
 
-3.20 
(0.94) 
-4.57 
(0.99) 
-2.10 
(0.93) 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
0.02 
 
-3.20 
(0.94) 
-4.58 
(0.99) 
-2.10 
(0.93) 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
0.02 
Random variable 
Location 3.36  3.16  
Participant number 1.33  1.34  
Model fit 
AICc 271.7  271.9  
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Table 22 - Model selection for Willingness to pay. Top fitted (ΔAICc<2) generalised linear mixed effects models to determine what variables predict if a crofter 
will be willing to pay for a hypothetical goose management plan. Full list of predictor variables see Table 14, only predictor variables which appeared in one or 
more of the top models are included here N=138. SCF: Scottish Crofting Federation. LGMG: local goose management group. 
 Model label 
1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 
Predictor variable Coeff. 
(Std 
Err.) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(Std 
Err.) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(Std 
Err.) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(Std 
Err.) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(Std 
Err.) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(Std 
Err.) 
Pr(>|z|) 
Crofting 
Area of croft -0.75 
(0.47) 
0.11   -0.78 
(0.47) 
0.10 -0.80 
(0.47) 
0.09     
1Time as a crofter -1.08 
(0.48) 
0.03 -1.21 
(0.47) 
0.01 -1.28 
(0.52) 
0.01 -1.09 
(0.49) 
0.03 -1.39 
(0.51) 
0.01 -0.97 
(0.45) 
0.03 
Township within 
LGMG shoot area 
            
Experience of goose impact 
Damage suffered in 
2016 
    0.74 
(0.60) 
0.22   0.67 
(0.58) 
0.25   
Concern for natural 
habitats 
      0.58 
(0.48) 
0.23     
Cost of goose scaring 
(financial) 
            
Concern for others 1.24 
(0.48) 
0.01 1.24 
(0.48) 
0.01 1.05 
(0.51) 
0.04 1.09 
(0.50) 
0.03 1.07 
(0.50) 
0.03 1.30 
(0.47) 
0.01 
Formal organisations 
1Membership of SCF 1.49 
(0.75) 
0.05 1.04 
(0.63) 
0.10 1.45 
(0.76) 
0.06 1.52 
(0.76) 
0.05 0.98 
(0.63) 
0.12   
Awareness of LGMG  
 
           
Random variable (variance) 
Location  3.6E-15  7.7E-15  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Model fit 
AICc 134.5  134.8  135.2  135.3  135.7  135.7  
1 Effect sized standardised to allow direct comparison of coefficients throughout the model 
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 Model label 
1G 1H 1I 1J 1K 1L 
Predictor variable Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) 
Crofting 
1Area of croft     -0.77 
(0.47) 
0.11 -0.76 
(0.47) 
0.11   -0.71 
(0.47) 
0.13 
Time as a crofter -1.21 
(0.48) 
0.01 -1.20 
(0.48) 
0.01 -1.13 
(0.49) 
0.02 -1.11 
(0.49) 
0.02 -1.15 
(0.48) 
0.02 -1.04 
(0.49) 
0.03 
Township within 
LGMG shoot area 
    0.29 
(0.49) 
0.55       
Experience of goose impact  
Damage suffered in 
2016 
  0.74 
(0.57) 
0.19       
 
  
Concern for natural 
habitats 
0.51 
(0.47) 
0.28           
Cost of goose scaring 
(financial) 
        -0.38 
(0.54) 
0.48 -0.27 
(0.56) 
0.63 
Concern for others 1.10 
(0.49) 
0.02 1.12 
(0.49) 
0.02 1.15 (0.51) 0.02 1.21 
(0.49) 
0.01 1.32 
(0.50) 
0.01 1.30 
(0.50) 
0.01 
Formal organisations 
1Membership of SCF 1.05 
(0.63) 
0.10   1.51 
(0.75) 
0.05 1.47 
(0.76) 
0.05 1.10 
(0.64) 
0.08 1.51 
(0.75) 
0.05 
Awareness of LGMG       0.33 
(0.60) 
0.58     
Random variable (variance)  
Location  0.00  5.5E-15  2.1E-15  0.00  0.00  6.0E-15  
Model fit  
AICc 135.8  136.2  136.4  136.4  136.5  136.5  
1 Effect sized standardised to allow direct comparison of coefficients throughout the model 
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Table 23 - Model selection for Willingness to Pay – Amount. Top fitted (ΔAICc<2) generalised linear mixed effects models to determine what variables predict 
how much a crofter will be willing to pay for a hypothetical goose management plan. Full list of predictor variables see Table 14, only predictor variables which 
appeared in one or more of the top models are included here N=113. LGMG: local goose management group. 
 Model label 
3A 3B 3C 3D 3E 3F 
Predictor variable Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) 
Crofting 
1Area of croft     0.10 (0.15) 0.50       
1Time as a crofter       -0.18 
(0.16) 
0.25   -0.11 
(0.16) 
0.48 
Township within 
LGMG shoot area 
  -0.19 
(0.18) 
0.29         
Experience of goose impact 
Damage suffered in 
2016 
0.31 
(0.21) 
0.13 0.41 
(0.21) 
0.05 0.34 
(0.21) 
0.10       
Cost of goose damage 
(financial) 
            
Cost of goose scaring 
(financial) 
0.33 
(0.18) 
0.07 0.40 
(0.19) 
0.04 0.34 
(0.18) 
0.07 0.39 
(0.19) 
0.04   0.40 
(0.19) 
0.04 
Cost of goose scaring 
(time) 
0.48 
(0.18) 
0.01 0.45 
(0.18) 
0.01 0.45 
(0.18) 
0.01 0.60 
(0.17) 
<0.001 0.78 
(0.14) 
6.1E-8 0.59 
(0.17) 
<0.001 
Concern for others 0.42 
(0.18) 
0.02 0.48 
(0.19) 
0.01 0.42 
(0.18) 
0.02 0.39 
(0.19) 
0.03 0.43 
(0.19) 
0.02 0.39 
(0.19) 
0.04 
Formal organisations 
1Membership of SCF             
Awareness of LGMG 0.20 
(0.18) 
0.26     0.31 
(0.18) 
0.09     
Random effect (variance) 
Location 0.12  0.13  0.14  0.11  0.13  0.12  
Model fit 
AICc 1023.8  1024.0  1024.6  1024.8  1025.0  1025.3  
1 Effect sized standardised to allow direct comparison of coefficients throughout the model 
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 Model label 
3G 3H 3I 3J   
Predictor variable Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|) Coeff. 
(SE) 
Pr(>|z|)     
Crofting             
1Area of croft   0.10 
(0.15) 
0.49         
1Time as a crofter             
Township within 
LGMG shoot area 
-0.09 
(0.17) 
0.60           
Experience of goose impact 
Damage suffered in 
2016 
            
Cost of goose damage 
(financial) 
    0.05 
(0.17) 
0.76       
Cost of goose scaring 
(financial) 
0.38 
(0.19) 
0.04 0.33 
(0.18) 
0.07 0.35 
(0.19) 
0.06 0.37 
(0.19) 
0.05     
Cost of goose scaring 
(time) 
0.59 
(0.17) 
<0.001 0.58 
(0.17) 
<0.001 0.56 
(0.18) 
<0.01 0.58 
(0.17) 
<0.001     
Concern for others 0.44 
(0.19) 
0.03 0.42 
(0.18) 
0.02 0.40 
(0.18) 
0.03 0.40 
(0.18) 
0.03     
Formal organisations 
1Membership of SCF       <0.01 
(0.16) 
0.99     
Awareness of LGMG   0.24 
(0.17) 
0.17         
Random effect (variance) 
Location 0.11  0.10  0.11  0.11      
Model fit 
AICc 1025.5  1025.6  1025.7  1025.8      
1 Predictors standardised to allow direct comparison of coefficients throughout the model 
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Table 24 - Model selection for Perception of others’ intention to cooperate. Top fitted (ΔAICc<2) generalised linear mixed effects models to determine what 
variables predict whether a crofter believes others will be willing to pay for a hypothetical goose management plan under uncertainty. Full list of predictor 
variables see Table 14, only predictor variables which appeared in one or more of the top models are included here N=113. LGMG: local goose management group. 
SCF: Scottish Crofting Federation. Coefficients in bold are significant to p<0.05. 
 Model label 
 4A 4B 4C 4D 4E 
Predictor variable Coeff. (SE) Pr(>|z|) Coeff. (SE) Pr(>|z|) Coeff. (SE) Pr(>|z|) Coeff. (SE) Pr(>|z|) Coeff. (SE) Pr(>|z|) 
Background 
1Time as a crofter 1.79 (1.10) 0.10 1.78 (1.09) 0.10   2.02 (1.13) 0.07   
Township within LGMG 
shoot area 
          
Experience of goose impact 
Cost of goose scaring 
(time) 
          
Concern for others   1.81 (1.40) 0.04     1.84 (1.42) 0.20 
Goose damage wrt Uist 
average: 
Less damage 
More damage 
Don’t know 
 
 
-2.62 (1.28) 
-3.89 (2.08) 
0.50 (1.96) 
 
 
0.04 
0.06 
0.80 
 
 
-2.78 (1.37) 
-3.91 (2.05) 
0.32 (1.95) 
 
 
0.07 
0.06 
0.87 
 
 
-3.16 (1.32) 
-3.82 (2.11) 
0.22 (1.97) 
 
 
0.02 
0.07 
0.91 
 
 
-2.60 (1.27) 
-4.10 (2.12) 
0.76 (1.98) 
 
 
0.04 
0.05 
0.70 
 
 
-2.84 (1.30) 
-3.86 (2.08) 
0.03 (1.97) 
 
 
0.03 
0.06 
0.99 
Formal organisations 
Membership of SCF -2.76 (1.38) 0.05 -2.78 (1.37) 0.04 -2.54 (1.40) 0.07 -2.74 (1.38) 0.05 -2.59 (1.39) 0.06 
Awareness of LGMG       -1.45 (1.41) 0.30   
Scenario treatment  
Uncertainty type: 
Scientific 
Administrative 
Political 
 
-1.84 (0.60) 
-2.94 (0.68) 
-1.76 (0.58) 
 
<0.01 
<0.001 
<0.01 
 
-1.85 (0.60) 
-2.95 (0.69) 
-1.77 (0.59) 
 
<0.01 
<0.001 
<0.01 
 
-1.84 (0.60) 
-2.94 (0.68) 
-1.76 (0.58) 
 
<0.01 
<0.001 
<0.01 
 
-1.85 (0.60) 
-2.95 (0.69) 
-1.77 (0.58) 
 
<0.01 
<0.001 
<0.01 
 
-1.86 (0.60) 
-2.95 (0.69) 
-1.77 (0.59) 
 
<0.01 
<0.001 
<0.01 
Individual cooperation 3.51 (0.96) <0.001 3.52 (0.96) <0.001 3.45 (0.96) <0.001 3.49 (0.96) <0.001 3.47 (0.97) <0.001 
Random variable 
Location 1.37E-13  0.00  0.00  -9.10E-14  -9.82E-15  
Participant number 16.35  16.14  16.96  16.35  16.95  
Model fit 
AICc 364.2  364.6  364.9  365.3  365.3  
1 Predictors standardised to allow direct comparison of coefficients throughout the model 
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 Model label 
Predictor variable 4F 4G 4H 4I 4J 
Background Coeff. (SE) Pr(>|z|) Coeff. (SE) Pr(>|z|) Coeff. (SE) Pr(>|z|) Coeff. (SE) Pr(>|z|) Coeff. (SE) Pr(>|z|) 
1Time as a crofter 2.06 (1.06) 0.05 1.85 (1.09) 0.09 1.99 (1.12) 0.08 1.72 (1.10) 0.12 1.85 (1.10) 0.09 
Township within LGMG 
shoot area 
  -1.10 (1.13) 0.33     -0.74 (1.11) 0.50 
Experience of goose impact 
Cost of goose scaring 
(time) 
          
Concern for others 2.32 (1.36) 0.09 2.09 (1.43) 0.15 1.72 (0.13) 0.22     
Goose damage wrt Uist 
average: 
Less damage 
More damage 
Don’t know 
   
 
-2.69 (1.34) 
-3.77 (2.04) 
-0.06 (1.96) 
 
 
0.05 
0.06 
0.97 
 
 
-2.28 (1.26) 
-4.09 (2.09) 
0.57 (1.97) 
 
 
0.07 
0.05 
0.77 
 
 
-2.44 (1.30) 
-4.07 (2.12) 
0.33 (1.98) 
 
 
0.06 
0.05 
0.87 
 
 
-2.92 (1.37) 
-3.80 (2.06) 
0.34 (1.97) 
 
 
0.03 
0.07 
0.86 
Formal organisations 
Membership of SCF -2.85 (1.31) 0.03 -2.90 (1.37) 0.03 -2.77 (1.37) 0.04 -2.93 (1.42) 0.04 -2.84 (1.38) 0.04 
Awareness of LGMG     -1.32 (1.40) 0.35     
Scenario treatment  
Uncertainty type: 
Scientific 
Administrative 
Political 
 
-1.80 (0.58) 
-2.87 (0.66) 
-1.71 (0.57) 
 
<0.01 
<0.001 
<0.01 
 
-1.84 (0.60) 
-2.93 (0.68) 
-1.76 (0.58) 
 
<0.01 
<0.001 
<0.01 
 
-1.86 (0.60) 
-2.96 (0.69) 
-1.77 (0.59) 
 
<0.01 
<0.001 
<0.01 
 
-1.85 (0.60) 
-2.95 (0.69) 
-1.77 (0.58) 
 
<0.01 
<0.001 
<0.01 
 
-1.83 (0.60) 
-2.93 (0.68) 
-1.76 (0.58) 
 
<0.01 
<0.001 
<0.01 
Individual cooperation 3.45 (0.94) <0.001 3.53 (0.96) <0.001 3.50 (0.96) <0.001 3.50 (0.96) <0.001 3.51 (0.95) <0.001 
Random variable 
Location 1.17E-13  9.38E-14  1.21E-13  5.16E-14  0.00  
Participant number 16.09  15.79  16.14  16.45  16.14  
Model fit 
AICc 365.6  365.8  365.8  365.9  365.9  
1 Predictors standardised to allow direct comparison of coefficients throughout the model
 
 
 
132 
 
 
Figure 11 - Probability of cooperation (±95% confidence intervals) of significant predictor 
variables on intention to cooperate with other crofters on a cooperative goose 
management plan under different types of uncertainty. Dots are model residuals. Outputs 
are from the simplest, best-fitting models. 
 
Figure 12 - Probability of cooperation (±95% confidence intervals) of significant predictor 
variables intention to cooperate with other crofters on a cooperative goose management 
plan (no uncertainty). Dots are model residuals. Outputs are from the simplest, best-
fitting models. 
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Figure 13 - Probability of cooperation (±95% confidence intervals) of significant predictor 
variables prediction of others to cooperate on a goose management plan. Dots are model 
residuals. Outputs are from the simplest, best-fitting models
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Chapter 5 
 
How do we successfully 
manage goose conflict? 
 
 
Chris Pollard, Steve Redpath, Aidan Keane, Juliette Young, Des Thompson, Luc 
Bussière and Nils Bunnefeld conceived the ideas and designed the methodology. 
CP analysed the data and wrote the Chapter. Drafts of the Chapter were 
commented on by SR, AK, JY, DT, LB and NB. 
  
 
 
136 
 
5.1 ABSTRACT 
In Scotland, geese and the conflicts surrounding their impacts on agriculture have 
been the focus of multi-stakeholder, collaborative management for over a decade. 
Yet the conflict persists. In light of the findings in Chapters 2 to 4 of this thesis and 
elsewhere, an appraisal of goose conflict management is appropriate. 
Using a conservation conflict management tool for conservation agencies, we 
evaluatee goose conflict management in Scotland to identify successes and areas 
for improvement. We then draw on the conclusions made in this thesis and 
compared with other examples of goose conflict management from Northern 
Europe and North America, to recommend policy interventions applicable to the 
Scottish conservation conflict context.  
Many existing structures and processes of goose conflict management in Scotland 
were successful. For example, multi-stakeholder groups at national and local level 
promoted participation; a set of three shared objectives built consensus between 
stakeholder groups; decision-making was distributed away from central forums to 
allow local stakeholders to find appropriate solutions to their context; and local 
expertise was coupled with scientific best practice to solve problems. Three areas 
for improvement were identified; i) limited horizontal and vertical interactions 
meant sharing of knowledge and perception of fairness suffered; ii) trade-offs 
involving data collection and management action implementation occurred, which 
exacerbated or have the potential to exacerbate the conflict; iii) multiple sources of 
uncertainty affect people in different ways and the heterogeneity of the system 
lacked balance between local and national levels.  
In order to build on the successes of goose conflict management so far achieved in 
Scotland we propose several practical interventions. Increasing interactions 
between individuals and groups; building data commons for shared learning; 
identification, acknowledgement, discussion and inclusion of trade-offs as they 
emerge; and making commitments to balance and fairness across the system. 
Enacting these recommendations would give goose conflict management in 
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Scotland greater ability to deliver positive outcomes in what is a continually 
changing issue. 
5.2 THE CHALLENGING CONFLICTS THAT ARISE FROM GOOSE 
HYPER-ABUNDANCE  
Goose population recoveries are hailed as conservation successes but this has been 
accompanied by disagreements arising between parties supporting goose 
conservation (e.g. birdwatchers) and those who suffer the impacts of the damage 
(e.g. farmers) (Eythórsson et al. 2017; Tombre et al. 2013a; McKenzie 2014; 
Anderson et al. 2018). Disagreements can become conservation conflicts if the 
parties clash over conservation objectives and one party is perceived to pursue its 
interests to the detriment of the other (Redpath et al. 2013).  
Conservation conflicts are complex, changing over time and subject to high levels 
of uncertainty from multiple sources (Redpath et al. 2013; Mason, Pollard et al. 
2018). Actively managing conservation conflict is required to achieve both positive 
social and biodiversity outcomes. Use of multi-stakeholder participatory processes 
for complex conservation problems are potentially beneficial (Henmati 2002; Balint 
et al. 2011). They are used to enhance decision-making by including a diverse range 
of viewpoints, whilst also increasing trust, generating shared learning, and 
increasing perceived fairness (Reed 2008; Young, Jordan, R. Searle, et al. 2013). To 
achieve these positive outcomes, the structure and process of the approach require 
careful design. For example: analysis of stakeholder groups allows systematic and 
transparent representation; integrating both local and scientific knowledge helps 
tailor solutions to local context; embedding participation early in the process and 
not just relying on the existing methods used by stakeholders avoids the 
limitations of processes designed to solve other problems; and distributing 
responsibility to give stakeholders independence avoids disenfranchisement of 
marginalised groups (Reed 2008; Young, Jordan, R. Searle, et al. 2013). 
Multi-stakeholder goose management in Scotland has been in place for over a 
decade which presents an ideal opportunity for an appraisal of the systems in place 
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for managing the goose conflict. We make a distinction between ‘goose 
management’ (the practical tasks of controlling goose numbers and limiting crop 
damage) and ‘goose conflict management’ (addressing the conflict between 
stakeholders, related to the geese).  We aim not to highlight best practice in goose 
management, as that is done elsewhere (e.g. Fox et al. 2016; Stroud et al. 2017), but 
rather to focus on the policy challenge of creating structures and processes suited 
to the complexity of goose conflict management in Scotland. We use a conflict 
management tool (Young, Thompson, et al. 2016) to systematically describe the 
successes of goose conflict management in Scotland and to explore areas for 
improvement. Then, comparing our findings to other goose conflicts in Northern 
Europe and North America, we compare successes and failures between case 
studies and identify policy interventions for strengthening goose conflict 
management in general. 
5.3 BACKGROUND TO GOOSE MANAGEMENT IN SCOTLAND 
In Scotland, two goose species, Greenland barnacle geese Branta leucopsis and 
greylag geese Anser anser, have seen a population recovery to levels of local hyper-
abundance. The Scottish population of Greenland barnacle geese overwintering in 
Islay has risen from c. 3,000 in 1952 to 46,000 in 2016 (WWT 2017). Non-migratory 
greylag geese, were restricted to c. 500 breeding birds in the 1930s mostly in the 
Outer Hebrides, but now breed at various locations across Scotland numbering c. 
40,000 (Mitchell et al. 2012; Bainbridge 2017). Population increases were due to 
decreased persecution, successful conservation interventions (practical and 
legislative), favourable climate change in breeding grounds, and promotion of 
farming practices such as improving grassland (Mason, Keane et al. 2018; 
Bainbridge 2017). 
The impacts of rising goose numbers on agriculture led to the formation of the 
National Goose Forum by Scottish Government in 1997, subsequently replaced by 
the National Goose Management Review Group (NGMRG) in 2001. The NGMRG 
remains the national level body for goose issues in Scotland and includes 
stakeholders representing Scottish Government, conservation organisations, 
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shooting interests, and farming and crofting interests. The NGMRG receives 
technical guidance from the Goose Science Advisory Group (GSAG). The NGMRG 
built consensus by having three shared objectives: meet the UK’s nature 
conservation obligations for geese, within the context of wider biodiversity 
objectives; minimise economic losses experienced by farmers and crofters as a 
result of the presence of geese; and maximise the value for money of public 
expenditure (Crabtree et al. 2010).  
Decision making for goose management was distributed to Local Goose 
Management Groups (LGMGs, Figure 14), which were responsible for 
implementing the NGMRG objectives in their respective contexts. Each locally 
tailored scheme is managed by the local Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH) office 
along with representatives from the important local stakeholder groups; mainly 
Scottish Government, conservation organisations, farmers and crofters, and 
wildfowl shooters. LGMGs use their own blend of actions to manage geese such as 
farmer payments for goose feeding areas, shooting, scaring, and population 
reduction. Funding comes from Scottish Government. However, the level of 
funding is based on the social and political history of each location rather than a 
costing linked to required management actions or damage incurred (Bainbridge 
2017). All LGMGs use annual goose counts and harvest (bag) data to model goose 
populations and set future targets for shooting. 
Barnacle geese on Islay 
Greenland barnacle goose management on Islay involves scaring, population 
reduction, designated refuge areas, and payments to farmers for sacrificial land 
(Figure 2, Table 27, Mckenzie 2014; McKenzie & Shaw 2017). A range of goose 
scaring techniques has been tried on Islay, with limited success primarily due to 
goose habituation. Population reduction of the Annex 1 listed barnacle geese 
required derogation under Article 9 of the EC Birds Directive. Conservation NGOs 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) and Wildfowl & Wetlands Trust 
(WWT) jointly lodged a complaint to the European Commission in contest to the 
population reduction of barnacle geese on Islay (RSPB Scotland & WWT 2015) and 
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withdrew their representatives from the NGMRG (Scottish Natural Heritage 2015), 
although local RSPB representatives are still involved in LGMG at some locations. 
Payments to farmers make up the bulk £0.9m of the budgeted £1.6m goose 
management programme on Islay (Figure 14, Table 27). The current Islay 
Sustainable Goose Management Strategy began in 2014 and runs until 2024 
(McKenzie 2014). 
Greylag geese across Scotland 
Conflict caused by British greylag geese has resulted in four adaptive management 
pilot schemes in Orkney, the Uists, Harris & Lewis, and Coll & Tiree (Figure 14, 
Table 27). Greylag geese can be legally hunted during the open season in winter 
(September – February) and each pilot scheme has one or two additional periods 
for controlled population reduction, carried out by volunteers and or paid 
shooters. No payments are made to farmers for sacrificial land in any of the 
adaptive management pilots, which resulted in the pilots all being an order of 
magnitude less costly than the barnacle goose scheme in Islay (highest cost greylag 
pilot £48k per year, compared to £1.6m per year to manage barnacle geese in Islay) 
(Figure 14, Table 27). 
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Figure 14 – Locations of goose conflict in Scotland. Label at each location show species of 
goose for which the Local Goose Management Group LGMG is responsible for controlling. 
Greylag geese are resident, Greenland barnacle geese are overwintering migrants. Pop: 
goose population in 2016, Target pop: maximum value of the target population range in 
the respective LGMG plan, Cost: cost in £GBP allocated for 2016 (2014 for Islay). 1Greylag 
goose population in Orkney increases to over 75,000 from November to February due to 
overwintering migrants. References: Islay (McKenzie 2014; WWT 2017), Coll & Tiree (SNH 
2016), The Uists (Ferguson 2016), Lewis & Harris (MacFarlane 2016), Orkney Islands 
(Mitchell et al. 2016; Churchill 2016). For further details see Table 27. Repeat of Figure 2, 
from Chapter 1. Goose silhouettes produced by Tom Mason. 
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5.4 CHALLENGES IN MANAGEMENT OF THE GOOSE CONFLICT IN 
SCOTLAND 
To systematically explore areas for improvement we used a conflict management 
tool for conservation agencies (Young, Thompson, et al. 2016). This framework asks 
six stepwise questions to help design multi-stakeholder processes for conservation 
conflict management (Table 25). 
 
Table 25 - Stages of a conflict management tool for conservation agencies, adapted from 
Young et al. (2016) 
Stage of the conflict management tool 
1. Is there a conflict? 
2. Is the context of the conflict understood? 
3. Is a multi-stakeholder process for conflict management required and / or how 
should it be structured? 
4. Is there a joint understanding of the conflict and its evidence base? 
5. Is there a shared goal and agreed process towards reaching this goal? 
6. Is there long-term monitoring and management capable of adapting to a changing 
conflict? 
 
5.4.1 Stage 1 – Is there a conflict? 
Disagreements surrounding the management of geese has boiled over into conflict 
as parties broadly in favour of agriculture or goose conservation clash and perceive 
one another to be attempting to pursue their interests at the expense of the other. 
This includes farmers who shoulder the negative impacts of large numbers of geese 
feeling goose conservation is given greater priority than their livelihood and 
conservationists seeing farmers as single-mindedly pursuing profit at the expense 
of habitat and biodiversity. However, there is much more nuance and variability in 
these stances and in-depth discussions of competing goals and perceptions held by 
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stakeholders are detailed in Chapter 3 of this thesis (for the Uists and Orkney) and 
in McKenzie & Shaw (2017) and Whitehouse (2009) (for Islay). 
5.4.2 Stage 2 – Is the context of the conflict understood? 
A wide range of stakeholders have formally contributed to the extensive ecological, 
economic, and political understanding of goose management in Scotland. For 
example: academic researchers have shown how ecological data can be better used 
for goose management in Scotland (Cusack et al. 2018) and the potential economic 
compensation required for the presence of hyper-abundant geese in Islay (Hanley 
et al. 2003); conservation charities have conducted robust ecological surveys of 
geese (e.g. WWT 2017) and challenged Scottish Government on the legality of their 
management plans (RSPB Scotland & WWT 2015); and Scottish Government have 
produced national level summaries (e.g. Crabtree et al. 2010). Additional 
contextual details of conflicts in the Uists and Orkney are in Chapter 3 and for 
Islay, in McKenzie & Shaw (2017) and Whitehouse (2009). 
5.4.3 Stage 3 – Is a multi-stakeholder process for conflict management 
required and / or how should it be structured? 
The structure of the NGMRG and the LGMGs have shown that multi-stakeholder 
processes are favoured by Scottish Government for goose management in Scotland. 
Using participatory multi-stakeholder processes for complex and contentious 
problems is not always feasible. Processes need to be acceptable to stakeholders, 
practical to implement, and technically, economically and politically possible. A 
successful multi-stakeholder process demands high level of social resources (time, 
funding and commitment) and as such can be easily derailed (Balint et al. 2011). 
Despite these challenges, distributed co-management has been successful at 
tailoring goose management methods for different locations using the expertise of 
local stakeholders. For example, in the Uists individual shooters are employed to 
actively patrol given areas of agriculture, whereas in the Orkney Islands shooting 
teams made up of volunteers reactively respond to requests from farmers. 
However, multi-stakeholder processes do not occur in a vacuum and issues of scale 
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need to be considered (Reed 2008; Young, Jordan, R. Searle, et al. 2013). We 
showed in Chapter 3 that differences between LGMGs (Figure 14, Table 27) have 
caused anger in farmers in greylag control areas, who see fewer resources for their 
own LGMG than are made available for barnacle goose management on Islay 
where the species is different but the impact on crops is the same (Howarth 2018). 
The membership of national and local groups has changed over time, for instance 
with RSPB and WWT choosing to leave the NGMRG and the RSPB leaving the 
Orkney Islands LGMG. In the latter case RSPB felt goose management was a lower 
priority than their other conservation work locally and the LGMG members 
generally felt that more efficient coordination of the project could be achieved 
without formal RSPB input (Chapter 3). Losing a unique viewpoint from the multi-
stakeholder processes could cause problems as interactions between stakeholders 
with diverse opinions and a dense network of individuals can both aid the solving 
of complex problems likely to arise in the future (Chapter 2). RSPB were also 
perceived as an important player in Orkney, should they choose to act unilaterally 
on goose management or if people preferentially interact with them because of 
their importance, the LGMG may be undermined (Chapter 2). 
5.4.4 Stage 4 – Is there a joint understanding of the conflict and its 
evidence base? 
LGMGs trust in the expertise of their members to implement goose control 
appropriate to the local context. The use of scientific evidence to guide decision 
making is overseen by Goose Science Advisory Group (GSAG), and technical advice 
on population modelling and efficacy of practical interventions is shared vertically 
between local managers and the central SNH coordinator. Scientific evidence on 
deciding between different management interventions and their efficiency, 
effectiveness and feasibility is rare (Tulloch et al. 2017; Mason, Keane et al. 2018). 
However, ideas discussed or tested at one location are not horizontally shared with 
individuals at another location. For example, in Chapter 3 we discovered how egg-
oiling to decrease goose productivity was often seen by farmers, crofters and 
shooters as a potentially successful intervention even though technical advice 
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shared by managers was to the contrary. This indicated a lack of trust in the 
technical advice or the reliability of its source. But if individuals tried the method 
themselves, they generally agreed egg-oiling was not feasible (Chapter 3). The 
information sharing network which currently relies on centralised coordination 
rather than horizontal interactions exacerbates any situation where individuals do 
not trust the source of the advice. 
5.4.5 Stage 5 – Is there a shared goal and agreed process towards reaching 
this goal? 
It is clear to stakeholders that they may have different goals to one another, but 
the NGMRG and LGMGs have successfully agreed on shared objectives (e.g. 
Ferguson 2016), meaning cooperative actions can be undertaken to manage geese. 
This includes agreed population targets for each goose management scheme. Still, 
shared goals alone are not sufficient for cooperation in goose conflict. Chapter 3 
showed many farmers are positioned very differently (e.g. geographically, 
economically, agriculturally) and Chapter 2 suggested that individual farmers do 
not all interact with the same organisations involved in goose management. 
Heterogeneity of circumstances and connections makes actions such as 
cooperative goose scaring tough to achieve, even though individual farmers may all 
share the same goal of crop protection. Within the same stakeholder group there 
were also differences vertically, between local and national interests. For example, 
expanding the market for goose meat sales to help fund goose control was a 
potential goal shared locally across stakeholder groups in Orkney and the Uists 
(including conservationists), but there was a perception that steps required to 
access a larger market were not taken due to the lack of support from influential 
national conservation organisations (Chapter 3). 
Practical implementation of goals can reveal emerging trade-offs between 
stakeholders (Chapter 3). For instance, shooters in the Uists wanting to efficiently 
reduce the number of geese require large flocks to gather, but crofters are 
encouraged to scare geese to protect their own crops. Scaring benefits short-term 
crop protection but harms efforts to reduce numbers over the longer-term.  
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5.4.6 Stage 6 – Is there long-term monitoring and management capable of 
adapting to a changing conflict? 
Goose management in Scotland follows adaptive management principles, allowing 
actions to be changed as their effectiveness becomes apparent. Monitoring for 
effectiveness is both quantitative through goose counts and population modelling, 
and qualitative through formal and informal feedback from stakeholders. 
Producing better model predictions can help prevent disappointment and quell 
conflict. Cusack et al. (2018) showed that on Islay hunting targets are largely set 
using population data from the previous year rather than from the same year 
running the risk of under- or over-harvesting. In Orkney, however, there was no 
direct link between population and target bag since 2010. Additionally, achieving 
even a robustly set hunting target can be extremely challenging, and will result in 
under-harvesting. It is most likely that stakeholders therefore lose trust in the 
management process. We described in Chapter 3 how SNH in Orkney commission 
the Wildfowl & Wetlands Trust (WWT) to conduct a goose survey over a four-day 
period (e.g. Mitchell et al. 2016), but timing of the survey clashes with periods 
when shooters most want to be culling geese, causing conflict over the 
management process. Whereas in the Uists, counting is participatory with local 
crofters, shooters, and conservationists collaborating for a day to count geese. The 
uncertainty in the data provided by this method is high, but stakeholders accept 
the methods and appreciate the transparency.  
We found in Chapter 4 that scientific uncertainty of goose ecology had less impact 
on Uist crofters’ intention to cooperate with each other, than administrative 
uncertainty surrounding commitment of external funders. In Islay a 10 year plan 
has been agreed (McKenzie 2014) allowing a welcome length of certainty and 
commitment. In all other locations, adaptive management schemes were piloted 
with five years of government funding. Methods suggested to fund goose 
management beyond the five years included development of a market for the sale 
of goose meat in the Uists and Orkney and introducing a small levy on animals 
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sold locally at market in the Uists, but a long-term replacement for government 
funding has yet to be found. 
5.5 BUILDING SYSTEMS TO BETTER MANAGE GOOSE CONFLICT  
Having highlighted some of the structures and processes in place for goose conflict 
management in Scotland, we now suggest improvements aimed at strengthening 
the Scottish system further. Our suggested system improvements are cross-cutting, 
each addressing challenges in more than one of the stages in the previous section. 
We also compare this to common challenges of European and North American 
goose conflict management and the current Scottish responses to these challenges 
(Table 26).  
5.5.1 Building interactions 
Increasing the interaction between currently unconnected stakeholders will help 
build a system more able to respond to forthcoming complex problems. For 
instance, Lefebvre et al. (2017) considered management of greater snow goose 
Anser caerulescens atlanticus populations in North America was successful due to 
interactions between wildlife managers and researchers made before 
overabundance became an issue. In Scotland, strengthening the network includes 
building stronger ties between major players such as the RSPB and those in the 
formal goose management process. Increasing diversity of viewpoints in this way 
may itself be challenging, but can foster creativity (Mason, Pollard et al. 2018) and 
build trust and legitimacy in the system (Henmati 2002). Madsen et al. (2017) 
describe how the adaptive management of the Svalbard pink-footed goose Anser 
brachyrhynchus population across Norway and Denmark was social-resource 
demanding but successful in achieving shared learning and transparency. The 
scheme well-documented the entire process (meetings, decisions, data, 
assessments) and made it all publicly available. In Scotland, ideas discussed or 
tested at one location by a particular stakeholder group or groups (e.g. experiences 
of egg-oiling) should be shared via direct interaction with individuals at other 
locations. Information is more likely to be trusted by a recipient if the source and 
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recipient share characteristics (e.g. both farmers) and if it comes via more than one 
connection (Bodin 2017). Finally, beyond information sharing, denser networks 
with more redundant interactions (ties between actors who are otherwise tied) can 
aid problem solving in complex cooperation-type problems such as the Scottish 
organisations involved in goose conflict in Scotland may currently be better 
structured to solving coordination-type problems of efficiency (Chapter 2). 
Recommendation - Develop networks of more diverse stakeholders and between 
individuals and organisations at different LGMG locations. Building data commons 
using an open-access list of ideas discussed and or tested at each site would aid 
shared learning in a transparent way. 
5.5.2 Managing trade-offs 
Stakeholder discussion is vital to make clear trade-offs for all parties (Mason, 
Pollard et al. 2018). There is an apparent trade-off when conducting goose counts 
between data quality and participation. This also shows the trade-offs between 
“goose management” and “goose conflict management,” where choosing higher 
quality data over participation may favour the former but not the latter. Better data 
does lead to better modelled predictions including reduced uncertainty, but better 
models don’t always help manage conflict. Eythórsson et al. (2017) report how a 
predictive model developed and used for distributing subsidy payments to farmers 
for pink-footed goose damage in Norway, was rejected by farmers as it rarely 
matched the reality of the damage. Instead, farmers favoured a simpler post-hoc 
compensation system based on monitored damage. In the Uists, trade-offs between 
scaring geese and population reduction emerged during implementation (Chapter 
3). Trade-offs are widely acknowledged as important factors in conservation 
management, but tend to be front-loaded (e.g. during objective setting) rather 
than confronted later-on (e.g. during implementation) (Hirsch et al. 2011). In 
Scottish goose management, stakeholders are aware of these trade-off situations as 
they arise, but they remain hidden from the formal management processes and the 
wider network (Chapter 3). 
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Recommendation - It is not possible to foresee many trade-offs before they occur. 
Their identification, acknowledgement, discussion, and inclusion in formal plans 
and reports should be ongoing as a process of conflict management. Learning can 
then be shared centrally and between LGMGs. 
5.5.3 Commitment and understanding 
The NGMRG was formed in 2001, with the various goose management schemes 
following later, leading to an unavoidable top-down direction of institutional 
design. Distributed decision-making to the LGMG is a successful approach, but 
differing treatment of goose management schemes in different locations has fed 
conflict where those at one location feel they have access to fewer resources than 
those elsewhere (Howarth 2018). Clearly defined and real stakeholder involvement 
and recognition is required. For example management of pink-footed geese in 
Norway suffered from a vague compensation plan unequally skewed towards 
specific areas. Farmers were left to feel there was no real recognition of their 
economic burden and they lost confidence in the process (Tombre et al. 2013b). 
Following pressure from farming unions, stakeholders cooperatively developed a 
workable compensation scheme which the government then decided to fund on a 
permanent basis. Balancing local concerns at the national level is key to a 
managing conflict across Scotland rather than just at distinct locations within 
Scotland.  
Multiple sources of uncertainty variably impact people in different ways. While 
some important elements of the system (e.g. funding) may be beyond the control 
of stakeholders, national level actors should make strong commitments towards 
the aims of multi-stakeholder processes (Henmati 2002). This would help alleviate 
the lower trust individuals in geographically and politically remote positions have 
in the process. 
Recommendation - Stakeholders should indicate a high level of commitment, 
particularly to bring balance and fairness to the process of funding goose 
management in Scotland over the medium- to long-term. This acknowledges the 
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uncertainty of the future but brings greater transparency and signals intention to 
cooperate equally with stakeholders across the locations. 
5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Formal goose management in Scotland has evolved over the last two decades to 
successfully include processes and structures suitable for dealing with the 
conservation conflict. Creation of multi-stakeholder groups, distributed decision-
making, creative solutions, regular formal interactions, and access to scientific 
support, have all helped to manage the negative aspects of the conflict. The 
complexity of conservation conflict however, means problems will inevitably 
change shape over time and persist in one way or another. System processes and 
structure must change, develop and experiment over time to tackle new aspects of 
the problem as they appear. Our recommendations aim to give stakeholders better 
opportunities to use their expertise collaboratively, both currently and to adapt to 
future problems. We’ve focussed on: increasing interactions between individuals 
locally and nationally, to share information and strengthen problem solving 
networks; capturing the unseen complexity of emerging trade-offs for management 
and learning; and showing commitment for developing long-term relationships. 
Applying these recommendations would help goose conflict management in 
Scotland to build on current successes and continue to deliver positive outcomes 
for people involved.
 
 
151 
 
Table 26 – Summary of common goose conflict management challenges and the associated 
structure/process of goose management in Scotland 
Common 
challenges 
Example 
references 
Associated structure/process of formal goose 
conflict management in Scotland 
Promoting 
stakeholder 
participation 
Holmgaard et al. 
2018; Tombre et 
al. 2013b; Lefebvre 
et al. 2017 
Multi-stakeholder groups formed at national and local 
level designed to include individuals representing major 
stakeholder groups: government, conservation, farming 
and crofting, shooting. 
Building 
consensus on 
management 
objectives 
Johnson et al. 
2015; Lefebvre et 
al. 2017 
The NGMRG has three shared objectives, each focussed on 
a major stakeholder group: farmers, conservationists, and 
government. LGMGs have adopted these objectives.  
Shaping 
organisational 
structure 
Eythórsson et al. 
2017; Johnson et 
al. 2015 
Decision-making is partially distributed away from the 
central NGMRG, allowing LGMGs to work with local 
stakeholders to find solutions appropriate for their 
context. 
Bridging gaps 
between technical 
& local expertise 
Johnson et al. 
2015; Tombre et al. 
2013b 
LGMGs take best practice from central organisations 
(GSAG, partner organisations) and implement alongside 
local experts. For example, using centrally built population 
models to provide bag targets, then developing shooting 
methods with local shooters. 
Coping with 
multiple sources 
of uncertainty 
Johnson et al. 2015 Established multi-stakeholder groups at local and national 
levels have range of experience and history of 
collaborating to solve unexpected problems.  
Maintaining 
momentum under 
pressure from 
alternative 
priorities 
Johnson et al. 
2015; Lefebvre et 
al. 2017; Madsen et 
al. 2017 
Local and national groups hold regular meeting of their 
members and publish annual management plans. SNH 
maintain priority by employing part- and full-time staff for 
goose management. 
Ensuing 
transparency and 
legitimacy of 
process and 
science 
Johnson et al. 
2015; Madsen et al. 
2017; Eythórsson 
et al. 2017 
Minutes of NGMRG meetings are available online and 
local SNH coordinators available for queries. Data 
collection methods for goose counts and hunting bags 
differ between locations. Model building is handled 
centrally. 
Retaining 
collective learning 
Tombre et al. 
2013b 
Feedback sessions between members of the LGMGs. 
Formal reporting of LGMG plans and outcomes to central 
coordinator. 
Communicating Tombre et al. 
2013a; Eythórsson 
et al. 2017; 
Johnson et al. 2015 
Regular meetings between stakeholders in local and 
national groups. Surveys conducted to collect farmer and 
crofter views. Communication with the public through 
press releases. 
NGMRG, National Goose Management Review Group; LGMG, Local Goose Management Group; GSAG, 
Goose Science Advisory Group; SNH, Scottish Natural Heritage
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Table 27 - Details of goose management schemes in Scotland with high levels of political activity. 
Goose 
species 
Greenland Barnacle 
Branta leucopsis 
British Greylag  
Anser anser 
Location Islay Orkney The Uists Lewis & Harris Coll & Tiree 
Goose 
population 
45,000 
(McKenzie 2014; WWT 
2017) 
24,250 
(Mitchell et al. 2016) 
 
6,400 
(Ferguson 2016) 
3,800 
(MacFarlane 2016) 
2,300 
(SNH 2016) 
Target 
population 
28,000 – 31,000 
(McKenzie 2014) 
9,000 – 11,000 
(Churchill 2016) 
3,600 – 4,400 
(Ferguson 2016) 
2,500 – 3,100 
(MacFarlane 2016) 
1,650 – 2,200 
(SNH 2016) 
Cost £1.6m (2014) 
(McKenzie 2014) 
£14k (2016) 
(Churchill 2016) 
£48k 
(Ferguson 2016) 
£17.5k 
(MacFarlane 2016) 
£11k 
(SNH 2016) 
Management 
actions 
Counting in Islay & across 
range (Greenland, 
Iceland) 
Compensation per goose 
(no scaring). Amount 
based on payment rate for 
habitat & goose density 
Special Protected Areas 
(SPAs) reserved for geese 
(mainly outside of 
agricultural areas) 
Scaring to keep the geese 
inside the SPAs 
Scaring methods 
(McKenzie 2014): takes 
place on 15-20% of the 6-
7k Ha of farmland 
included in the scheme – 
the rest is for the geese. 
Shooting to reduce 
numbers (controversial) 
using the Trinder 
Population Viability 
Analysis + simpler Excel 
Adaptive management 
pilots: 
Counting 
Shooting during the open 
season 
Shooting during the 
closed season 
(Autumn only) 
 
 
Adaptive management 
pilots: 
Counting 
Shooting during the open 
season 
Shooting during the 
closed season 
(Spring & Autumn) 
Scaring 
Damage monitoring 
(reporting from farmers 
and questionnaire). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adaptive management 
pilots: 
Counting 
Shooting during the open 
season 
Shooting during the 
closed season 
(Spring & Autumn) 
 
 
Adaptive management 
pilots: 
Counting 
Shooting during the open 
season 
Shooting during the 
closed season 
(Spring only) 
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model (endorsed by 
GSAG). 
Measuring goose damage 
with exclosure cages to 
link goose numbers and 
goose damage 
Aims 
(beyond 
National 
Strategy 
Objectives) 
Develop habitat 
management techniques 
to support Greenland 
white-fronted geese. 
 
Ensure large areas of 
suitable habitat are 
available to all species of 
geese as undisturbed 
roosting and feeding 
areas. 
Maintain a viable number 
of geese at a level which 
meets conservation 
obligations. 
 
Ensure there will be no 
adverse effect on site 
integrity of the SPAs by 
considering the 
conservation objectives 
of the sites. 
 
Reduce the damage to 
grass crops by reducing 
the number of barnacle 
geese on Islay, and 
therefore reducing the 
impact of geese on the 
agricultural economy. 
To test whether local 
populations of resident 
geese can be managed 
effectively to maintain a 
stable population at 
levels that reduce the 
impacts of goose grazing 
on agriculture and retain 
the conservation interest. 
 
To test how effectively 
shooting levels can be 
managed, through setting 
agreed shooting levels 
and regular monitoring of 
population levels. This 
will protect populations 
from over exploitation, 
while at the same time 
reducing agricultural 
damage. 
 
In addition, the Project 
will be an important test 
of whether approaches to 
adaptive management 
which rely on voluntary 
recording of bag data are 
sufficiently robust to 
safeguard goose 
To test approaches to 
adaptive management of 
geese and in particular to 
test whether local 
populations of geese can 
be managed effectively to 
maintain a stable 
population at levels that 
reduce the impacts of 
goose damage on 
agriculture and retain the 
conservation interest. 
 
To test how effectively 
shooting levels can be 
managed, through setting 
agreed shooting levels 
and regular monitoring of 
population levels.  This 
will protect populations 
from over exploitation, 
while at the same time 
reducing agricultural 
damage. 
 
In addition the project 
will be an important test 
of whether approaches to 
adaptive management 
which rely on voluntary 
The objective of the pilot 
is to test the approach to 
adaptive management of 
resident greylag geese on 
both islands. 
 
The pilot will test 
whether local populations 
of resident geese can be 
managed effectively to 
reduce agricultural 
damage whilst 
safeguarding the species 
conservation status and 
its geographical range. 
The aim of the Project, as 
set out in the Project 
Agreement is to test 
whether local populations 
of resident greylag geese 
can be managed 
effectively to maintain a 
sustainable population at 
levels that reduce the 
impacts of geese on 
agricultural activity and 
retain their conservation 
interest. The project relies 
on the following 
underlying principles: 
To know goose numbers 
and life statistics, 
especially mortality from 
shooting; to have a degree 
of control over the 
numbers of geese being 
shot each year; to be able 
to assess population data 
and inform take each 
year; to have agreement 
and buy-in from local 
interests. 
 
The agreed objectives are:  
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Ensure that farmer 
compensation payments 
to farmers for goose 
damage are targeted at 
the most appropriate 
management activities 
(i.e. those growing grass). 
 
populations, while at the 
same time allowing co-
ordinated effort, 
including scaring, to 
prevent agricultural 
damage. 
 
To meet our nature 
conservation obligations 
it is necessary to maintain 
both a sustainable and 
stable resident greylag 
goose population and its 
geographical range. 
 
To keep agricultural 
conflicts to an acceptable 
level. 
 
To have agreement and 
support from local 
interests. 
recording of bag data are 
sufficiently robust to 
safeguard goose 
populations. 
Maintain a sustainable 
resident greylag goose 
population and range. 
 
Keep agricultural conflicts 
to an acceptable level.  
 
Allow for recreational use 
that does not jeopardise 
the resident population. 
Conflict 
management 
Multi-stakeholder LGMG 
Consultations, open / 
public meetings, 
attendance at community 
events for public 
information. 
Multi-stakeholder LGMG 
Objectives of minimising 
conflict (recording crop 
damage) and involving 
local people including the 
public and farmers who 
are not already on the 
LGMG. 
 
Farmer survey to 
investigate perceptions of 
scheme success. 
Multi-stakeholder LGMG. 
 
Multi-stakeholder LGMG 
Questionnaire of grazing 
clerks and farmers to 
investigate perceptions 
around geese and 
agriculture.  
Multi-stakeholder LGMG 
Questionnaire of land 
managers to investigate 
perceptions around goose 
impacts and goose 
management.  
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Chapter 6 
 
General discussion 
 
 
6.1 History of goose populations and impacts 
The negative impact of geese in Scotland was documented over 300 years ago 
when, visiting the Outer Hebrides of Scotland, Martin (1703) wrote “the wild geese 
are plentiful here, and very destructive to the barley, notwithstanding the many 
methods used for driving them away both by traps and gunshot.” In the 
intervening three centuries, the fortunes of geese in Scotland have fluctuated with 
populations depleted in the first half of the twentieth century due to hunting for 
food and sport, systematic persecution and habitat disruption (Bainbridge 2017). 
Populations have been increasing from these historically (recorded) low numbers 
to again damage crops and compel the use of gunshot, if not traps. The modern-
day goose in Scotland has support of national and international conservation 
organisations and legislation protecting them from persecution and securing their 
habitat (Williams et al. 2005; European Union 2009). Government support has led 
to the formation of collaborative multi-stakeholder goose management groups, 
both centrally and in the locations most affected (Bainbridge 2017). However, 
conflict has persisted (Howarth 2018; Edwards 2018), providing us with a mature 
yet dynamic case study for examining the role of social interactions in conservation 
conflict.   
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6.2 Cooperative interactions in goose conflict management in 
Scotland 
6.2.1 Structure 
The presence or absence of interactions between actors accumulate to form 
network structures through which information, influence and resources flow.  
Formal management of the goose conflict in Scotland, using participatory multi-
stakeholder groups connected to a national coordinator had some success due to 
distributed decision-making, regular formal interactions, and access to scientific 
support (Chapter 5, Table 26). We recommended structural changes to increase 
the number and diversity of vertical interactions between local and national 
stakeholders and horizontal interactions between stakeholders in different 
locations or different fields (Chapter 5). 
In Chapter 2 we showed how interaction networks in two goose management 
locations showed over-representation of configurations indicative of bridging 
social capital. Bridging social capital involves a network structure of sparse 
interactions with more centralised “hubs.” This suggests that individuals formed 
interactions in response to coordination problems, where efficient identification 
and organisation of tasks to meet shared goals is important (Bodin 2017). The 
prevalence of bridging configurations also showed that the networks at both 
locations had the capacity to deal with coordination problems now and potentially 
increases capacity to do this in the future. We also discovered in the same 
networks, a lower prevalence of configurations indicative of bonding social capital. 
This type of social capital involves a network structure with more interactions and 
more closure. Multiple redundant interactions, rather than a central hub, mean 
information can be verified through more than one channel, enhancing trust in the 
information and increasing ease with which bad behaviour is detected (Berardo & 
Scholz 2010). The lower prevalence of configurations indicative of bonding social 
capital suggested that (at least in the Orkney Islands network) interactions were 
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not formed in response to cooperation problems, where actors have competing 
goals requiring negotiation in order to find solutions and progress (Bodin 2017). 
The lack of bonding social capital in the Orkney Islands may be due to the 
withdrawal of RSPB from the Local Goose Management Group. The RSPB were 
generally perceived as having a viewpoint contrary to many other stakeholders. 
The removal of a challenging voice would turn a cooperation problem into a 
coordination problem (i.e. turn negotiating with different goals, to organising with 
shared goals) allowing actors to form interactions better suited to the latter 
problem type (Chapter 2, Bodin 2017). This can be dangerous in three ways: firstly, 
when complex cooperation problems arise in the future, the current network 
would not have the capacity to respond and costly reorganisation of interactions 
must occur; secondly, that the context changes causing the unconnected party to 
act unilaterally; and finally, exclusion (whether mutually agreed or forced) of an 
organisation perceived to be one of the most important in the system, could push 
individuals seeking to preferentially form interactions with organisations perceived 
as more important (known as linking social capital (Woolcock 2001)), to bypass the 
LGMG altogether, potentially undermining the strength of the policy forum. 
In Chapter 3 we revealed how the advantages of distributed decision-making were 
diluted due to isolation of local groups from shared learning opportunities and the 
perception of unequal distribution of resources by national level management 
across local goose management groups. Restricted structures for shared learning 
resulted in useful knowledge (e.g. experiences of egg-oiling) going to waste, as it 
was not disseminated through trusted pathways. The perception of unequal 
resource distribution caused conflict, potentially decreasing cooperative behaviour 
in crofters.  
6.2.2 Process 
Processes (the management and content of interactions) such as consensus 
building on management objectives, freedom to try creative solutions, and an 
adaptive management mindset for participatory testing of creative management 
options, all contributed to successful management (Chapter 5, Table 26). We 
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recommended increasing the diversity of farmer and crofter representation at the 
local level, actively identifying trade-offs for acknowledgement, discussion and 
communication, and high-level commitment to fairness and transparency at the 
national level (Chapter 5). 
Heterogeneity within the ‘farmers & crofters’ stakeholder group was not adequately 
included at the local level (Chapter 3). Perceptions of farmer and crofter goals by 
other stakeholders did not accurately describe the range of views on goose 
management which the farmers and crofters expressed themselves.  Even 
individuals who stated similar goals as each other could be in different positions 
and have different barriers to cooperation. For example, an increase in crofters’ 
intention to cooperative was not predicted by the impacts they suffered themselves 
from geese. Rather, concern for other people predicted greater cooperation, 
indicating the number of individuals willing to cooperate on the management of 
geese was underestimated. Additionally, the longer an individual had been 
crofting, the less likely they were to cooperate (Chapter 4).  
Novel trade-offs were identified as impacting cooperative behaviours. In Chapter 3 
we exposed three such examples which had emerged during implementation of 
goose management actions. Firstly, shooters were attempting to navigate the 
trade-off between population reduction to benefit the community on the one 
hand, and crop protection to benefit the individual crofter on the other. Secondly, 
shooters were potentially locking-in a suboptimal set of management actions to 
avoid the risk of losing out on their hard-won shooting rights. Thirdly, an increase 
in robustness of goose counting method was traded-off with decreased good-will of 
non-scientists. In Chapter 4 we showed experimentally how crofters’ intention to 
cooperate changed under scenarios with different types of uncertainty. On average 
the presence of uncertainty decreased cooperative behaviours as measured, but 
different sources of uncertainty affected the trade-off between cooperating and 
defecting differently. Administrative uncertainty regarding the commitment of 
external funding for goose management had the greatest negative effect on 
cooperation.  
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6.3 Research approach to mapping and management of 
conservation conflict 
In a mature, well-studied conflict such as that of our goose case study, much useful 
ecological, social, economic and political knowledge is available for mapping and 
management (see Chapter 5). We used mixed-methods (qualitative and 
quantitative) to triangulate our results and gain a holistic view of the conflict 
context. We approached our conflict case study using the Institutional Analysis 
and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom 2011), to re-map from the perspective 
of cooperative behaviours and assess the management actions already taken. The 
IAD framework has the individual at the local level as its unit of analysis, which 
can then be scaled to draw system wide conclusions (Ostrom 2011; Orach & 
Schlüter 2016). This framework fit our system well, as we sought to understand 
cooperation between individuals and between individuals and organisations, and 
the IAD captured the importance of scale effects such as the value of horizontal 
and vertical interactions. Understanding heterogeneity of stakeholders at the scale 
of analysis is important for design of conflict management processes (Henmati 
2002; Reed 2008) and using the IAD framework we identified variability between 
individuals which impacted cooperation (Chapter 2 and 3). However, the extent of 
data collection and analysis required to uncover and understand the variation 
using this framework resulted in a high resource cost (Chapter 3). 
The IAD assumes actors to be boundedly rational fallible learners (Ostrom 2011). 
The framework fit our research needs allowing us to map a stakeholder’s objective 
or goal, as defined in conservation conflict (Redpath et al. 2013), to the payoff 
criterion in the IAD (Ostrom 2011). On the other hand, fallible learning assumes 
imperfect but stepwise use of knowledge, but in conservation conflict knowledge 
and learning are themselves value laden and associated with impartiality and trust 
(Redpath et al. 2015; Young, Searle, et al. 2016). This was confirmed in Chapter 4 
where information about the source of uncertainty resulted in changes in intention 
to cooperate, even though the statistical likelihood of alternative outcomes in each 
treatment was identical. Overall, the IAD framework was suitable for 
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understanding cooperation in conservation conflict, particularly at the individual 
user scale. However, researchers should be cautious about using the IAD due to 
underlying assumptions of rational learning behaviour and the limitations of the 
data collection required to gain understanding of individual behaviours at multiple 
scales and locations. 
Our assessment of goose conflict management focussed on the formal structure of 
the Local Goose Management Groups (LGMGs) in two locations in Scotland. We 
judged our sampling for social network analysis (Chapter 2) and semi-structured 
interviews (Chapter 3) to have reached saturation when at least one person from all 
organisations named more than twice was interviewed (with one exception, see 
Chapter 2; Method). Sampling of crofters to take part in the experiment in Chapter 
4, was via random selection from a registered list. Clear boundaries of social-
ecological systems are rare (Angst & Hirschi 2017; Balint et al. 2011) and this was 
evident from our findings. We focussed on the local situation of the interviewees, 
which was geographically unambiguous given the island locations of the study 
sites. Perhaps because of this focus, important external (‘off-island’) interactions 
were identified (see Structure and Process sections, this chapter), and their 
evaluation formed the basis of several of our main conclusions and 
recommendations (Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5).  
6.4 Dealing with complexity in conservation conflict 
The goose conflict in Scotland confirms the complex nature of conservation 
conflict, as we observed instances of all six types of conflict (Table 28). It would be 
expected that some of these conflict types are more important in driving the 
conflict than others at any one time, however a feature of complex systems is that 
of constant dynamic change (Liu et al. 2007). White et al. (2009), Redpath et al. 
(2013) and Young et al. (2016) all allude to this in their respective conservation 
conflict frameworks, by illustrating a cyclic flow of mapping and management 
activities suggesting that assessments should be repeated to check what has 
changed.  
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To address complexity in managing the impacts of the geese, multi-stakeholder 
LGMGs in Scotland have embraced adaptive management. Adaptive management 
is the cyclic, iterative method of testing and monitoring management options to 
guide future decision making (McCarthy & Possingham 2007). Together, the 
recommendations made in this thesis point towards a similar approach to goose 
conflict management: building the adaptive capacity of collaborating individuals 
and groups. Adaptive capacity is the ability of a system to take advantage of 
opportunities or to respond to consequences (Mcleod et al. 2016). Folke et al. 
(2003) give four dimensions of adaptive capacity; i) learning to live with change 
and uncertainty; ii) nurturing diversity for resilience; iii) combining different types 
of knowledge; and iv) maintaining opportunity for self-organisation. Our findings 
mirror these dimensions: we highlighted the importance of learning to live with 
uncertainty, due to the different effects specific sources of uncertainty had on 
intention to cooperate (Chapter 4); we found the representation of within group 
diversity was lacking at the local level, and that emerging trade-offs will cause 
changes in cooperative behaviour (Chapter 3); and we discussed horizontal 
interactions for combining and sharing knowledge and how preferential self-
organisation of interactions in networks influences the function of coordination 
and cooperation problem solving (Chapter 2).  
We found that cooperative behaviours can improve adaptive capacity via both 
problem-solving network structures and knowledge sharing; and that adaptive 
capacity can improve cooperative behaviours via embracing uncertainty and 
identifying trade-offs (Figure 15). Tuvendal & Elmberg (2015) report that a goose 
management group in Sweden maintained the adaptive capacity to deal with 
evolving goose conflict using cooperative behaviours such as seeking shared 
solutions, exploring the perspectives of one another, and sharing information. The 
goose management group in Sweden was bottom-up / self-organised and had no 
formal or legal authority, unlike our case study. Given the theoretical literature 
together with the Swedish and our own case studies, further research on the 
interplay between cooperative behaviours and the adaptive capacity is warranted. 
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Table 28 – Application of a typology of conservation conflict to the goose conflict in 
Scotland, adapted from Jones et al. (2005) and Young et al. (2010). Actors can be people, 
groups or organisations. 
Category Source of conflict Example from goose conflict in 
Scotland 
Conflict of 
interest 
Actors want different 
things from the same 
habitat or system 
 
Broadly, farmers and crofters need to 
make a living from the land, but 
conservationists prioritise the same 
land to support biodiversity (Chapter 
3).  
Beliefs & values Actors hold different 
normative perceptions 
on the value or use of 
wildlife 
 
Some stakeholders perceived that 
conservationists and government 
valued wildlife more than the people 
working in agriculture. In reverse, 
some stakeholders saw farmers and 
crofters as favouring habitat 
destruction for financial gain 
(Chapter 3). 
Process Actors approach a 
problem favouring 
different approaches 
 
Crofters who attended the National 
Goose Management Review Group 
chose to disengage from the process 
feeling their voices were not 
adequately heard (Chapter 3). 
Information Knowledge is missing, 
uncertain or perceived 
differently by different 
actors 
 
Source of uncertainty (e.g. scientific 
or administrative) impacted the 
intention to cooperate of crofters, 
even though the stated outcomes 
were the same (Chapter 4). 
Social structure Actors interact within 
social, legal, economic 
and political 
arrangements 
 
Local individuals and organisations, 
and their national equivalents did 
not share the same positions, goals 
and barriers, impacting cooperative 
behaviours in the system (Chapter 3). 
Interpersonal Individual actors or 
groups have personal 
differences with one 
another, such as issues 
with trust or 
communication 
A conservation organisation leaving 
the local goose management group 
was seen as positive by some other 
stakeholders, based partly on the 
perception that the conservationists 
would always block required actions 
(Chapter 2, 3). 
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Figure 15 - The reinforcing relationship between adaptive capacity and cooperative 
behaviours in conservation conflict, with examples from the goose conflict case study 
referenced by thesis chapter. Adaptive capacity dimensions from Folke et al. (2003), 
cooperative behaviours from Pound (2015) 
  
6.5 Cooperation across scales 
Aligning conservation management activities (including those for conflict 
management) with the scale as perceived by stakeholders, is more likely to be 
successful (Young, Jordan, Searle, et al. 2013). The goose conflict in Scotland 
permeates between local and national scales. Goose flyways elsewhere in the world 
introduce an international scale, for example greater snow goose Anser 
caerulescens atlanticus populations are managed between Canada and the U.S. 
(Lefebvre et al. 2017) and pink-footed goose Anser brachyrhynchus populations 
across Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium (Madsen, et al. 2017).  
Conflict in environmental management and conservation scaled to the global level 
are increasingly prominent and important as the world wakes up to the global 
environmental challenges we face in the 21st century. The crossing of planetary 
boundaries including biodiversity loss, land conversion, and climate change, will 
cause a shift from the hospitable conditions of the Holocene into a new regime 
with disastrous consequences for people (Scheffer et al. 2001; Rockström et al. 
2009). Planetary boundaries are tightly coupled to one another so efforts to tackle 
one without considering the trade-offs will result in failure (Rockström et al. 2009). 
To add further complexity, whilst staying within these limits it is both ethically 
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correct and politically necessary to simultaneously build and maintain the 
foundations of life quality such as social equality, clean water and food security 
(Raworth 2017). It is increasingly likely that critical planetary thresholds will be 
crossed faster than previously predicted (Xu et al. 2018), with climate change 
triggering a series of regime shifts such as dieback of the Amazon rainforest and 
permafrost thawing, which will accelerate warming through additional carbon 
release (Steffen et al. 2018). The size of the collective action problem requires 
global collaborative action involving deep transformations in how we live (Steffen 
et al. 2018). Cooperation of governments to design and enact policy instruments is 
required to meet the problem, although actions which conflict with the 
requirements of power and privilege are rarely successful (Chomsky 1992). 
However, global policy instruments are not the only mechanisms for achieving big 
goals. Ostrom (2010) champions the capacity of bottom-up, self-organising 
polycentric systems for achieving direct benefits (e.g. lower greenhouse gas 
emissions) whilst facilitating learning and experimentation across diverse policies. 
Our suggestions for learning and experimentation for goose conflict management 
by, for example, sharing knowledge gained from learning and experimentation for 
goose management is the application of Ostrom’s nested polycentric solutions. 
Conservation researchers have taken Ostrom as an inspiration for capturing the 
advantages of both bottom-up and top-down conflict management (Redpath et al. 
2017). In this thesis we have recommended actions specific to the context of the 
goose conflict in Scotland and added to the burgeoning theory regarding the role 
of social interactions in conservation conflict management for use at any scale. 
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